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Executive summary 
The significant role played by small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) for growth and employ-
ment is undisputed in industrialized and develo-
ping countries alike and has been documented by 
numerous studies. If the development potential of  
this business segment is to be harnessed, it is es-
sential that SMEs have access to adequate finan-
cing. In capital markets SMEs are faced with a 
number of company-sized related features of fi-
nancing, e.g. serious information deficits. This 
situation entails a number of financing-related 
disadvantages that may mean higher costs for 
capital, or indeed wholly exclude SMEs from 
access to investment capital. 
In developing countries provision of long-term 
financial resources is a source of major problems. 
While access to the short-term capital needed to 
finance current assets has been improved decisive-
ly by the development of specialized finance insti-
tutions in recent years, SMEs continue to be ham-
pered by a chronic lack of financial resources 
tailored to their specific investment needs. This 
often means that potentially profitable projects are 
not realized, the consequence being stagnation of 
company development. 
The use of alternative financing instruments with 
quasi-equity or equity-substituting features has 
proven helpful in situations where access to bank 
loans is problematic. Positive experiences made in 
industrialized countries indicate that venture capi-
tal and leasing are instruments that hold conside-
rable promise for overcoming the bottleneck in 
access to long-term capital, and this approach is 
being actively promoted by bi- and multilateral 
development institutions. 
Based on the example of Peru, the present study 
looks into the questions a) whether the above-
named instruments are suited to financing the 
investments of SMEs in developing countries and 
b) what conditions have to be met to ensure that 
venture capital and leasing are used in a manner 
suited to the specific needs of the target group. 
Between February and April 2002 the authors of 
the present study conducted a comprehensive 
survey aimed at answering these questions. The 
interview partners included potential investors of 
venture capital active in the Peruvian investment 
market and leasing operators that offer services to 
larger companies. Furthermore, 38 SMEs from 
two industries were interviewed with a view to 
assessing the financing constraints faced by Peru-
vian companies and to determining their views on 
possible alternative means of financing. The sur-
vey also included complementary interviews with 
private-sector experts and representatives of pub-
lic-sector institutions. 
Key features and advantages of venture 
capital and leasing as alternative means of 
financing 
Financing papers with different term structures 
and according different legal rights to investors 
offer some differentiated possibilities of risk-
sharing and incentive design. In typical credit-
based financing, collateral securities are deman-
ded as a means of effectively protecting the lender 
against default. The reasons for this security re-
quirement must be sought in the information a-
symmetry between borrower and lender. The mo-
re weighty the information asymmetry and/or the 
larger the security gap involved, the more risky a 
project will appear to the lender. 
Long-term investments involve more pronounced 
objective planning and earnings risks, and they are 
also more susceptible to the consequences of une-
venly distributed information than short-term in-
vestments. And if such investments are highly 
company-specific or investments in human capital 
or intangible assets made by young and innovative 
firms, these risks and problems tend to be more 
frequent and pronounced. Acquisition of informa-
tion aimed at eliminating existing information 
deficits becomes increasingly costly; and this in 
turn makes it more difficult and expensive to work 
out the contractual arrangements or securities 
required for credit-based financing. 
Against this background, venture capital repre-
sents an interesting alternative means of financ-
ing. By making his capital available, the investor 
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bears a share of the investment risk, though he is 
at the same time entitled to a share of any possible 
increases in profits. The investor's rights of 
control and codetermination serve to compensate 
him for the lack of collateral provided for his in-
vestment. For the company involved, the equity 
character of this means of financing implies en-
larged liquidity margins, since it involves no re-
demption payments and profit-related investor 
returns accrue only in the case that the company 
operates successfully. Furthermore, young com-
panies in particular can benefit from the manage-
ment support often provided for in connection 
with a venture-capital investment. Another key 
feature of venture capital is its limited investment 
horizon of five to ten years. Since the mid-1980s 
venture-capital funds have been launched in de-
veloping countries with the support of the IFC and 
other institutions engaged in financial coopera-
tion, the main objective being to overcome some 
of the financing constraints faced by SMEs. 
With leasing contracts , the fact that the leased 
asset remains the property of the lessor minimizes 
risk and facilitates financing efforts. The leased 
asset is an investment good and may at the same 
time constitute collateral for the provider. What 
this means is that when a company lacks the ne-
cessary collateral, leasing may be the only viable 
financing instrument available to it. The fact that 
in most cases no asset-unrelated security is requi-
red for leasing enhances the financing options 
open to a company. And in this case whatever 
collateral may exist is available for use in other 
transactions. Two further advantages of leasing 
are the lower immediate liquidity drain and the 
normally flexible and expeditious contract proce-
dures which the instrument involves. One factor 
of particular interest for development policy is 
that leasing ensures that financial resources provi-
ded are in fact used for investment purposes. At 
present the IFC is the leading actor involved in 
promoting leasing for SMEs in developing coun-
tries. 
The financing framework in Peru 
Three factors that play a crucial role for the finan-
cing situation of SMEs are monetary policy, the 
institutional structure of the financial sector, and 
the volume and efficiency of the national financial 
system. Since the early 1990s the paramount goal 
of Peruvian monetary policy has been monetary 
stability, and this has led to continuously decli-
ning inflation rates, which reached a low of 2 % in 
2001. However, the high minimum reserve requi-
rements set for deposits in nuevo sol and USD 
entail, not least, a tangible strain for commercial 
banks, limiting the credit supply and hampering 
the mobilization of saving. Furthermore, high 
interest rates constitute an obstacle to outside fi-
nancing of companies. An additional monetary 
factor relevant to the financing situation of com-
panies is the progressive dollarization of the Peru-
vian financial sector. At the end of 2001 no less 
than 71.5 % of all deposits and 80.1 % of all cre-
dits were denominated in USD, a fact that mirrors 
insufficient confidence of economic agents in the 
domestic currency. In other words, a deterioration 
of the nuevo sol's external value entails risks for 
the stability of the banking sector as well as for 
companies indebted in foreign currency. 
In Latin America financial intermediation is gene-
rally dominated by banks, an observation which 
applies for the overall structure of Peru's financial 
system as well. In 2001 Peruvian commercial 
banks handled some 90 % of all national lending 
operations and administered 85 % of all financial 
assets. And yet the volume of the banking sector, 
i.e. its size and activity measured as the ratio of 
M3 to GDP, is relatively small, the current ratio 
being 31 %. High relative operating costs also 
indicate a low level of efficiency on the part of 
Peru's commercial banks. Peru's financial markets 
are likewise marked by low volume and low le-
vels of efficiency. 
All told, Peru's financial sector cannot be said to 
fully fulfill its intermediary function, and this lack 
of financing capacity has highly adverse impacts 
on SMEs, a fact reflected in the findings of the 
present company survey. 
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Peruvian SMEs in the textile and agricul-
tural industries: investment activity and 
financing behavior 
Aside from a large number of formal and informal 
small-scale and microenterprises (SSMEs) active 
in Peru, one feature typical of the Peruvian bus i-
ness structure is its low proportion of dynamic, 
competitive SMEs. According to estimates, only 
some 2 % of the enterprises registered in Peru are 
SMEs. Our empirical study looked into the in-
vestment and financing behavior of companies in 
the textile and clothing industry and the agricultu-
ral industry. Both industries generally are seen as 
having great potential for development and 
growth. In particular, the present study inter-
viewed a number of relatively successful and 
comparatively dynamic companies from these two 
industries, though without aiming to come up with 
any representative statements on the overall indus-
tries. 
The survey confirmed that the SMEs in the sam-
ple are flexible and have growth potential. Howe-
ver, they see themselves faced with a number of 
problems that prevent them from exploiting their 
specific competitive advantages and developing 
into a central pillar of the Peruvian economy. Our 
companies see the lack of (long-term) financing as 
the most serious obstacle to their development. 
On the one hand, the dynamics and productivity 
of the SMEs interviewed is reflected especially in 
their high level of expansion-oriented investment 
activity. Over the past three years these companies 
have invested an average of USD 457.000 p.a., 
with only 11 % not reporting any investment acti-
vity at all during this period. On the other hand, 
their remarkable level of innovativeness is an 
indicator of the creativity of these companies. The 
companies in our sample also indicated their in-
tention to continue to invest and expand in the 
future. However, for a number of different reasons 
these companies are faced with difficulties in fi-
nancing their investments: 
The companies interviewed lack sufficient access 
to bank credits. The demand for medium- to 
long-term credit is often not met for lack of col-
lateral security, and this means that important 
investments are often simply not made. The ma-
jority of our companies indicated that they have 
lost customers or good market chances for lack of 
credits or sufficient credit lines. Their restricted 
access to outside sources of financing and the 
need this implies to fall back on company profits 
as their main source of financing is reflected in 
their high equity ratios, which range between 
43 % and 60 %. 
The fact that small companies are required to pay 
an interest rate of 15.6 % for loans denominated 
in USD constitutes an additional obstacle to the 
realization of investment projects and places ex-
port-oriented companies at a disadvantage in 
competition with foreign competitors. Nor are 
current loan repayment periods in line with 
company needs. In most cases, the credit agree-
ments concluded by companies interviewed have 
a repayment period of under one year (65 %). This 
short term nature of credit has influenced our 
companies in two ways: on the one hand, compa-
nies are unable to make certain investments. On 
the other hand, to be able to realize investments 
despite this situation, our companies have fallen 
back on financing mechanisms such as short-term 
working capital loans, which in turn can seriously 
jeopardize a company's liquidity. 
On the whole, the findings of our survey reflect 
the inadequate supply of financing instruments 
available in the Peruvian banking system, above 
all as far as long-term financing is concerned. In 
view of the fact that most of the companies in our 
sample anticipate future growth, a better supply of 
SMEs with financial resources tailored to their 
needs would contribute to a more efficient alloca-
tion of capital and encourage economic growth in 
the long term. Against this background it appears 
reasonable to promote alternative financing 
mechanisms and the markets bound up with them, 
in particular since this could be expected to in-
crease competition and efficiency in the national 
financial system. 
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Venture capital as an alternative source of 
financing in Peru: chances and constraints 
In view of the advantages of venture capital outli-
ned above, and against the background of the ina-
dequate availability of long-term financing re-
sources for Peruvian companies, both public and 
private actors in Peru are engaged in efforts aimed 
at launching venture capital as a an alternative 
means of company financing. The Peruvian ven-
ture-capital market is still in its infancy. Whether 
or not this instrument of financing will prove suc-
cessful, depends, first and foremost, on external 
conditions. While the existing economic and legal 
conditions do not constitute an impediment to a 
dynamic development of the market, institutional 
factors such as an underdeveloped capital market, 
a low number of potential investors, a lack of 
experienced fund managers, and a lack of exit 
options constitute serious obstacles. 
The supply of venture capital tends to grow most 
rapidly in a prospering economy. Experiences 
made in other countries have shown that the 
prospects of a venture-capital investment are par-
ticularly positive when the investment is made in 
a phase of recession or stagnation and can then 
profit from ga ins made during a period of econo-
mic upturn. Following a phase of economic reces-
sion, positive economic growth is anticipated for 
Peru in 2002, and this could mean prospects of 
good returns for potential venture-capital funds. 
The legal framework in Peru is also seen as ade-
quate by market actors. Compared with other 
countries in the region, protection of minority 
shareholders and company buybacks of shares are 
seen as unproblematic in Peru. But one obstacle 
must be sought in the country's current tax legis-
lation. Under it investment funds are defined as 
natural persons and are subject to income tax, a 
situation which leads to double taxation in that 
investors are also required to tax their earnings 
from funds as income. 
A smoothly functioning and active capital mar-
ket provides a transparent view of the investment 
behavior of institutional and private investors and 
plays an important role in the successful termina-
tion of investments. In Peru, however, a weak 
primary market and the low level of liquidity in 
the secondary market indicate that the capital 
market is still underdeveloped. This means highly 
restricted options when it comes to terminating an 
investment made in a venture-capital fund. 
In Peru the potential investors for venture capital 
include the private pension funds (Administrado-
ras de Fondos de Pensiones/ AFPs), insurance 
companies, public institutions, commercial banks, 
and national and international development coo-
peration organizations. While all of the actors 
interviewed complained especially about the lack 
of long-term investment opportunities in the Peru-
vian capital market, only about half of our poten-
tial investors, including in particular the AFPs, 
would be prepared to invest in a venture-capital 
fund. This reticence to invest, due mainly to risk 
aversion, further restricts the number of potential 
investors in the Peruvian market, which is low in 
any case. 
As far as fund management is concerned, we can 
identify some bottlenecks in Peru, most of which 
are bound up mainly with lack of experience in 
the market. Specifically, the number of instituti-
ons interested in launching a fund is not only low, 
these potential investors are also criticized for 
their lack of both a track record and institutional 
backing. 
Peruvian SMEs, mostly family-run, are noted for 
their lack of openness and their low level of 
transparency. Yet the only way to heighten in-
vestor confidence would be for companies to ac-
cept control mechanisms put in place by fund 
managers. Coming up with a critical mass of 
companies offering good investment opportuni-
ties is not seen as a major obstacle in Peru, since 
there are enough companies with interesting po-
tentials in the country. 
A further impediment to the development of the 
venture-capital market is the lack of sufficient 
exit options in Peru. At present the only exit opti-
ons available are trade sales – i.e. sales of shares 
to other companies – and, most important, com-
pany buybacks. But it is currently practically im-
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possible to terminate an investment by means of a 
secondary purchase, i.e. sale of the shares to a-
nother financial investor, or via an initial public 
offering. 
Venture capital as a financing instrument 
for SMEs? 
Apart from the general conditions required to 
establish a venture-capital market, introduction of 
the instrument as an alternative means of finan-
cing SMEs hinges on its acceptance in the rele-
vant business segment as well as on the wil-
lingness of investors to invest in funds geared 
specifically to SMEs. In Peru both small and me-
dium-sized companies have a positive attitude 
toward accepting an investment partner, but the 
risk-averse stance of potential investors appears to 
indicate that Peru's first venture-capital funds will 
tend to look more to medium-sized companies 
than to small firms. 
Most Peruvian SMEs are relatively unfamiliar 
with the concept of venture capital. Only 23 % of 
the companies interviewed indicated that they 
were familiar with the instrument. The companies 
unfamiliar with venture capital were given a brief 
rundown on the way the instrument works and 
then presented with some of the key features of 
this alternative means of financing. As the study's 
findings indicate, these companies would welco-
me management support and consultations on the 
conduct of business, be it in the areas of accoun-
ting, marketing, or the establishment of new bus i-
ness contacts. They even see this as the most im-
portant feature of venture capital. Most of the 
entrepreneurs interviewed regard the equity func-
tion of such investments as beneficial, noting that 
an equity base strengthened by a venture-capital 
investment would not only make their companies 
"more sound" but would also imply an active in-
vestor interest in their companies. An additional 
point of interest for our companies was the impro-
ved access to credit and longer terms of credit 
associated with a venture-capital investment. Even 
though both the investor's right to information 
and, in particular, his right of codetermination in 
company management were seen in a somewhat 
critical light, the companies interviewed were still 
more open to the idea of accepting a new partner 
than we had anticipated. The annual returns of 20-
30 % expected by investors were regarded by 
most of our companies as too high. Still, some 
companies, especially small firms, would be pre-
pared to accept a participating interest as an alter-
native means of financing. 
However, potential investors are somewhat reluc-
tant to invest in small companies and regard such 
investments as highly risky, especially in view of 
these companies' lack of transparency and their 
informal character. Only four potential investors, 
including DC institutions, signaled their wil-
lingness to invest in a fund tailored to this bus i-
ness segment. But nearly all of the potential inves-
tors interviewed stated their willingness in prin-
ciple to invest in a fund for medium-sized compa-
nies. 
Leasing as an alternative means of financ-
ing in Peru 
Unlike venture capital, leasing is widespread in 
Peru. This can be demonstrated, first, with refe-
rence to the volume of leasing-financed invest-
ments, second, in rela tion to other financing in-
struments, and, third, by comparison to the use of 
leasing in other Latin American countries. This 
instrument also shows a high degree of maturity 
as regards the goods and sectors financed in Peru 
with the aid of leasing. Leasing has, however, 
been slow to catch on as a financing instrument 
for SMEs. Whether leasing will develop dynami-
cally for this segment as well, depends on the 
external framework conditions, the attitudes of 
leasing companies, and the flexibility and concre-
te terms of leasing agreements. 
Framework conditions for the Peruvian 
leasing market 
Apart from the weakness of the Peruvian econo-
my in recent years, which has contributed to a 
decline in leasing investment, the institutional 
framework has an important role to play in the 
development of leasing in Peru. For instance, in-
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dependent leasing operators, which cannot fall 
back on the resources of a parent bank, have seen 
themselves faced with refinancing problems. And 
it is precisely this group of leasing operators that 
have proven to be SME-friendly, serving this 
customer segment more actively than bank-
affiliated leasing operators. On the other hand, the 
widespread dollarization of the Peruvian leasing 
market inhibits the demand for leasing of compa-
nies that do not earn foreign exchange. A further 
institutional factor inhibiting an SME orientation 
on the part of Peruvian leasing operators is the 
underdeveloped state of the used-goods markets in 
Peru. In cases of customer insolvency, leasing 
operators are faced with the risk of being unable 
to recover the market value of certain leased as-
sets. This lack of sufficient avenues of compensa-
tion for possible losses gives rise to a more cauti-
ous risk assessment on the part of leasing opera-
tors, a factor that has negative impacts on SMEs, 
which are perceived as risk-intensive. 
As far as the legal framework is concerned, lea-
sing operators have no problems in asserting their 
property rights to leased assets. However, the tax 
implications of a recent amendment to Peru's lea-
sing law (December 2000) has clear-cut negative 
impacts on leasing investments. 
Leasing: customer structure and outreach 
Despite the obstacles outlined above, leasing is a 
profitable business field in Peru. Thanks to the 
high profits margins it offers, leasing bus iness 
with the SME segment is generally regarded as 
lucrative. Due to a lack of statistical data on 
customer structures broken down for company 
size, however, it is as good as impossible to make 
any exact statements on the percentage share of 
SME contracts in the portfolios of leasing opera-
tors. Looking at the information provided by the 
leasing operators interviewed, we find that leasing 
business with medium-sized companies is already 
relatively well established in Peru, while the in-
strument reaches far fewer small companies. 
Despite the often-announced intention of leasing 
companies to gear their business more to the SME 
segment, there is still a lack of both concrete plans 
to develop this customer potential and efforts gea-
red to lowering administrative costs as a means of 
offering leasing contracts that are at the same time 
small in volume and profitable. The reasons cited 
by leasing operators for this more or less cautious 
attitude include the often informal nature of 
SMEs, their weak financial management, and the 
high default risk implied by this situation. 
Our company sample shows that medium-sized 
companies are served by all leasing operators, 
while small companies have access only to inde-
pendent operators and a few bank-affiliated provi-
ders. Accordingly, thus far hardly any of the very 
small companies in our sample have made use of 
leasing. Moreover, there are marked disparities 
between company locations. While the large ma-
jority of companies in Lima have already gained 
experience with leasing, only a small minority of 
companies in Arequipa and Cusco had made use 
of the instrument. 
The advantages of leasing in theory and in 
Peruvian reality 
As far as concrete leasing arrangements are con-
cerned, the present study shows that the leasing 
contracts offered in Peru either wholly lack cer-
tain elements often attributed to leasing or contain 
these elements only in a restricted form. This can 
be illustrated on the basis of an examination of 
five central advantages of leasing and their consti-
tutive features: 
On the whole, we find that SMEs in Peru have far 
better access to leasing than to long-term credit. 
The main factor involved here is the guarantee 
provided by the leased asset, which continues to 
be the property of the lessor – although, for rea-
sons bound up with risk assessment, leasing ope-
rators often also demand additional securities. 
Another positive aspect here is the short periods 
of time that nonbanks usually need to process 
leasing contracts. Banks, on the other hand, are 
often hampered in coming up with a prompt deci-
sion by their need to present applications to their 
central risk-assessment departments for approval. 
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This in principle more unproblematic access to 
leasing is furthermore bound up with the type of 
risk analysis on which the transaction is based: in 
theory, anticipated cash flows are more important 
to decisions on leasing contracts than a company's 
past credit ratings and equity base. However, only 
in rare cases is cash flow a relevant decision crite-
rion in Peru, and to customers the process of risk 
analysis often seem highly intransparent. As re-
gards the minimum sums for which contracts are 
signed, leasing operators are not always able to 
satisfy low-volume financing needs. The min i-
mum sums demanded vary between USD 10.000 
and 50.000, which appears very high, particularly 
for used machinery. 
Leasing constitutes less of a strain on a company's 
financial margins  than bank credit, a fact due 
above all to the lower immediate outflows of li-
quidity involved in leasing. In practice, however, 
Peruvian companies are often required to provide 
a deposit which may depend on a customer's cre-
ditworthiness and the marketability of the asset in 
question – although we did find some measure of 
willingness to adjust leasing rates for seasonal or 
volume-related factors. 
The write-off modalities currently in effect in 
Peru provide SMEs a cost advantage in leasing 
compared with bank loans. The study thus con-
firmed the assumption current in theory that lea-
sing is a lower-cost form of financing than bank 
credit. But leasing rates are high, especially for 
small companies. Moreover, more favorable terms 
for the purchase, insurance, and maintenance of a 
leased asset, factors assumed to make leasing 
more attractive, are as a rule not available in Peru. 
In Peru leasing in fact offers SMEs a viable in-
strument for their medium- and long-term 
financing needs. The statutory minimum terms 
for leasing contracts vary between two years (mo-
vable goods) and five years (immovable goods). 
The actual terms offered are in fact longer, and the 
majority of companies perceive them as adequate. 
In industrialized countries additional advisory 
services and close contact with customers are 
often integral components of leasing agreements. 
Advisory services on management, accounting, or 
marketing are intended to boost customer market 
capabilities. However, these possible features of 
leasing are seldom to be observed in Peru. 
Conclusions and recommendations  
Peruvian SMEs are marked by strong dynamics 
and high levels of innovativeness, features that 
enable them to exploit competitive chances. In 
achieving sustainable growth, however, they are 
hampered by limited access to needs-oriented 
means of financing for their investment projects. 
Venture capital and leasing can provide a major 
contribution to eliminating this constraining factor 
in company financing. 
In the view of the companies interviewed, ven-
ture capital is an adequate alternative means of 
financing for investments in capital goods. Peru-
vian SMEs express a high level of willingness to 
accept external investment partners, and this indi-
cates that the establishment and consolidation of a 
venture-capital market in Peru can set important 
incentives for growth in the SME segment. Ho-
wever, the development of this instrument in Peru 
is faced with four important obstacles – tax regu-
lations, a low number of institutional investors 
and experienced fund managers, and a lack of 
sufficient exit options. To promote the venture-
capital market in Peru, both the Peruvian govern-
ment and bi- and multilateral DC should focus on 
the following fields of action: 
— To provide for an adequate tax framework 
in line with international standards, venture-
capital funds should not be subject to income 
tax and should instead have a neutral status in 
tax terms. A bill currently under discussion in 
Peru would require investors to tax their in-
vestment earnings as income. Funds would be 
exempt from taxation and have only a chan-
neling function. This arrangement would 
contribute to creating a clear and stable tax 
regime by ruling out the possibility of any 
double taxation (of investor and fund). 
— To enlarge and diversify the group of insti-
tutional investors , it would be possible, first, 
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to diversify the national pension system, 
which is at present limited four the four Peru-
vian AFPs. In order to do so a necessary step 
would be to create viable mechanisms geared 
to allowing a more flexible and less concen-
trated investment of pension funds as well as 
to stimulating private saving. One conceiv-
able approach would be to introduce a sec-
ond, voluntary pillar of the pension system 
whose funds would be administered by spe-
cialized financial institutions, possibly mod-
eled on the US 401(k) Plan. Second, govern-
ment should assume a more active role in the 
venture-capital market, for instance by stimu-
lating development of the market with the aid 
of special investment vehicles. A helpful 
approach here would be to establish a fund 
that invests solely in private venture-capital 
funds active in Peru (fund-to-fund financing). 
Third, the investment regulations on public 
institutions should be amended to allow these 
institutions to invest in venture-capital funds. 
— To alleviate the lack of experienced fund 
managers in Peru, it would be possible to ar-
range for conferences and seminars, grants 
for advanced training, and further instruments 
geared to the exchange of information – e.g. 
an Internet platform to facilitate contacts 
between investors and companies seeking ca-
pital. DC activities of bi- and multilateral or-
ganizations in the framework of "financial 
system development" should focus on provi-
ding such services and make the necessary 
resources available. 
— To improve exit options , it would be essen-
tial to reduce the transaction costs bound up 
with initial public offerings (IPOs). To 
strengthen the company buyback exit option, 
it would be necessary to enlarge the critical 
mass of SMEs with growth prospects as well 
as to improve their administrative capacities. 
This is a task for both government actors and 
development cooperation. Measures should 
be focused, first, on enhancing the survival 
and growth capacities of young and innovati-
ve companies; these might include develop-
ment of incubator facilities (like technology 
and startup centers), which could provide a 
crucial contribution. Second, it would be im-
portant to offer bus iness development servi-
ces (BDS) aimed at enabling SMEs to present 
themselves as serious partners prior to see-
king investments and to lay the groundwork 
needed to buy back company shares. One step 
essential in this context would be improved 
information based on reliable company ac-
counting. Third, conferences and seminars 
could be held to raise the awareness of the 
concept of venture capital and promote the 
exchange of information between investors 
and companies seeking investment. 
As far as leasing is concerned, the findings of the 
present study indicate that this means of financing 
constitutes an important alternative for SMEs in 
Peru, though at present its outreach extends more 
to medium-sized companies than to small firms. 
Furthermore, certain individual features of leasing 
have not met the expectations placed in the in-
strument. This would be an important field of 
action for the Peruvian government and DC as 
well as for market actors themselves. 
To extend the outreach of leasing both for small 
firms and in regional terms, the following approa-
ches would be appropriate: 
— For lack of a unified definition of SMEs and 
in view of the deficient state of the data avai-
lable on them, both of which factors obstruct 
the development of a promotion and/or mar-
keting strategy keyed to this customer seg-
ment, relevant government actors like the na-
tional banking oversight agency should step 
up their efforts aimed at collecting and sta-
tistically processing SME-specific data. 
— At present the problem of refinancing for 
independent leasing operators constitutes a 
serious constraining factor limiting the ex-
pansion of leasing activities to include new 
customer segments as well as a high barrier to 
the entry of new companies to the market. 
Here financial cooperation could, among o-
ther things, focus more on providing refinan-
cing credits. Bi- and multilateral financial 
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cooperation institutions should offer ap-
propriate services, focusing chiefly on medi-
um-sized, independent leasing operators, sin-
ce the latter are more oriented to SMEs. 
— Furthermore, the risks associated with SMEs 
constitute an obstacle to an expansion of lea-
sing activities to include small companies in 
particular. On the supply side this impression 
is substantiated by deficits in risk analysis as 
well as by decision-making procedures not 
adapted to the needs of SMEs. Measures 
bound up with the institutional advisory ser-
vices provided in connection with technical 
cooperation and conducted in cooperation 
with private-sector actors like the Peruvian 
banking association could be used to foster 
the development of a more sustainable pro-
duct technology and promote the willingness 
of leasing companies to reach out to new 
customer groups. On the demand side it 
would be necessary to focus at the same time 
on increasing company transparency and en-
couraging company formalization, tasks 
which could best be addressed by developing 
business development services. 
Qualitative weaknesses in the supply of leasing 
services that are detrimental to an orientation of 
leasing business to SMEs include the usual de-
mands for asset-unrelated collateral, decision-
making procedures not adjusted to company cash 
flows, and relatively inflexible contract-
processing procedures, especially outside Lima. 
Here the following approaches would be ap-
propriate: 
— The need to demand additional collateral 
security is closely bound up with the under-
developed state of Peru's markets for used 
goods. A new Internet platform could be used 
to bring supply and demand more into line 
and increase market transparency. Furthermo-
re, experiences from other countries indicate 
that creation of a fair for used machinery can 
provide a crucial contribution to increasing 
the levels of activity in the used-goods mar-
ket. 
— Problems in contract-processing procedures 
can be alleviated by reorienting risk analysis; 
this should be an integral component of the 
DC field of "financial system development." 
It appears that contract-processing procedures 
could be accelerated especially by shifting 
risk analysis from a bank's central risk-
assessment department to its leasing depart-
ment as well as by introducing standardized 
leasing contracts. Furthermore, a risk analysis 
geared to company cash flows can provide 
more reliable data than a risk assessment ba-
sed solely on past credit ratings, and this can 
help reduce possible losses. If, moreover, a 
leasing operator is interested in actively in-
fluencing customer risk, he also has the opti-
on of using more intensive contacts to his 
customers and more transparent, cooperation-
oriented risk analysis to help improve com-
pany financial management. 
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1 Introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are 
seen as having great significance for the develop-
ment process. To cite an example, the strong eco-
nomic upswing experienced in the US in the 
1990s was closely linked to a favorable growth 
climate for service-related SMEs and high-tech 
startups.1 If they are to fully utilize their man-
power resources and innovative capacities, SMEs 
need to be sure that capital is either available or 
can be readily obtained. Financing bottlenecks do, 
however, constitute a crucial obstacle to invest-
ments in SMEs, a factor which sometimes means 
that potentially profitable projects fail to material-
ize. 
In developing countries the long-term provision of 
financial resources is a source of major problems. 
It is true that liberalization of national financial 
markets and development of target-group-oriented 
financial institutions have contributed crucially to 
improving the supply of SMEs with financial ser-
vices. But while the short-term capital needed to 
finance current assets is now largely available in 
urban regions, SMEs continue to be hampered by 
a chronic lack of financial resources tailored to 
their specific investment needs. And it is precisely 
these investments that play a central role for self-
sustaining economic growth. 
1.1 The Present Study's Background, 
Subject Matter, and Structure 
The financing of investments as a rule means 
long-term financing. Long-term investments not 
only involve greater objective planning and earn-
ings risks, they are also particularly susceptible to 
the consequences of unevenly distributed informa-
tion. This constitutes an obstacle to financing. 
When, in addition, such investments are highly 
company-specific, e.g. investments in human 
capital or nonphysical assets envisaged by young 
and innovative firms, these risks/problems tend to 
be more pronounced and frequent. And this in 
                                                     
1 Cf. Gerstenberger / Vögtle (2000), p. 23. 
turn makes it more difficult and costly for such 
firms to enter into the contractual arrangements 
typical of conventional credit-based financing, the 
final outcome being that sound and potentially 
profitable investments may simply not be made. 
In the industrialized countries an alternative ap-
proach to financing projects that commercial 
banks regard as too risky for lack of sufficient 
security or adequate information is the use of qua-
si-equity or equity-substituting finance papers that 
enlarge the financial scopes open to business 
enterprises. Under this approach the lender shares 
the investment risk while at the same time acquir-
ing a claim of possible higher profits. As far as the 
long-term financing of SMEs is concerned, ven-
ture capital and leasing are often seen as promis-
ing instruments for overcoming financing bottle-
necks, though here, too, potential borrowers still 
have to solve information problems and find suit-
able lenders. Against this background the present 
study is intended to provide a contribution to ad-
dressing the following higher-level problem: 
Do venture capital and leasing rep-
resent suitable alternative modes of 
financing for investments of SMEs in 
developing countries, and what con-
ditions must be given to ensure that 
the use of these instruments is fo-
cused on specific target groups? 
The problem outline above is looked into with 
reference to the case of Peru. Unlike microenter-
prises, Peruvian SMEs mainly operate in the for-
mal sector; they employ regular workers, are 
growth-oriented, and are thus in need of financing 
for their long-term investments. Realization of 
investment projects is often impeded by the short-
age of long-term capital to be observed in Peru as 
well as in other developing countries. This short-
age becomes manifest, first, in a lack of invest-
ment loans with appropriate credit periods. Sec-
ond, looking beyond its banking system, Peru 
presently lacks sufficient alternative financing 
instruments. Positive experiences made in other 
countries have induced both international and 
Peruvian finance institutions to encourage the 
promotion of new approaches to financing. 
2 Petra Schmidt et al. 
The study's objective is thus to look into the use of 
the alternative approaches offered by venture 
capital and leasing in the Peruvian context, exam-
ining the conditions under which leasing and ven-
ture capital may prove to be effective means of 
financing for the target group, SMEs. The study 
furthermore analyzes the crucial external condi-
tions for the use of these new financing instru-
ments, discussing their advantages and drawbacks 
and scrutinizing the interest shown by business 
enterprises and financial intermediaries in the use 
of these instruments. Finally, the study attempts to 
work out the policies and strategies needed to 
establish alternative means of financing, the aim 
being to provide recommendations for the relevant 
actors in the government sector, the donor com-
munity, and the business sector. 
The study breaks down into seven chapters. Fol-
lowing the Introduction, Chapter 2 provides an 
overview of the financing problems faced by 
SMEs in general and investment financing in par-
ticular. Chapter 3 discusses leasing and venture 
capital as alternative means of financing for SMEs 
in developing countries and explains some of their 
most important features and advantages. Chapter 
4 is concerned with the SME business segment in 
Peru. The chapter starts out by briefly outlining 
the present situation of Peruvian SMEs, then, ba-
sed on the study's company sample, going on to 
look into the dynamics of SMEs as well as exist-
ing financing bottlenecks. Chapter 5, based on 
interviews, analyzes the Peruvian venture-capital 
market, presenting the most important actors and 
discussing, against the background given in Peru, 
the extent to which venture capital may represent 
a viable financing alternative for SMEs. Chapter 6 
discusses leasing as a possible financing alterna-
tive for SMEs in Peru, examining the current 
situation of the Peruvian leasing market as well as 
the framework conditions given there. This is 
followed by a discussion of the prevalence of 
leasing among Peruvian SMEs and the possible 
advantages that leasing may or may not offer in 
this connection. Chapter 7 sums up the study's 
results and provides recommendations for public-
sector institutions, bi- and multilateral develop-
ment cooperation (DC), and market participants. 
1.2 Methodological Approach 
The study's results are based, first, on the authors' 
evaluation of the relevant literature on investment 
financing and on experiences made by German 
and international DC organizations with venture 
capital and leasing as financing instruments, and, 
second, on an empirical study conducted by the 
authors in the framework of an 11-week working 
visit to Peru from February to April 2002, with 
the latter constituting the core element of the 
analysis. The study is qualitative in nature. Its aim 
was not to come up with representative proposi-
tions for the SME sector, i.e. the demand side. 
The study's main aim was to look into a large 
share of the actors involved on the supply side 
with an eye to coming up with quantitative results 
for a number of cases. The overall project was 
conducted in close cooperation with the counter-
part institution, the Peruvian national develop-
ment bank, COFIDE (Corporación Financiera de 
Desarrollo). 
The Supply Side 
To look into the issue of venture capital, the 
study used semi-standardized questionnaire for 
interviews with 15 potential investors; these in-
cluded four private pension funds (so-called 
AFPs), three private insurance companies, three 
public-sector institutions, two banks, and three 
institutions engaged in development cooperation.2 
In addition, open-design questionnaires were used 
to interview three institutions set to launch a fund 
in Peru as well as a number of experts in the field 
of venture capital. One aim of the survey was to 
come up with an overview of possible obstacles to 
and chances for the development of a venture-
capital market in Peru. A further aim was to de-
termine whether SMEs are given adequate con-
sideration as a potential customer group for ven-
ture capital. As far as leasing is concerned, the 
authors interviewed 11 financial intermediaries, 
                                                     
2 The actors were selected with the aid of the national 
counterpart, COFIDE, as well as through interviews with 
experts, the aim being to cover the entire spectrum of 
potential investors for a Peruvian venture-capital fund. 
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three of them independent leasing companies and 
eight of them banks. The survey's aim was to ob-
tain information on the products available and on 
supplier-customer structures as well as to identify 
possible obstacles to and chances for an expansion 
of leasing business to include SMEs. 
The Demand Side 
On the demand side, the authors used semi-
standardized questionnaires to interview a total of 
48 SMEs with an eye to examining their financing 
practices and any possible experiences they may 
have made with venture capital and leasing as 
well as to determining their assessment of the use 
of these instruments. With the aid of relevant in-
stitutions and business experts, the authors se-
lected companies from two industries that ap-
peared especially suitable for the purposes of the 
study, the textile industry and the agroindustry.3 
Branches of industry were defined on the basis of 
the assumption that SMEs4 in these key sectors of 
Peru's economy, which are in the process of 
growth and modernization, are typified by a cer-
tain level of management dynamics, are innova-
tive, and gear their operations to export markets or 
to national market niches. It was further assumed 
that companies displaying one or more of these 
characteristics will be faced with growing needs 
for long-term financing. 
                                                     
3 The criterion used for a rough selection of sectors was 
their relevance for the Peruvian economy, measured in 
terms of a given sector's share in GDP. This meant initi-
ally that the study had to choose between the following 
sectors: mining, manufacturing (including textiles and 
clothing), agriculture, fisheries, construction, transporta-
tion, and communications. Cf. COFIDE (2001), p. 12. 
Four further criteria were used for the final, fine selecti-
on: industry growth potential, relevance for the export 
sector, innovativeness, and SME-typical business struc-
ture. 
4 In accordance with a definition commonly used in Peru, 
SMEs were classified in terms of their annual sales vo-
lume. Cf. Chapter 4.1 for more detailed information. 
1.3 The Study's Relevance for Develop-
ment Policy 
The present study's relevance for development 
policy is bound up with the need, first, to foster 
SMEs as vehicles of a dynamic economic devel-
opment and, second, to support Peru's financial 
system. 
Experience in recent years has shown that devel-
oping countries too have no viable alternatives to 
integration in increasingly globalized markets. 
Development of a competitive private sector is a 
sine qua non for coming to terms with the condi-
tions posed by an open, globalized world econ-
omy. Small and medium-sized companies boost a 
country's competitiveness and are at the same time 
vehicles of growth and employment. This is why 
development cooperation should accord particular 
attention to the group of SMEs. 
The study focuses on SMEs active in the formal 
sector. Although independent small-scale and 
microenterprises (SSMEs) in the informal sector 
make up the majority of all companies active in 
most developing countries, they are for the most 
part characterized by weak productivity and low 
levels of worker qualification and offer very little 
social security. To the extent that SSMEs ensure 
the survival of their owners, these companies 
must be seen as having an important social func-
tion. But they for the most part lack the where-
withal to develop into competitive firms in mod-
ern, productive, and legally formalized business 
sectors. 
Unlike SSMEs, SMEs are an integral component 
of any functionally specialized and competition-
oriented business structure. Their high level of 
flexibility and adaptability enables SMEs to re-
spond swiftly to changing economic and political 
framework conditions. SMEs contribute in this 
way to adapting an economy to the ongoing proc-
ess of technoeconomic change. SMEs can service 
market niches that are uninteresting for larger 
companies, or they can position themselves as 
suppliers in value chains. A further chance open 
to SMEs lies in complementary specialization and 
cooperation among SMEs. For example, devel-
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opment of industrial clusters entailing intensive 
functional intercompany specialization and coop-
eration can serve to enhance the competitiveness 
of dynamic groups of SMEs.5 They can in this 
way harness synergy effects to compensate for the 
handicaps involved in small-scale production. As 
suppliers or members of a cluster SMEs further-
more have better chances to overcome market-
entry barriers such as minimum manufacturing 
quantities, in this way gaining access to export 
markets. 
Integration in modern, functionally specialized 
organizational structures presupposes a willing-
ness to accept and follow up on important techni-
cal innovations. This encourages companies to 
gear their activities to general innovativeness, 
development of entrepreneurial innovations, and 
international competitiveness and entails positive 
external effects for the overall economy: interna-
tional competitiveness is a sine qua non for solid 
economic growth. While in many cases large 
companies reduced their workforces in the 1990s, 
SMEs are marked by highly positive employment 
effects.6 SMEs not only create new jobs, they also 
create an above-average number of jobs per unit 
of capital and thus contribute in the longer-term to 
an improved employment picture in the formal 
sector. Creation of new jobs leads to higher in-
crements in real wages and are thus a crucial fac-
tor in reducing poverty.7 
But the development of private entrepreneurial 
activity depends crucially on provision of needs-
oriented financial resources by an efficient finan-
cial system. The question of an optimal financing 
of investments and innovations – and not only for 
technology-oriented firms in forward-looking high-
tech industries but also and above all for dynamic 
companies in the so-called old economy – is a 
core problem involved in coming successfully to 
grips with structural change and achieving long-
term growth. Private-sector projects are as a rule 
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6 Cf. Gerstenberger / Vögtle (2000), p. 23; Qualmann 
(2001), p. 328. 
7 Cf. Altenburg (2001), p. 325. 
financed via financial intermediaries, i.e. through 
the banking sector as well as through money and 
capital markets. Smoothly functioning financial 
systems have a salutary influence on the devel-
opment process in that they boost saving rates and 
ensure that resources are deployed efficiently.8 
The use of financial intermediaries, who mediate 
between suppliers of capital (savers) and deman-
ders of capital (investors), can serve to reduce the 
transaction costs involved in borrowing and lend-
ing.9 Ensuring that scare savings are directed into 
the most productive investment projects has posi-
tive impacts on an economy's growth process. 
And identifying and financing promising pioneer-
ing firms constitutes a crucial contribution to mas-
tering the process of technological change.10 
One feature of many developing countries is their 
underdeveloped financial systems, i.e. their bank-
ing sectors and their financial markets in particu-
lar tend to be marked by inefficiency and low 
volumes. Peru's financial system, dominated by 
the banking sector, does not adequately fulfill its 
intermediary function. First, the size and activity 
of the banking system, seen in terms of the share 
of economic transactions handled by banks, are 
relatively underdeveloped.11 One exacerbating 
factor here is that restructuring processes in Peru's 
banking sector that followed on the heels of the 
1997 international financial crisis has led to a 
reticence on the part of banks to provide credit. 
Second, the share of operating costs in overall 
lending is higher than average, a fact that indi-
                                                     
8 Gurley and Shaw see a financial system's contribution to 
improving capital efficiency as its most important task. 
Cf. Gurley / Shaw (1955), pp. 115f.; World Bank 
(1989), p. 32. 
9 This reduction of costs is due to the many-faceted trans-
formation services provided by financial intermediaries, 
which include transformation of terms, scales, and risks. 
Cf. Lachmann (1997), p. 120. 
10 Cf. World Bank (2002), p. 75. 
11 The indicator used here is what is known as financial 
deepening, i.e. the ratio of M3 to GDP. Cf. Demirguç-
Kunt / Levine (1999), p. 6. In Peru this ratio was 31 % in 
1999. By way of comparison, the figure for Chile was 
51 % in the same year. Cf. IMF (2000). 
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cates low levels of efficiency.12 Weak competition 
due to a lack of alternative financing options has 
contributed to a situation in which banks and fi-
nance institutions have little incentive to lower 
their intermediation costs and profit margins with 
an eye to offering lower fees (interests charges).13 
Against this background it is essential to promote 
alternative financing instruments beyond the clas-
sic bank loan, and this would encourage the emer-
gence of a more diversified financial system and 
improve financial intermediation. 
2 Problems Associated with a long-term 
Financing of SME Investments 
Financing business projects inevitably entails 
fundamental risks, be the borrower a large estab-
lished corporation or an SME. Unlike the model 
world of the perfect capital market,14 which is 
marked, among other things, by perfect competi-
tion and in which every market participant is in 
possession of all relevant information and there 
are no transaction costs,15 exchange relations in 
real markets are not free of costs. Information 
asymmetries force partners to contracts to make 
provisions for risks, and in the case of finance 
contracts this leads to credit rationing and may, in 
extreme cases, even mean in effect exclusion of 
certain groups of businesses from the capital mar-
ket. 
In capital markets SMEs are faced with a number 
of company-size-related limitations that are espe-
cially acute in the field of investment financing 
and often impede the access of SMEs to capital. 
Companies are in need of both short-term and 
                                                     
12  While in the period between 1992 and 1999 the average 
operating costs of banks in 63 countries were 4 %, the 
figure for Peru was 10 % for the same period, Cf. De-
mirguç-Kunt / Levine (1999), appendix, Table 1. 
13 Cf. Hallberg (2001), p. 11; MEF (2001b), pp. 14f. 
14 On the theory of the perfect capital market, see e.g. 
Fama (1970), Mossin (1973), Rudolph (1979). 
15 Cf. e.g. Nicholson (1998), pp. 401f. 
long-term capital.16 In the short term, companies 
need capital to run their current operations as well 
as to finance the assets they need to produce. The-
se current assets include all items that are not 
devoted to long-term business activities. Current 
assets include material goods and supplies (or the 
production resources needed to produce a com-
pany's products) as well as nonphysical goods like 
accounts receivable, checks, and cash balances. 
Assuming that a company's aim is not only to 
survive but also to boost its productivity and ex-
pand, it will need long-term capital to invest in 
fixed assets. It will furthermore have to continu-
ously reinvest in existing fixed assets to compen-
sate for wear and tear and maintain its integrity. 
This would include fixed assets like real estate, 
machinery, and business equipment, but also non-
physical assets like licenses and concessions and 
deposits or payments on account. 
The following section, which starts out with a 
general discussion of information-related prob-
lems involved in financing, looks into some of the 
special features of SME financing. This is fol-
lowed by a look at some of the special characteris-
tics of long-term investment projects. 
2.1 Asymmetric Information and 
General Problems involved in the 
Financing of SMEs 
Imperfect and unevenly distributed information 
and the transaction costs that result from this situ-
ation are chiefly relevant for markets in which 
goods and/or services are not exchanged at the 
same time. This is the case, for instance, with 
credit markets or labor markets. Unlike spot mar-
kets for consumer goods, the goods/services 
transacted here have the form of a right of dis-
posal to future supplies of goods or services. 
                                                     
16 Short-term capital is provided for periods of up to one 
year. Medium-term financing papers are those with 
terms between one and five years. All forms of financing 
that cover periods of five years or more are referred to as 
long-term. Cf. Thielmenn (1998), pp. 22f. 
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That´s why credit contracts entail a shift of the 
transaction into the future, and for the lender this 
means a high degree of uncertainty regarding the 
borrower's ability or willingness to perform on a 
contract. 
As far as an investment project is concerned, the 
borrower generally has an information edge over 
the lender, e.g. as regards profit margins and the 
chances a product may have in a specific market. 
And when decisions are made subsequent to the 
conclusion of a credit contract, the lender is 
unlikely to be more than approximately as well 
informed as the borrower.17 This information 
asymmetry potentially leads to two classic prob-
lems: adverse selection and moral hazard.18 
Adverse selection is a risk that occurs before a 
contract is concluded. The key variable involved 
in any economic transaction is price, e.g. the in-
terest rate agreed on in a credit contract. Whether 
or not a lender is willing to provide financial re-
sources at a given interest rate will depend in this 
case on the risk or the likelihood that the borrower 
will repay the loan. Higher risk is as a rule com-
pensated for by a higher interest rate. Under the 
condition of asymmetric information, however, it 
is either difficult or impossible to estimate risk. 
And for this reason banks gear their lending to an 
estimated average credit risk and demand a pre-
mium for the risk of default. One inevitable con-
sequence of this is that borrowers who are willing 
and able to perform on a loan are saddled with 
higher interests rates and consequently often 
forced to withdraw from the market. The outcome 
is that only the best potential borrowers are se-
lected. In other words, there is little leeway avail-
able to adjust interests rates in such a way as to 
compensate for risk. Thus, the average risk in-
creases over time, a factor which leads to higher 
risk premiums. This aggravates adverse selection 
and can, in the extreme case, lead to a complete 
collapse of the market. 
                                                     
17 Cf. Leland / Pyle (1977), p. 371. 
18 Cf. Frank (2000), pp. 197f., 214f.; Varian (1999), pp. 
645, 647. 
Once a contract has been signed, there is a further 
risk, namely moral hazard. This is a typical prin-
cipal-agent problem. Once the entrepreneur (a-
gent) has obtained the capital he needs, he is in a 
position to exploit his information edge over the 
lender (principal), e.g. by running greater risks or 
by misusing the capital he has borrowed. To cush-
ion this risk, the lender will either demand high 
interests rates or be faced with a negative utility if 
he is forced to withdraw completely from an in-
novation project. However, aside from the deci-
sions made by an entrepreneur, exogenous eco-
nomic factors also play a role here, and thus a 
project's success of failure may not be wholly and 
unambiguously due to an agent's actions.19 Verifi-
cation problems make it very difficult for a lender 
to sanction such actions. 
Both cases involve an incentive to reduce infor-
mation deficits. To this end, the lender can pro-
cure information (screening) and the borrower 
himself can provide information (signaling). 
These measures, however, entail costs and may be 
seen as reasonable only if they can at the same 
time be used to reduce borrowing costs. 
The information-related problems outlines here 
apply generally for the financing of businesses. 
With SMEs, however, this uneven distribution of 
information between lender and borrower is far 
more pronounced than it is with large corpora-
tions, and this in turn implies higher costs for 
reducing information deficits. At the same time, 
SMEs are confronted with a number of structural 
disadvantages in borrowing which exacerbate 
existing financing bottlenecks: 
— The disproportionate information asymme-
try involved in transactions with SMEs is 
due, among other factors, to often relatively 
intransparent company accounting systems. 
Balances are frequently faulty, and some-
times different balances are even kept for in-
ternal and external uses. Only in exceptional 
case are audits conducted by specialized ex-
ternal accountants. In extreme cases business 
accounting may even be seen as superfluous, 
                                                     
19 Cf. Franke / Hax (1994), p. 415. 
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with such companies perceiving absolutely no 
need to provide information. Furthermore, 
SMEs quite often have a very low public pro-
file and seldom manage to build a reputation 
that would heighten the confidence of poten-
tial lenders. It is for this reason very difficult 
(and costly) to assess their ability and will-
ingness to pay. 
— One structural problem involved in the fi-
nancing of SMEs is the high level of fixed 
costs bound up in capital transactions with 
them. The volumes of the financing required 
by SMEs are as a rule relatively low. But all 
borrowing of capital involves degressive 
fixed costs, and this means that costs accruing 
in credit transactions with SMEs tend to be 
relatively higher than they are for credit 
transactions with large corporations.20 Since 
SMEs as a rule operate with relatively low 
capital volumes, the outcome for them is dis-
proportionately high credit costs. 
— The risk situation of SMEs also poses prob-
lems. Since the product range and sales mar-
kets of companies in this business sector tend 
to be no more than weakly diversified, SMEs 
find it difficult to provide or compensate in-
ternally for risks.21 What this means is that 
SMEs are exposed to major earnings fluctua-
tions and thus have a poorer risk profile than 
large corporations. They are furthermore 
more vulnerable to the effects of business cy-
cles and less able to influence them.22 
— Finally, the relatively low volumes which 
they demand, their limited self-financing ca-
pacities, and the limited information available 
on the products on offer in the financial mar-
ket negatively affect the bargaining position 
of SMEs. The advisory services available to 
SMEs are often one-sided, and they tend to be 
more dependent on banks than larger compa-
nies. 
                                                     
20 Cf. Schröder (1992), p. 137. 
21 Cf. Gerke et al. (1993), p. 17. 
22 Cf. Kaufmann / Kokalj (1995), p. 15. 
All told, the problems outlined above mean in the 
end that SMEs are not perceived by existing fi-
nancial institutions as an attractive customer 
group. At best, SME have access to high-interest 
loans or are cut off from altogether access to cre-
dit. For SMEs, the problems outlined above tend 
to be prohibitive when it comes to realizing long-
term investment projects. This aspect will be 
addressed in the following section. 
2.2 Specific Problems involved in Finan-
cing Investments of SMEs 
Longer-term investments involve more pro-
nounced objective planning and earnings risks, 
and the consequences of asymmetric information 
distribution tend to be greater here than they are 
for short-term investment financing. In such cases 
procurement of the information needed to reduce 
information deficits is accordingly more cost-
intensive, a factor which further impedes financ-
ing. Moreover, it is important to distinguish be-
tween behavior-related information deficits that 
can be assessed and those that no amount of effort 
will suffice to predict. Precisely in countries with 
underdeveloped financial systems it is as good as 
impossible to predict fluctuations bound up with 
inflation, interest rates, or exchange rates. To 
cushion these uncertainties, lenders are forced, for 
instance, to seek relative certainty (e.g. by avoid-
ing contracts with protracted repayment terms), to 
build reserves, and to diversify their portfolios as 
a means of compensating for risk. Since SMEs are 
as a rule highly vulnerable to external shocks, 
financial intermediaries tend to be particularly 
restrictive in providing long-term investment lo-
ans to this business segment. 
The volume of a company's long-term invest-
ments in plant and equipment is furthermore 
greater than the volume of funds its needs to fi-
nance short-term working assets. In the event of 
failure this means correspondingly higher credit 
default costs for the lender. Another problem in-
volved in long-term investments is the fact that 
returns on investment take a relatively long period 
of time to materialize. And while interest and 
redemption payments are due as soon as an in-
8 Petra Schmidt et al. 
vestment is made, it often takes years for returns 
to begin to flow. This time lag between expendi-
tures and revenues aggravates a company's liquid-
ity situation and can lead to insolvency of young 
or highly indebted firms that lack adequate re-
serves. 
If lenders see problems in financing an invest-
ment, they will pass on the increased risk either in 
the form of higher interest rates or refuse to fi-
nance the investment. The risk here is that a 
higher interest burden may lead to an exacerbated 
risk situation, and potentially profitable invest-
ments may therefore either fail or not be realized 
in the first place. 
This problematic is even more complex when the 
long-term financing in question is for innovative 
investment projects. There is no doubt about the 
great significance of company innovativeness as 
far as economic goals such as growth, employ-
ment, or successful participation in the process of 
economic change at the national and international 
level is concerned. Thanks to their high levels of 
flexibility and adaptability, SMEs are an impor-
tant pillar of the innovation process. Often driven 
by dynamic management, SMEs tend to be quick 
to seize new technical opportunities and cash in 
on growth chances at an early stage of the game. 
If a company introduces a new or markedly im-
proved product or a new service to the market, 
and consumers accept this product, the company 
has good chances to realize high profits. In the 
short term product innovations mean high sales 
and turnover figures. In the medium and/or long 
term a company may use its so-called first-mover 
advantage to earn itself a name, a reputation. 
Their dynamic behavior gives such companies a 
competitive advantage that they can use to better 
position themselves in the market and to acquire 
more market power. 
Apart from their chances and their need to engage 
in innovation projects, SMEs in particular are also 
faced with serious financing problems that may 
block a project in its initial phase. Increased plan-
ning and earnings risks and severe information 
deficits leave their mark here too23 – to say noth-
ing of the so-called market-entry risk. What is 
meant by planning risk is that in looking into 
innovative projects an entrepreneur is unable to 
fall back on the experiences he has made in past 
projects. It is unclear how the project will develop 
over time, how much capital will be needed, and 
to what extent available resources can be used.24 
The entrepreneur is also faced with an earnings 
risk bound up in essence with uncertainty as to 
technical feasibility and prospects for success in 
the market.25 
Even in cases in which an entrepreneur is success-
ful in developing a new product or process and 
planning a project, he is still faced with a high 
market-entry risk. New companies in particular 
often find it difficult to position themselves in a 
market dominated by experienced and established 
firms. They lack the confidence of a solid client 
base and are often unable to make up for the com-
petitive advantages enjoyed by other companies, 
e.g. their economies of scale. 
Another barrier must be sought in the fact of an 
especially acute problem of asymmetric informa-
tion in the innovation process.26 What is meant 
here is an information paradox, i.e. a company 
must on the one hand present its investment pro-
ject in terms as simple and transparent as possible 
if it is to win over investors for a project. On the 
other hand, the investment's potential value con-
sists precisely in its novelty, which implies an 
information edge over potential competitors. As 
soon as an innovator makes his new idea known, 
others may imitate it, a factor which would dimin-
ish its value. Protective property or patent rights 
are unsatisfactory here to the extent that they are 
too difficult to implement, too costly, or not suffi-
ciently effective at the international level.27 
                                                     
23 Cf. Wittneben (1997), p. 30. 
24 Cf. Klemm (1988), p. 58. 
25 Cf. Wittneben (1997), pp. 32f. 
26 Cf. Wupperfeld (1994), p. 49. 
27 Cf. Kaufmann / Kokalj (1996), p. 6. 
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In the end, bank financing is often not a viable 
option on account of the risks and problem struc-
tures outlined above. Company-generated cash 
flows or internal resources for this reason play an 
important role in the financing of investments, 
though precisely SMEs are often hampered by a 
thin equity base. Additional equity or quasi-equity 
forms of financing can open up important new 
options here, as will be explained in the following 
section. 
3 Alternative Financing Instruments for 
SMEs 
Against the background of the above-described 
problematic involved in the (credit-based) financ-
ing of SMEs, the present chapter looks into 
proven and promising alternative financing in-
struments. It will start out by outlining some ap-
proaches pursued by multi- and bilateral devel-
opment organizations. It will then go on to discuss 
some general features and advantages of venture 
capital and leasing, the two alternative means of 
financing most frequently promoted in this con-
text. 
3.1 Approaches to Development Financing 
pursued by bi- and multilateral De-
velopment Organizations 
As used in the fields of research or practical de-
velopment work, the term "development financ-
ing" refers in the narrower sense to the provision 
of investable funds and in the broader sense to the 
development of financial systems in developing 
countries and countries in transition. The latter 
usage includes, among other aspects, efforts un-
dertaken to strengthen financial institutions which 
provide financing, investment, and payment ser-
vices for other economic entities. As far as pro-
motion of SMEs is concerned, this means reach-
ing companies indirectly via efficient financial 
intermediaries instead of, as in the past, providing 
them with direct support, e.g. in the form of inter-
est subsidies. The aim is to build financial institu-
tions that are in a position to reduce both existing 
information asymmetries and transaction costs, in 
this way providing a sustainable supply of needs-
oriented financial survives for a growing share of 
the target group.28 
The development in the 1990s of target-group-
oriented financial institutions contributed to 
achieving a decisive improvement in the number 
of small clients with access to financial services. 
Even established and financially sustainable mi-
crofinance institutions (MFIs) like the Grameen 
Bank, the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, the Banco Sol, 
and the Caja los Andes limit their loan business to 
providing short-term credits to SSMEs. Efforts 
aimed at servicing new client segments in the 
SME sector continue to be underdeveloped. One 
reason for this is that the potential in existing cus-
tomer segments has not yet been fully exhausted 
and there is therefore no need to reach out to new 
customer groups outside the SSME segment. The 
other is that MFIs operate with credit technologies 
that have been specially tailored to SSMEs and 
are not wholly adequate to the task of longer-term 
investment financing. 
As a means of overcoming the bottleneck in the 
financing of SME investments, multilateral devel-
opment organizations like the World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) have 
proposed three alternative approaches: first, the 
use of loans to stimulate local commercial banks 
to provide medium- and long-term lines of credit 
for SMEs; second, promotion of venture-capital 
funds; and, third, support for leasing companies.29 
The present study focuses on the latter two financ-
ing instruments. This would appear to make good 
sense in that SMEs in Peru are already being pro-
moted via the national banking sector, though thus 
far this approach has contributed little to 
overcoming the existing financing bottleneck.30 
One problem here is that commercial banks have 
                                                     
28 Cf. Schmidt (2000), p. 5. 
29 Cf. IFC (1996), p. 4; World Bank Group (2001), p. 26. 
30 The investment program of the Peruvian development 
bank COFIDE is made up of the PROPEM and PROBID 
credit lines, which are addressed to SMEs as their ulti-
mate borrowers. Cf. COFIDE (2001), p. 32. 
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problem here is that commercial banks have been 
reluctant to make use of these SME-oriented cre-
dit lines, which has meant that relatively few 
SMEs have been able to obtain long-term loans. 
On the other hand, the approach aimed at estab-
lishing venture capital as a means of supporting 
SMEs appears to hold considerable promise. 
Since the early 1980s, and even more since the 
1990s, international development organizations 
have been developing venture-capital funds in 
developing countries and countries in transition. 
This development goes back on the one hand to 
the positive experiences made with this form of 
financing in industrialized countries31 and is on 
the other hand due to an increased demand for 
capital in the countries in transition and the grow-
ing economic stability experienced by many Latin 
American economies once the debt crisis had been 
overcome.32 One prominent actor here is the IFC, 
which has thus far invested USD 1 billion in a 
total of 100 funds, 85 of which are venture-capital 
funds.33 The regional development banks have 
also worked out more and more approaches to 
promoting venture capital in developing countries. 
The Interamerican Development Bank (IADB), 
for instance, has created a fund (Fondo Multilat-
eral de Inversiones / FOMIN) which is already 
cofinancing some 22 venture-capital funds in Cen-
tral and South America. The anticipated earnings 
are expected to convince third-party investors of 
the attractiveness of innovative SMEs and to en-
courage them to invest in this business segment.34 
One example of a regional venture-capital fund is 
the EcoEnterprise Fund, which invests in socially 
                                                     
31 As an example: between 1991 and 1995 venture-capital-
financed firms in the US have achieved 30 % higher ra-
tes of growth and created 24.5 % more jobs than the 
most important US corporations. Cf. Nuechterlein 
(2000), p. 12. 
32 Cf. Carter (1995), p. 2. 
33 Cf. IFC [http://www.ifc.org/funds/] (accessed on 05 July 
2001). 
34 "We believe that there are many thousands of small 
businesses in the region which can offer attractive, com-
petitive rates of return to third party investors.[....]. Our 
demonstration effect is to make profitable investments 
through these funds." MIF (1999), p. 2. 
and ecologically sustainable SME investment 
projects. The Fondo Capital Activo de Bolivia 
likewise supports Bolivian SMEs active in non-
traditional sectors.35 All told, the number of ven-
ture-capital funds investing in SMEs increased 
sharply in the 1990, and has continued to grow, 
first in Asia and since 1994 in central and eastern 
Europe as well.36 In Latin America experience 
with venture capital has mainly been concentrated 
in Brazil and Argentina. 
Promotion of leasing is the third widespread ap-
proach used to strengthen investment financing in 
developing countries. Here too, the IFC has been 
by far the most important actor involved in devel-
oping this alternative form of financing. In coun-
tries without any leasing activities the IFC is pur-
suing the goal of creating successful, independent 
leasing companies with a model character with an 
eye to encouraging imitators and providing an 
impetus for the development of leasing markets. 
In existing leasing markets the IFC seeks to 
promote competitiveness by supporting 
independent leasing companies and providing 
them incentives to become active in new market 
segments.37 From 1977 to the middle of 2000 the 
IFC invested some USD 924 million in 92 
investment companies specialized in capital 
goods; 90 % of these funds consisted of loans, the 
remainder was equity capital. In 22 countries IFC 
has participated in the establishment of new 
leasing companies; these countries include 
Bangladesh, Ghana, Egypt, Pakistan, Peru, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. In other 
countries, e.g. in Brazil, it has supported leasing 
firms in positioning themselves in new market 
niches. The IFC's regional focus has been Asia, 
where it has invested USD 470 million. Its 
financial commitments in South America reached 
a level of some USD 170 million in the same 
period (Figure 1). In addition, the IFC has  
 
 
                                                     
35 Cf. MIF [www.iadb.org/mif/investment_page/public. 
html] (accessed on 28 Feb.2001). 
36 Cf. Aylward (1998), p. 2. 
37 Cf. IFC (1996), pp. 28, 30, and 34. 
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raised some USD 445 million from other 
sources.38 On the whole, the IFC's assessment of 
its commitment is positive, a fact which it docu-
ments on the basis of four factors: leasing com-
pany profitability, mobilization of private re-
sources, consolidation of SMEs, and a deepening 
of financial systems. 
Beside the IFC there are other donors actively 
engaged in promoting leasing for SMEs. The 
Deutsche Investititions- und Entwicklungsgesell-
schaft mbH (DEG), for instance, with its overall 
portfolio of over EUR 100 million, is presently 
active in the field of leasing in 17 countries, in-
cluding India, Indonesia, Thailand, Uganda, Ru-
mania, and Peru. It conducts its projects only to-
gether with Western technical partners, often co-
financing leasing companies together with the 
IFC. 
Against the background of the approaches out-
lined above, it will be necessary to look into some 
of the general features and important advantages 
of venture capital and leasing for SMEs in devel-
oping countries before moving on to the concrete 
case of Peru. 
                                                     
38 Cf. Euromoney (2000), p. 21. 
3.2 Venture Capital as an Alternative 
Mode of Financing in Developing 
Countries 
Venture capital as an alternative financing instru-
ment to classic bank loans can provide a crucial 
contribution to financing long-term investment 
projects. Its most important advantages over tradi-
tional external financing must be sought in its 
ability to strengthen the equity base of firms in 
search of capital as well as in the advisory ser-
vices and support it entails for the management of 
young companies in particular. 
Concept and Key Features of Venture 
Capital 
Both in the literature and in the discussion in the 
field of economics the terms private equity, de-
velopment capital, and venture capital are some-
times distinguished in various ways, sometimes 
used synonymously. Some of these terms accent 
the uncertainty and risk involved in an invest-
ment. They apply mainly to firms with a special 
risk-chance profile, like that typical of young 
companies and startups in the fields of communi-
cation and information technology or biotechnol-
ogy. Investments in such companies are usually 
made with the goal of gaining returns from in-
Figure 1: Regional Distribution of Leasing Commitments, 1977 – 2000 
 
Source: Authors' presentation, based on: Euromoney (2000), p. 21 
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creasing in the value of the equity investment in 
question. There are, however, also numerous ex-
amples of innovative, unlisted "old economy" 
companies that have good growth prospects and 
might thus also be interesting candidates for fi-
nancing via venture capital. Investments in such 
companies are geared to earning regular profits.39 
In order not to marginalize any companies, and 
with an eye to doing justice to the broad range of 
potential means of financing available, the present 
study has opted for a broad definition of venture 
capital. In keeping with the practice of the German 
Bundesverband deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsge-
sellschaften (BVK / German Venture Capital Asso-
ciation), the study uses the terms outside capital 
and venture or risk capital synonymously.40 
Under the terms outside capital and venture capi-
tal, the present study understands all financing 
papers that a) are primarily liable in the event of 
bankruptcy, b) entail no legal requirement for the 
borrowing company to pay back the investment, 
c) involve no right of termination on the part of 
the creditor, and d) offer a profit-related claim to 
returns on investment. Such capital investments 
are as a rule bound up with rights of control, in-
formation, and involvement in decision-making.41 
Outside or venture/risk capital is thus defined by 
the following features:42 
— A risk capital function, i.e. unlike loans, 
venture capital is risk-bearing capital which 
involves no investment security and is used to 
service the claims of third parties in the event 
of bankruptcy. 
— For the borrowing company such participa-
tion involves no obligation to repay the 
capital provided. The lender may sell his eq-
uity in the company at a point of time previ-
ously agreed upon, in this way recovering his 
                                                     
39 Cf. Geigenberger (1999), p. 2. 
40 Cf. Butzmann (1999), p. 2; BVK, [www.bvk-ev.de/ 
leitfaden/leitfaden.cfm], (accessed on: 07 Jan. 2002). 
41 Cf. Kaufmann / Kokalj (1996), p. 8; Butzmann (1999), 
p. 2. 
42 Cf. Butzmann (1999), p. 3. 
investment. His return on investment is 
conditioned on an appreciation of the com-
pany's value or a participation in its profits. 
Guaranteed payments during the term of the 
investment are not customary. 
— A fixed-term investment horizon, i.e. capi-
tal is provided to a company for a medium to 
long term (usually up to ten years), with the 
term being stipulated in advance. The inves-
tor has no option to terminate prematurely. 
— The investor's rights of control and code-
termination in the making of fundamental 
decisions are intended to compensate him for 
the lack of security involved in his invest-
ment. 
— It is customary for the investor side to pro-
vide active management support and guid-
ance for young companies or factories in fi-
nancial difficulties. 
Actors and Mode of Operation of the Ven-
ture-Capital Market 
A functioning venture-capital market is character-
ized by interplay between a number of actors. 
Apart from the supply and demand sides, capital 
investment companies (CICs) play an essential 
role here as intermediaries.43 Investors of venture 
capital range from commercially oriented inves-
tors like banks to private individuals or the state 
sector, all of whom are interested in making in-
vestments in innovative companies with growth 
potential. As a rule they invest not directly in eq-
uity-seeking companies but in funds set up and 
administered by capital investment companies. 
Due to their orientation toward companies with 
potential or innovative projects, venture-capital 
investments involve a higher-than-average risk. 
CICs, with their specific knowledge of the market, 
allocate the resources made available to them to 
various investment projects and are responsible 
for an optimal portfolio mix geared to minimizing 
 
                                                     
43 The present study uses the terms capital investment 
company and fund administrator synonymously. 
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investment risks (Figure 2). In the ideal case there 
will be a network consisting of CICs that are spe-
cialized in different kinds of investment and in-
tended to facilitate the termination of an invest-
ment or the sale of shares held.44 While the use of 
an intermediary initially means additional transac-
tion costs, the latter can be wholly compensated 
for by the fact that CICs have specific market 
information that enables them to reduce the risk of 
investment loss, e.g. by means of active control of 
and support for the management of young innova-
tive companies.45 
A company may need additional equity during 
various phases of its lifecycle, and the reasons for 
this demand may vary in nature. It is customary to 
distinguish between early-phase financing (seed 
                                                     
44 Cf. Wittneben (1997), p. 7; Geigenberger (1999), pp. 20 - 22. 
45 Cf. Kaufmann / Kokalj (1996), p. 11. 
and startup financing) and growth-phase financing 
for companies that are planning to expand or ai-
med to assist firms that have run into a liquidity 
crisis to return to a growth path. The investment is 
concluded with the disinvestment phase, in which 
an investor withdraws from a company, selling 
the company shares which he holds in the fund.46 
Important Advantages of Venture Capital 
for SMEs and the Conditions required for 
Success 
The use of venture capital offers advantages that 
make this form of financing particularly attractive 
for companies with good growth prospects. The 
main aspects involved here are the low strain on 
                                                     
46 For phases of financing, see Butzmann (1999), pp. 4f.; 
Geigenberger (1999), pp 48 - 54; Wittneben (1997), pp. 5f. 
Figure 2: Mode of Operation of a Capital Investment Involving a Capital Investment Company 
 
Source: Authors’ presentation, after Geigenberger (1999), p. 21; Baier / Pleschak (1996), p. 118 
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liquidity implied by venture-capital financing, 
access to long-term resources, and the support 
provided to company management: 
— As its level of outside financing increases, a 
company is faced with growing costs for in-
terest and redemption. This makes it more 
and more difficult for an investment project 
to earn the surpluses needed for this pur-
pose.47 In the initial phase of an investment a 
company normally is not expected to earn re-
turns from its business activity. But financing 
via venture capital involves a liquidity ad-
vantage, since this form of investment entails 
no redemption payments and profit-related 
payments are due only when business suc-
cesses begin to materialize.48 
— Companies unable to provide sufficient secu-
rity for bank loans can gain access to capital 
in this way. Because they are unable to pro-
vide adequate security, precisely young firms 
and small, underdiversified companies are of-
ten affected by credit rationing and thus 
forced to rely on financing papers that reduce 
investor risk without regard to collateral secu-
rity.49 
— An equity base bolstered by venture capital 
increases a company's financial leeway: this 
makes it easier for a firm to acquire addi-
tional financial resources from banks or gov-
ernment support programs, the leverage ratio 
of venture capital being roughly 1:2.50 Par-
ticipation of a CIC can thus also be seen as a 
mark of quality for the company involved. A 
CIC's commitment is regarded as a positive 
signal for investors, banks, or government in-
vestment-promotion agencies less familiar 
with the industry in question.51 
                                                     
47 Cf. Bisa (2001), pp. 52f. 
48 Cf. Kaufmann / Kokalj (1996), p. 9; Butzmann (1999), 
p. 14; Schertler (2001), p. 99. 
49 Cf. Christians / Schröder (2001), p. 103. 
50 Cf. Butzmann (1999), p. 13. 
51 Cf. Geigenberger (1999), p. 10. 
— Such companies can profit from the support 
provided by the investor. Depending on the 
intensity of the support agreed on, the role as-
sumed by the investor may range from that of 
the observer and controller to that of the 
business consultant or indeed temporary 
manager.52 Most investors of venture capital 
have a store of experience in the industry 
concerned and/or specialized knowledge in 
the fields of financing, accounting, control-
ling, and tax law. They furthermore often 
have important contacts to key persons active 
in various areas such as banking and govern-
ment agencies as well as to suppliers.53 
Aside from the benefits for capital-seeking firms 
outlined above, investments in venture-capital 
funds also offer advantages for investors: as a new 
form of long-term investment with potential for 
high returns, venture-capital funds enlarge the 
supply spectrum in local capital markets. Since in 
this case returns are contingent on success, such 
investments tend to seek companies with growth 
potential and good prospects of earnings. It is, 
however, difficult to predict how such firms will 
develop, and this means that investment risks are 
relatively high. Against this background, invest-
ments in a fund run by a professional management 
are geared to reducing investment risk by means 
of diversification and advantages based on spe-
cialization and information. At the same time, this 
type of investment lowers the fixed costs borne by 
the individual investor.54 
However, the prospective success of venture capi-
tal is bound up with certain framework conditions 
of an economic, legal, and institutional nature. 
Emerging venture-capital markets are often ham-
pered by an inadequate number of investors, capi-
tal investment companies, and the lack of a criti-
cal mass of companies with growth potential. 
Moreover, existing legal frameworks are often not 
                                                     
52 Cf. Butzmann (1999), pp. 24f. 
53 Cf. Geigenberger (1999), p. 9. 
54 Cf. Carter (1995), p. 13. 
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conducive to the smooth operation of venture-
capital funds, and exit options are often limited. 
3.3 Leasing as an Alternative Form of 
Financing in Developing Countries 
Experiences from a number of developing coun-
tries indicate that leasing can constitute an appro-
priate means of financing the investments of a 
good number of SMEs. Viewed against the back-
ground of an insufficient credit supply, leasing 
can be an effective approach mainly because the 
"rental character" of the transactions involved 
lessens the risk faced by investor and capital-
seeker alike. The present chapter will start out by 
clarifying the terminology involved and then go 
on to look into the advantages of leasing from the 
viewpoint of the investor and the seeker of capital 
and outline the conditions that must be met if leas-
ing is to become an established practice. 
Concept and Main Forms of Leasing 
One feature common to all leasing contracts is a 
separation of the legal ownership of an economic 
good from its economic utilization. The so-called 
lessee can, accordingly, make use of an economic 
good temporarily provided to him by a lessor55 in 
exchange for a regular payment (the leasing rate). 
In essence, leasing thus bears a certain resem-
blance to a normal housing lease. But leasing 
transactions in the present sense contain elements 
that are atypical for housing leases, e.g. additional 
services provided by the lessor, or a lessee option 
to buy at the end of the term of a lease.56 The lit-
                                                     
55 Leasing operators may include banks and manufacturers, 
but also independent leasing companies. 
56 Cf. Bitz (2000), p. 109. If the good in question is automa-
tically transferred to the lessee when the last leasing pay-
ment has been made, this is referred to as "sale on hire" 
and, at least in Germany, treated as a leasing contract for 
tax and balance purposes. Cf. Tacke (1999), pp. 5f. Under 
the International Accounting Standards (IAS), however, 
the term is more broadly defined and refers to any tempo-
rary form of surrender of the use and benefit of movable 
and immovable property. Cf. Weinstock (2000), pp. 91f. 
erature distinguishes between different types of 
leasing: 
Finance leasing, on which the present study fo-
cuses, is an alternative to credit-based financing 
of investment goods. During the term of a lease, 
which usually covers the better part of a good's 
service life, leasing contracts can as a rule not be 
terminated. One important difference to conven-
tional leases is that in the present case the lessee 
bears the investment risk57 and is responsible for 
all costs bound up with repairs, maintenance, and 
insurance. But a leasing contract may also provide 
for some additional services.58 Leasing rates gen-
erally cover procurement or production costs, 
financing and administrative costs, and the lessor's 
profit margin (full amortization). At the end of the 
lease the lessee may have an option to buy or to 
renew.59 
Operate leasing, on the other hand, is not an in-
strument used to finance medium- to long-term 
investments, since here the term of the lease is far 
shorter than the good's normal service life and the 
lessee has no interest in a long-term use of the 
good.60 
With sale-and-leaseback a leasing company or a 
bank purchases investment goods, for the most 
part durable, and then leases the good back to the 
seller. This unlocks fixed capital, making it possi-
ble for the seller to realize a clear-cut financing 
                                                     
57 The investment risk is the risk that the good in question 
may be vulnerable to inadvertent destruction as well as to 
theft, obsolescence, or technical defects. Cf. Bitz (2000), 
p. 109. 
58 Cf. Coyle (2000), pp. 35f.; World Bank Group (1997), p. 
6; Wöhe (1998), p. 188. 
59 Cf. Bitz (2000), p. 111; Wöhe (1998), p. 189. 
60 As with conventional leases, the lessor bears the invest-
ment risk. The lessor benefits from this mode only when 
the good is repeatedly leased and finally sold. The lessor 
is therefore reliant on the good's condition and the  
existence of a functioning market for used goods. He of-
ten is responsible for repair, maintenance, and insurance 
costs. Cf. Coyle (2000), pp. 31 f.; World Bank Group 
(1997), p. 6; Wöhe (1998), p. 187. 
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effect while continuing to use the investment good 
involved.61 
Notable Advantages of Leasing and Condi-
tions required for Success 
Leasing offers a number of benefits to the lessor 
and the lessee alike: 
— For SMEs and farms in many developing 
countries leasing is the only source of fi-
nancing available to realize long-term private 
investments. In view of underdeveloped capi-
tal markets and restrictive bank lending poli-
cies, the central strength of leasing is its reach 
and flexibility.62 
— The fact that leasing is relatively accessible is 
closely bound up with the risk assessment of 
the financial transaction on which it is based: 
unlike a lender, a lessor has, in the leased 
good, a form of solid security and is thus fa-
ced with a low risk, even without additional 
guarantees. This of course presupposes that 
he is able to assert his ownership rights and 
that as yet unredeemed procurement costs can 
be recovered by selling the leased good in the 
market or by returning it to the producer.63 
Looking at the lessee side, the fact that out-
side collateral security or deposits are re-
quired only in exceptional cases goes some 
way toward widening the financing options 
open to a company. And in this case securi-
ties that are available can be used for other 
transactions.64 
— Furthermore, the fact that a good is leased 
ensures that the resources involved are 
                                                     
61 Cf. Bitz (2000), p. 112. 
62 Cf. World Bank Group (1997), p. 7. While there are no 
consistent figures available on the share of leasing 
agreements concluded with SMEs, the relatively low 
leasing costs of most of the leasing companies financed 
by the IFC and a large number of customers in some 
markets suggest that SMEs account for a significant per-
centage of their customers. Cf. IFC (1996), pp. 37f. 
63 Cf. Kroll (1997), pp. 166f. 
64 Cf. Bitz (2000), p. 124. 
clearly allocated, and this implies a moral 
risk lower than that involved in borrowing. 
These risk-minimizing features of leasing 
also make it possible for banks engaged in 
leasing to develop untapped customer poten-
tials as well as new markets.65 
— For a company that, for lack of credit, has 
until now been compelled to use funds of its 
own to finance its investments, leasing offers 
the advantage of a lower immediate liquid-
ity drain. And this makes it possible to re-
duce the high risk of insolvency implied by 
new investment projects, especially in their 
initial phase.66 
— In addition, leasing agreements are often mo-
re flexible than credit agreements and can be 
adapted to individual lessee needs, e.g. by 
adjusting leasing rates for seasonal factors.67 
Beyond thee advantages, a functioning leasing 
market may have positive impacts on a country's 
economic development: in this case leasing may 
boost private investment, and technical innova-
tions can be used to build competitiveness. Taken 
together, these aspects can lead to sustainable 
economic growth and rises in the demand for la-
bor.68 The emergence of new actors, new prod-
ucts, and new investment potentials in a capital 
market may be expected to deepen a financial 
system and impart greater dynamics to it. This can 
mean further steps on the road to economic effi-
ciency in the sense of adequate margins and fi-
nancing options. 
Yet it should be noted that the success of leasing 
is bound up with certain framework conditions 
that must be given at the macroeconomic, institu-
tional, and legal levels. Internally, a leasing com-
pany's activities must be marked by cautious port-
folio management, high cash-flow and risk-
analysis standards, and a sound capital base. 
                                                     
65 Cf. IFC (1996), p. 11; World Bank Group (1997), p. 10. 
66 Cf. Kroll (1997), p. 155. 
67 Cf. Kroll (1997), pp. 128f. 
68 Cf. FTAA Consulting (1999), p. 10; IFC (1996), p. 12. 
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These conditions imply great challenges for leas-
ing company management, and for this reason 
participation of a competent and committed (for-
eign) partner may be necessary, at least in the 
initial phase.69 Developing countries often lack 
adequate refinancing capacities and the function-
ing second-hand markets needed to realize resid-
ual values. The tax legislation of developing coun-
tries, often marked by deficits in this respect, must 
be internally consistent and at least accord leasing 
the role of a promotion-worthy instrument on an 
equal footing with other modes of financing.70 
The following chapter will look into the extent to 
which the advantages of leasing and venture capi-
tal are a promising option for Peruvian SMEs and 
whether the conditions required for a dynamic 
development of these instruments are given in 
Peru. With this in mind, the following section will 
analyze some characteristics and financing needs 
of SMEs in Peru. 
4 SMEs in Peru and the Role of 
Financing 
The following chapter first provides a brief out-
line of the makeup and the present situation of 
Peru's SMEs and then goes on to look into the 
structure and dynamics of the SMEs interviewed. 
The chapter then takes a look at the financing 
framework there, using the study's data to illus-
trate the financing situation of the companies in-
cluded in the sample. 
4.1 Peruvian SMEs: their Makeup and 
Present Situation 
The Peruvian business sector is marked by a dual 
structure. There are on the one side a small num-
ber of modern firms that work with state-of-the-
                                                     
69 Cf. GTZ (1999), pp. 15f.; Havers (1999), pp. 48f.; IFC 
(1996), pp. 33f. and pp. 23f. 
70 Cf. IFC (1996), p. 29; GTZ (1999), p. 9. 
art technologies and are internationally competi-
tive. On the other side we find a large number of 
formal and informal SSMEs that mainly secure 
the economic and social survival of their owners, 
but without generating enough income to accumu-
late capital, use modern technologies, or open up 
to new markets. Compared with its microenter-
prises, Peru's relative share of dynamic, competi-
tive firms continues to be relatively small. 
There is no unified, internationally accepted defi-
nition of the term SME, though the three most 
frequently used parameters are: number of per-
sons employed (including the owner and the fam-
ily members he employs), fixed assets (the value 
of machinery and equipment), and annual sales. 
In addition to these quantitative factors, qualita-
tive criteria are also cited as defining features. 
With SMEs, for instance, there is generally a 
close link between ownership and liability for the 
outcomes of business activity, and the organiza-
tional structures of SMEs are often highly person-
alized.71 Table 1 provides an outline for a tentative 
classification of Peruvian SMEs: 
It is impossible to determine the exact number of 
SMEs in Peru, particularly in view of the fact that 
there are no exact, up-to-date figures available 
that accurately reflect Peru's business structure. 
An industry ministry (MITINCI) study analyzing 
business statistics for the period between 1990 
and 1996 concludes that 98 % of a total of some 
500.000 businesses are microenterprises, the re-
maining 10.000 firms being mainly SMEs.72 
The small group of SMEs sees itself confronted 
with a number of problems that prevent these 
companies from utilizing their specific competi-
tive advantages and developing into a one of the 
main pillars of the Peruvian economy. For in-
stance, their generally low productivity is due, 
among other things, to insufficient and/or obsolete 
technical equipment. Low worker qualification 
levels, and inadequate know-how.73 Peruvian  
                                                     
71 Cf. Wittneben (1997), p. 22. 
72 Cf. Gallástequi / Villaran (1999), p. 134. 
73 Cf. Documento Foro Nacional (2001), p. 8. 
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SMEs are mainly concentrated in traditional in-
dustries with lower market-entry barriers and tend 
to produce simple consumer goods for the local 
market, which is characterized by permanent  
oversupply, low prices, and low quality. 
If they are to remain competitive against foreign 
suppliers and large companies, Peru's SMEs must 
be enabled to play their own part in a business 
framework defined by functional specialization. 
This requires investments for modernization or 
expansion, and in most cases there are no funds 
available for the purpose.74 Since in their invest-
ment-financing activities banks mainly focus on 
large companies, and SMEs have access, at best, 
to short-term, high-interest loans, these firms are 
unable to make necessary investments. This im-
pairs their competitiveness, leads to declining 
wage levels, and in the end means insecure jobs 
and/or frequent layoffs.75 To promote the growth 
potentials of Peruvian SMEs, it is therefore neces-
sary to improve the access of this group of busi-
nesses to adequate financial services. 
                                                     
74 Cf. Barbachán (1999), p. 2. 
75 Cf. Kuczynski / Zevallos (2001), p. 144; Barbachán 
(1999), p. 40. 
4.2 Peruvian SMEs in the Textile and 
Agricultural Industries: Structure 
and Dynamics 
The intention of present study was to select the 
dynamic, growth-oriented SMEs from the pool of 
the roughly 10.000 firms named above. Based on 
the assumption that such companies are most 
likely to be found in what is known as potential 
industries, two sectors were chosen for the sam-
ple, the textile and clothing industry and the agro-
industry, which may be assumed to have a high 
potential for development and growth and a busi-
ness structure typical for SMEs. 
The Sectors 
Peru's textile and clothing industry76 accounts 
for a large percentage of the country's manufactur-
ing industry77 and is at the same time closely in-
tertwined with some other sectors of the economy, 
e.g. agriculture. The sector is marked by a high 
degree of capacity utilization and average growth 
                                                     
76 The textile and clothing industry embraces the whole of 
the multi-stage manufacturing and distribution process 
for textile goods, from the fiber to the sale of finished ar-
ticles of clothing. 
77 The manufacturing industry accounts for an 8.6 % share 
of Peru's GDP. Cf. COFIDE (2001), p. 12. 
Table 1: Classification of SMEs 
Business type Number of persons 
employed 
Annual sales in USD Fixed assets in USD 
Microenterprises Up to 10 Up to 125.000 Up to 25.000 
Small enterprises 11 – 50 125.000 – 1.5 mio. 25.000 – 300.000 
Medium-sized enter-
prises 
51 – 200 1.5 – 20 mio. 300.000 – 4 mio. 
Large enterprises Over 200 Over 20 mio. Over 4 mio. 
Sources: García Dìaz (1998), p. 153; INEI (undated), p. 229 
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rates of 10 %.78 Furthermore, the textile and cloth-
ing industry is enormously important for employ-
ment, providing jobs for some 32 % of all persons 
employed in the manufacturing sector.79 As far as 
exports are concerned, Peru's textile and clothing 
industry has notable comparative advantages, a 
fact due to the high quality of the primary goods it 
uses (e.g. alpaca wool and cotton), the sector's 
high level of integration in the vertical production 
process, a good supply of qualified workers, and 
the sector's relative proximity to its major sales 
market, the US.80 And even though large compa-
nies continue to account for a major percentage of 
exports, the export share of SMEs is on the rise.81 
Since the early 1990s major investments have 
been made in the textile and clothing industry, a 
development that has been accompanied by tech-
nological innovation, the aim being to maintain 
and improve productivity and product quality. 
However, in this sector SMEs are increasingly 
hampered by their limited access to adequate fi-
nancing, and the outcome is that they are unable 
to invest, or invest adequately, in technological 
innovations, a factor which has negative impacts 
on the productivity and competitiveness of the 
SMEs active in the industry.82 
Peru's agroindustry, which accounts for 8.2 % of 
GDP, is an important and highly employment-
intensive sector of the economy.83 The country's 
comparative advantages in agriculture lie in its 
climatic and biological diversity and its real wage 
                                                     
78 Cf. Banco Wiese Sudameris (2001), p. 2. 
79 Estimates of exact employment figures range between 
150.000 (cf. Banco Wiese Sudameris (2001), p. 3) and 
180.000 (cf. Barbachán (1999), p. 13). Some 15 % of 
these workers are employed in the textile industry and 
75 % in the clothing industry. Cf. Barbachán (1999), p. 
21. 
80 Cf. Barbachán (1999), p. 78. 
81 Between 1993 and 1997 SMEs accounted for 6 % of 
exports in the textile industry and 18 % of exports in the 
clothing industry, and – at least in the clothing industry – 
these percentage shares continue to rise. Cf. Barbachán 
(1999), pp. 30 und 32. 
82 Cf. Banco Wiese Sudameris (2001), p. 11; Barbachán 
(1999), pp. 40 and 43. 
83 Cf. COFIDE (2001), p. 12. 
levels, which are relatively low in comparison to 
those of the industrialized countries.84 In 2001, for 
instance, agricultural products accounted for an 
important share of 9 % of Peru's overall export 
earnings.85 Although the growth rates for some 
traditional agricultural products like coffee have 
been declining for several years, a number of non-
traditional products have recorded high rates of 
growth. The country already has developed proc-
essing chains and markets, e.g. for asparagus, 
mangos, marigold, grapes, and peppers.86 Some of 
these products are exported mainly as fresh pro-
duce (e.g. marigold and grapes) while some others 
are in part processed in the country, e.g. canned 
asparagus and tomato paste or marigold meal.87 
The companies active in these areas are faced with 
high national and international competitive pres-
sure, and the use of innovative processes is there-
fore essential here. If they are to effectively ex-
ploit their competitive advantages, SMEs active in 
the agroindustry are reliant on adequate financing 
for their long-term investments. 
Company Structure 
Due to the country's centralization, with its focus 
on the capital, it was necessary to conduct most of 
the study's interviews (32) in Lima. But to come 
up with a picture of the financing situation of 
SMEs in the provinces, interviews were con-
ducted with an additional 10 companies in Are-
quipa and six companies in Cusco. 
A total of 31 interviews were conducted in the 
textile and clothing sector, 15 of them with small 
companies and 16 with medium-sized firms. Of 
the 17 companies interviewed in the agricultural 
sector, eight were small and nine medium-sized. 
In keeping with the definitions used by many Pe-
ruvian financial institutions, the small and me-
                                                     
84 Cf. Apoyo Consultoría (2001), p. 7. 
85 Cf. Prompex, [www.prompex.gob.pe/prompex/Inf_ Sec-
torial /Agro/Noviembre/Pag6.htm], (accessed on 17 Jan. 
2002). 
86 Cf. Apoyo Consultoría (2001), pp. 8f. 
87 Cf. Apoyo Consultoría (2001), pp. 10 - 56. 
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dium-sized companies selected were classified 
solely on the basis of their annual sales figures 
(Table 2).88 
In evaluating the data, we found no noteworthy 
differences in the financing situation of companies 
in the two sectors, and for this reason the analysis 
of our interview data was, with a few exceptions, 
conducted on a cross-sectoral basis. Furthermore, 
we distinguished between companies in Lima and 
in the provinces only in cases where the factor of 
company location was found to play a particular 
role. 
Looking at the employment intensity of the com-
panies interviewed, we find that the agricultural 
sector creates fewer regular jobs than the textile 
and clothing industry, a factor bound up in par-
ticular with seasonal fluctuations in employment 
in the former sector. In addition to their regular 
workers, eight of the 17 companies interviewed 
employ seasonal workers, numbering, in some 
cases, more than 2000 persons. Three of the com-
panies in the textile sector work together with 
independent suppliers. 
As far as the ownership structure is concerned, 
the survey revealed that 39 of the companies con-
cerned, i.e. the greater majority, are family-owned 
companies or companies founded and owned by 
                                                     
88 Among others, COFIDE defines companies exclusively 
on the basis of the parameter "annual sales", without ref-
erence to the parameters "workforce employed" or "fixed 
assets". For a classification of SMEs on the basis of their 
annual sales, see Table 1. 
the same person. In nine cases a minority partner 
was involved, either a friend of the owner or an-
other company. Only six companies, five of them 
medium-sized companies from the agricultural 
sector, had an ownership structure involving dif-
ferent partners. The question of ownership is im-
portant for the development of venture capital to 
the extent that, as we found, companies with more 
than one partner tend to be more open to accept-
ing additional partners than family-owned compa-
nies. 
Our analysis of the age structure of the compa-
nies interviewed shows that nearly half (48 %) are 
young companies that were founded in the 1990s 
and thus have existed for less than ten years, 
which could be an indication of a special need for 
capital. 16 companies were founded in the 1980s, 
four in the 1970s, and only one has been in opera-
tion since the 1940s (Figure 3). 
Investment and Innovation Activities 
Productivity and competitiveness and the financ-
ing needs of SMEs are closely bound up with 
company investment activities and technological 
endowments. Generally speaking, modern and 
competitive technologies require sizable invest-
ments, while older, less productive technologies 
involve lower investments. Moreover, investment 
activity is an indicator of an entrepreneur's will-
ingness and motivation to tackle new challenges, 
even under suboptimal conditions, e.g. in the face 
of scarce resources. 
Table 2: Annual Sales of the Companies Making up the Sample 
Medium-sized com-
panies, T&C industry 
Small companies, 
T&C industry 
Medium-sized com-
panies, agroindustry 
Small companies, 
agroindustry 
 
∅ max min ∅ max min ∅ max min ∅ max min 
Annual sales in 
mio. USD, Dec. 
2001 
8.3 20 2.4 0.585 1.5 0.0125 8.2 20 2 0.474 1.125 0.0125 
Source: Authors' survey 
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Our data on investment activity over the past 
three years show that only 11 % of the companies 
interviewed did not invest during the period under 
consideration. All other companies invested on 
average USD 457.000 per annum, which sums up 
to overall investments of USD 20.6 million. The 
median is USD 125.000 per annum. None of the 
companies interviewed directed 100 % of the 
sums they invested into replacement of machin-
ery. The majority invested for expansion pur-
poses, a fact which points toward dynamic man-
agement and growth in production. This invest-
ment activity is especially noteworthy in that the 
period under consideration was one marked by 
economic instability and recession. 
The dynamics and creativity of SMEs can also be 
measured with reference to the innovation ratio 
implied by the investments made. While produc-
tivity growth is dependent on product and factor 
markets, what is needed for product market 
growth, input stocks remaining equal, is the intro-
duction of new products. A product innovation 
may be based on the development of new products 
or merely on improvements of sales strategies, 
marketing, or designs.89 The crucial factor is new 
ideas used by a company to secure competitive 
advantages and reach higher sales figures. Over 
half of the companies interviewed had introduced 
a product innovation in the three preceding years. 
While for some textile companies such innovation 
was restricted to a new collection, for others inno-
vation meant coming up with a product unique to 
the Peruvian or a regional market.90 
Aside from product innovation, process innova-
tion, i.e. new, innovative production processes, 
may also mean reduced costs and sizable produc-
tivity gains. With five exceptions, all of the com-
panies interviewed had made continuous innova-
tions in their production processes in the preced-
ing three years, e.g. by installing new computer 
systems or generally mechanizing operations. 
                                                     
89 Cf. Grömling / Lichtblau (1997), p. 13. 
90 Examples would include the introduction to the Peruvian 
market of a certain synthetic thread or of particular ma-
terials for the construction trade. 
Figure 3: Year of Company Formation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' presentation 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
19
40
-19
59
19
60
-19
69
19
70
-19
74
19
74
-19
76
19
77
-19
79
19
80
-19
82
19
83
-19
85
19
86
-19
88
19
89
-19
91
19
92
-19
94
19
95
-19
97
19
98
-20
00
22 Petra Schmidt et al. 
The high level of investment and innovation in 
recent years points to the dynamics of the compa-
nies interviewed, and this is also confirmed by 
their future-oriented business planning. Our sur-
vey results on planned investment activities within 
the coming three years indicate that 70 % of our 
companies intended to invest in the foreseeable 
future. There is a difference here between small 
and medium-sized companies. While five of a 
total of 23 small companies did not plan to invest, 
for lack of capital among other reasons, nearly all 
of our medium-sized companies indicated that 
they intended to invest.91 
In a comparison of the current level of business 
activity and the level anticipated in three years, 
companies in both sectors and companies from the 
SE and ME segment both see relative positive 
growth prospects (Table 3). Some of these com-
                                                     
91 Only two medium-sized companies from the textile and 
clothing industry intended to condition their investment 
decisions on the results of negotiations on APTA. In the 
framework of APTA the US is to grant the Andes count-
ries, in particular those that show special commitment in 
the fight against drugs, tariff preferences on certain pro-
panies even see growth of over 100 %, though in 
many cases this is predicated on the assumption 
that textiles and clothing articles made of Peru-
vian fibers will fall under the Andean Trade Pref-
erence Agreement (ATPA) and that Peruvian 
firms will gain improved access to financing re-
sources. 
4.3 Framework for Financing 
Before looking into the financing situation of 
companies in our sample, we will, in the follow-
ing section, discuss the framework conditions of 
the financing available to SMEs. In Peru the im-
portant elements include the institutional structure 
of the financial sector, monetary policy, and the 
volume and efficiency of Peru's financial system. 
 
                                                                                  
ducts. An enlargement of these preferred tariffs to inclu-
de other products is currently under negotiation. 
Table 3: Future Growth Expectations of the Companies Interviewed 
Number of companies per sector  
Total compa-
nies in % Medium-sized 
companies 
Small compa-
nies  
Textile compa-
nies 
Agricultural 
companies 
Strong growth 
(> 20 %) 
48 % 12 11 14 11 
Moderate 
growth 
(< 20 %) 
33 % 10 6 10 6 
Constant pro-
duction level 
17 % 3 5 7 2 
Marked re-
duction 
(< - 20 %) 
0 0 0 0 0 
Moderate 
reduction 
(> - 20 %) 
0 0 0 0 0 
Not specified  2 % 0 1 0 0 
Sum 98 % 25 22 31 19 
Source: Authors' survey 
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Institutional Structure of the Financial Sys-
tem 
At the end of 2001 the institutional structure of 
Peru's financial sector had the following outlines: 
Aside from the central bank and the banking over-
sight authority SBS (Superintendencia de Banca y 
Seguros), the financial sector includes 15 private 
local commercial banks and five finance institu-
tions. There are in addition 39 microfinance 
institutions, including rural and urban savings and 
loan associations, seven leasing companies, and 
six pawnbrokers active in Peru's financial mar-
ket.92 The numerous specialized government fi-
nance institutions encountered in the 1980s and 
primarily involved in directing financing re-
sources into sectors assumed to hold promise for 
development were closed down in the wake of 
financial-market liberalization in the 1990s. 
Monetary policy and some central features 
of Peru's financial system 
Financial reforms conducted since the 1990s have 
substantially improved the framework conditions  
 
                                                     
92 Cf. SBS (2002), p. 43. 
for financing in Peru. Apart from privatization of 
government-owned banks, elimination of interest-
rate regulations, and introduction of supervisory 
standards in line with the Basel Concordat, one 
particularly important step was the establishment 
of an independent central bank. The paramount 
objective set for monetary policy was monetary 
stability, a goal that has been consistently pursued 
and has found expression in a continuous decline 
in inflations rates (Figure 4). An inflation rate of 
2.5 % is anticipated for the year 2002.93 
The monetary anti-inflation instruments used by 
the central bank have in some cases had the effect 
of restricting the expansion of the supply of fi-
nancing resources available. For instance, com-
mercial banks are required to hold high minimum 
reserves with the BCRB. The minimum reserve 
requirement for deposits in domestic currency is 
6 %, and for deposits denominated in USD the 
figure is 34 %.94 In a highly dollarized economy 
like Peru's, high minimum reserve requirements 
serve to limit money supply growth in foreign 
currency and to increase hard currency reserves as 
a buffer against the risk of any sudden outflow of 
capital abroad. On the other hand, these reserve 
                                                     
93 Cf. BCRP (2002), p. 9. 
94 Cf. IMF (2001), p.76. 
Figure 4: Annual Inflation Rate in Peru, 1990 – 2000 
 
Source: Author's calculations, based on BCRP, [www.bcrp.gob.pe] 
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requirements constitute a major burden for com-
mercial banks, limiting the credit supply and in-
hibiting the mobilization of savings. 
Moreover, high interest rates are an obstacle to 
outside financing (Figure 6). Since liberalization 
the BCRP has exerted no active influence on in-
terest rates, and both interest rates and exchange 
rates are determined by the market mechanism.95 
However, liberalization was followed by a sharp 
rise in real interest rates, a trend that has only 
gradually been reversed since then.96 
Another monetary indicator that gives cause for 
concern is the marked dollarization of the Peru-
vian financial sector. Currency substitution got 
underway in 1977 with the introduction of USD-
denominated so-called CBME certificates, a liquid 
monetary investment vehicle aimed at restricting 
capital exodus and building currency reserves.97 
Contrary to the expectation that the degree of 
dollarization experienced subsequent to reorgani-
zation of the financial sector and stabilization of 
the domestic and external value of the nuevo sol 
would decline on its own, currency substitution 
continued to increase in the 1990s. If in 1989 
42 % of all deposits and 34 % of all loans were 
denominated in USD, the corresponding figures 
for 2001 were as high as 71.5 % and 80.1 %, re-
spectively.98 This growing dollarization indicates 
that economic actors lack confidence in the do-
mestic currency and are largely unwilling to enter 
into borrower-lender relationships based on the 
nuevo sol. 
Dollarization also has implications for monetary 
and currency policy. On the one hand, the central 
bank's control capacity is limited since a large 
share of the money in circulation is beyond its 
influence. On the other hand, any deterioration of 
the domestic currency's external value implies 
                                                     
95 Cf. BCRP, [www.bcrp.gob.pe/Espanol/Wotros/Pre-Fre-
Polit.htm], (accessed on: 19 Jan 2002). 
96 Cf. Kiefer (1998), p. 147. 
97 Cf. Urljevic / Hector (1985), p. 236. 
98 Cf. SBS, [www.sbs.gob.pe], (accessed on: 01 August 
2002). 
risks for the stability of the banking sector and/or 
for companies with debts in foreign currency if 
the latter do not earn sufficient foreign currency. 
However, Peru's loss of monetary control capacity 
is no longer seen as problematic, indeed there 
have even been some calls for a complete dollari-
zation of the economy.99 
Volume and Efficiency of Financial Inter-
mediation 
In Latin America financial intermediation is 
largely dominated by the banking sector, an ob-
servation which holds for the structure of Peru's 
financial system as well. In 2001 Peruvian com-
mercial banks handled some 90 % of all national 
lending operations and administered 85 % of all 
financial assets.100 Bank deposits account for the 
main share of household saving, and bank loans 
are the most important mode of outside financing 
for businesses. 
Two indicators can be used to estimate the vol-
ume of the banking sector, i.e. its size and activ-
ity. The first, quantitative indicator used is nor-
mally the ratio of M3 to GDP.101 In Peru this ratio, 
also referred to as financial deepening, was 
roughly 31 % in 1999. While this means that the 
financial depth of the Peruvian banking sector has 
nearly doubled since 1992 (15.7 %), the figure is 
low by comparison with other countries. While 
the figure for Peru's neighbor Ecuador is 34 %, 
the corresponding value for Chile is 51 % (Figure 
5). The second indicator of banking-system vol-
ume is the ratio of overall banking-system assets 
to GDP. Here the figure for Peru is roughly 37 %, 
while the corresponding figures for Chile and 
Ecuador (1998) are 60 % and 48 %, respectively. 
                                                     
99 Cf. Müller (2001), p. 237. 
100 Cf. SBS (2002), p. 43. 
101 Cf. Demirguç-Kunt / Levine (1999), p. 6. In Peru this 
ratio, also referred to as financial deepening, was rough-
ly 31 % in 1999. 
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Banking-system efficiency is also measured with 
the aid of two indicators. The first indicator is 
formed on the basis of the ratio of operating costs 
to overall banking-system lending. Low relative 
operating costs indicate higher efficiency, and 
higher operating costs are a sign of inefficiency or 
a lack of competition in a banking system.102 
While in the period between 1992 and 1999 the 
average relative operating costs of banks in 63 
countries under consideration were 4 %, the figure 
for Peru in the same period was 10 %.103 The sec-
ond indicator uses the net interest margin, i.e. the 
ratio of interest revenues to interest costs. Narrow 
interest margins indicate greater competition and 
higher efficiency. While the average value calcu-
lated for 63 countries in the period from 1992 to 
1999 was 4 %, the corresponding figure for Peru 
was 8 %. However, this figure does include the 
additional fees charged, which further raise the 
                                                     
102 One sign of a lack of competition in the Peruvian ban-
king system is the high concentration of banks in it; this 
is measured as the loan and deposit share of the three 
largest banks in the system. In the last quarter of 2001 
the share of the three largest banks in Peru (Banco de 
Crédito, Banco Sudameris, Banco Continental) was 
63.3 % and 72.9 %, respectively. Cf. SBS (2002), p. 47. 
In addition, there is also a regional concentration of the 
banking sector in Lima – Callao. 
103 Cf. Demirguç-Kunt / Levine (1999), Appendix, Table 1. 
actual interest margin. On the whole, the interest 
margins in Peru point to low efficiency in the 
Peruvian banking sector (Figure 6). 
The share of financial assets mediated by the fi-
nancial market is traditionally low in Latin 
American countries, a factor that is reflected in 
the Peruvian financial market. While in 1999 the 
private sector received loans amounting some 
USD 14 billion, the value of obligations and 
stocks issued by the nonfinancial private sector 
was only USD 543 million.104 The main features 
of the Peruvian financial market are its low vol-
ume and the low liquidity of many stocks and 
bonds. The volume of financial markets can be 
determined with the aid of two indicators. Market 
size is reflected by market capitalization, i.e. the 
ratio of the value of all stocks listed at a given 
point of time to GDP. In the period between 1992 
and 1999 Peru had an average ratio of 11 %. This 
figure is comparable with Ecuador's market size 
(11 %), but far lower than the figure for Chile 
(84 %).105 In the year 2000 Peru's market-size 
figure was 20 %. Market activity (or market li-
quidity) is determined by forming the ratio of 
                                                     
104 Cf. Instituto Apoyo (2001), p. 3. 
105 Cf. Demirguç-Kunt / Levine (1999), Appendix, Table 5. 
Figure 5: Volume of Financial Intermediation Across Latin America (1999) 
 
Source: Authors' calculations, based on IMF, Financial Statistics Yearbook 
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trade to GDP. For the period between 1992 and 
1999 the market-liquidity ratio was 4 %. Ecuador 
has a lower market-liquidity ratio (1 %), while the 
corresponding figures for Chile and Germany are 
9 % and 28 %, respectively.106 Market efficiency 
is measured on the basis of the ratio of market 
activity of trade to the overall value of stock. Here 
the figure for Peru was 8 % in the year 2000. This 
figure likewise indicates a relatively low effi-
ciency of intermediation for Peru's financial mar-
ket. 
All told, Peru's financial sector cannot be said to 
fully fulfill its intermediary function, and this lack 
of financing capacity has highly adverse impacts 
on SMEs. At present Peru's underdeveloped fi-
nancial markets thus do not offer any adequate 
alternative modes of financing for SMEs, and this 
in turn means that the country's banking system 
plays the dominant role in financing the private 
investments of this business segment. But bank  
 
 
                                                     
106 Cf. Demirguç-Kunt / Levine (1999), Appendix, Table 5. 
loans are scare and costly. One particular obstacle 
to the development of business activity in Peru is 
inadequate access of businesses to long-term in-
vestment loans. If they are made at all, investment 
loans with appropriate repayment periods go 
mainly to large companies.107 
Inadequate access to investment loans via the 
banking system, which are cost-intensive and/or 
limited in nature, is attributable to several differ-
ent factors. Thanks to their often inadequate or-
ganizational and information structures, their lack 
of acceptable securities, and the fact that they are 
often not properly registered, Peruvian SMEs are 
rated by commercial banks as highly risky. Fur-
thermore, transformation of short-term capital 
investments into long-term credits appears highly 
risky to many financial intermediaries, the result 
being that at present only relatively few long-term 
loans are made.108 
                                                     
107 Cf. Barbachán (1999), p. 40. 
108 Cf. Kiefer (1998), p. 149. 
Figure 6: Average Debit Interest and Credit Interest in the Peruvian Banking System, 1994 – 2002 
 
Source : Author's calculations, based on BCRP, [www.bcrp.gob.pe] (accessed on: 30 May 2002) 
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Aside from the "risk structure" of SMEs, an addi-
tional factor behind the reticence of banks to lend 
is the susceptibility to crisis and the lack of com-
petition in the financial sector. For the financial 
system, the 1998 financial crisis meant growing 
liquidity and solvency problems. The restructuring 
processes that followed (mergers and closures) 
entailed a highly conservative lending strategy 
coupled with a policy of high interest rates.109 
Furthermore, The lack of competition for alterna-
tive financing options led to a situation in which 
banks and finance institutions are without any 
sufficient incentive to lower their intermediation 
costs and profit margins with a view to lowering 
their lending fees.110 
At present the Peruvian financial market like-
wise offers no adequate financing possibilities for 
SMEs. For the most part, SMEs fail to meet the 
crucial criteria set by issuers of stock, e.g. trans-
parency (of information). Moreover, the financing 
needs of SMEs are as a rule too low to permit 
issuers to cover their fixed costs. Current transac-
tion costs in Peru required a minimum issue vol-
ume of USD 10 million;111 this means that na-
tional issues of stock presuppose a certain com-
pany size and solvency, and this in turn consti-
tutes a virtually insurmountable obstacle to SME 
access. Only a minority of large Peruvian compa-
nies have the option of financing their investments 
through the stock exchange. 
4.4 SMEs from the Study's Sample: Fi-
nancing Situation and Behavior 
In Peru access to financing resources constitutes a 
twofold obstacle to business development. On the 
one hand, the great majority of Peruvian compa-
nies are excluded from the country's financial 
system and are forced to fall back on informal-
sector sources of financing or to finance their 
investments from their own resources, a situation 
                                                     
109 Cf. Instituto Apoyo (2001), p. 2. 
110 Cf. Hallberg (2001), p. 11; MEF (2001b), pp. 14f. 
111 Cf. Instituto Apoyo (2001), p. 2; MEF (2001a), p. 25. 
highly deleterious to their chances and prospects 
of growth. On the other hand, companies that 
have access to formal sources of financing are 
often faced with conditions that are so unfavor-
able that they hinder returns on capital or indeed 
block investments from the very start.112 
The companies interviewed in connection with the 
present study belong to the group of business that 
have access to bank loans. When asked, 90 % of 
these companies indicated that they had recently 
obtained loans from commercial banks. The rea-
son why the remaining 10 % did not seek bank 
loans to finance their investments must be sought 
in their risk aversion or their insistence on finan-
cial autonomy. Only two companies were refused 
bank financing loans because of their high credit 
risk. 
Apart from the significant role played by bank 
loans in company financing, the most important 
means of financing for the companies in the sam-
ple were self-financing from profits, write-offs, 
and reserves. 94 % of these companies made use 
of this form of financing. This is followed, in 
order of ranking, by bank loans (90 %) and sup-
plier credits (46 %). Other sources indicated in-
cluded partner investments (36 %) and capital 
contributions of new partners (15 %). 
This financing structure is reflected in the moder-
ate debt ratio and the good equity base of the 
SMEs interviewed. While the small companies 
have an average equity ratio of 60 %, the corre-
sponding figure for the medium-sized companies 
is 43 %. By way of comparison, the average eq-
uity ratio of German SMEs is 17.5 %, a fact 
which points to the traditionally high level of 
bank financing among German firms.113 
As far as the terms of financing are concerned, the 
survey's findings show that the great majority 
                                                     
112 Cf. MEF (2001a), p. 4. 
113 In industrialized countries an equity ratio of between 
35 % and 40 % is generally regarded as propitious for 
business development. Cf. Deutsche Bundesbank 
(1994), p. 78. 
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(78 %) of companies interviewed are dissatisfied 
with the financial services available, a fact due, as 
will be explained in more detail below, to insuffi-
cient access to bank loans, excessive interest rates, 
and short repayment periods. 
Although in principle the SMEs interviewed have 
access to the formal financial system, the supply 
of bank loans available to them is insufficient 
and their requests for credit are often not met. The 
majority of these companies have, for instance, 
been turned down by finance institutions at least 
once on requests for loans. The reasons indicated 
were, first, their inability to provide sufficient 
security, second, their insufficient equity ratios, 
and, third, the high levels of risk posed by an in-
vestment project. 
This insufficient access to bank loans is also re-
flected in these companies' high equity base, 
which is far in excess of the measure regarded as 
adequate in industrialized countries. Although this 
figure has to be adjusted for countries with higher 
interest rates or higher-risk sectors, the far higher 
equity ratio of up to 60 % mentioned above indi-
cates a restrictive bank lending policy for certain 
business sectors. 
In the opinion of the firms interviewed, the fi-
nancing bottleneck observed has negative impacts 
on business growth. All told, 34 of the 48 compa-
nies interviewed assume that they would have 
achieved better growth figures if they had had 
better access to bank credit. The companies often 
indicated that they were, at a given point of time, 
unable to take advantage of good market chances, 
or indeed that they had lost clients, for lack of 
sufficient credit lines. Only a small number of 
these companies sees their problem less in limited 
access to bank credit than in blocked access to 
markets. Only a few of our companies are risk-
averse; i.e. they prefer to get along without out-
side financing, even though this means slow 
growth. 
Against the background of an insufficient supply 
of outside capital, and despite their theoretically 
adequate degree of capitalization, 23 companies 
responded in the affirmative when asked whether 
they would have experienced more growth if more 
equity capital had been available to them. This 
view is shared in particular by firms from the 
agricultural sector, which repeatedly pointed out 
that their sector is marked by a lack of equity 
capital, a fact which constitutes a serious obstacle 
to development in the sector. 
Apart from insufficient availability of outside 
capital, high interest rates pose a further obstacle 
to the development of SMEs. Only a few, in par-
ticular large, companies are granted reasonable 
interest rates that enable them to operate competi-
tively. While the medium-sized companies in our 
sample pay an average interest rate of 11.5 % (in 
USD), small companies are forced to pay an aver-
age of 15.6 %. Apart from a few companies which 
have been able to make all of the investments they 
require despite the high interest rates demanded of 
them, the greater majority have been forced to 
refrain from making planned investments because 
of the high costs of credit. Furthermore, compa-
nies active in the export sector see high interest 
rates as a disadvantage to them in competition 
with foreign firms, which have access to financial 
resources on more favorable terms. 
If we look at the repayment periods of financing 
contracts, our sample indicates that short-term 
periods tend to be predominant (Figure 7). In the 
majority of cases the credit agreements signed 
have repayment periods of less than one year. 
Figure 7: Repayment Periods for Credits to Firms in 
our Sample 
 
Source: Authors' presentation 
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Only 9 % of our companies indicate that their 
loans have – on average – a term of over five 
years. 
We must note here that repayment periods are as a 
rule somewhat longer in the agricultural sector. 
For instance, the longest repayment periods 
granted to companies in the sample – on average 
5.4 years – were accorded to agricultural enter-
prises, while companies from the textile and cloth-
ing sector were granted no more than an average 
of 2.4 years. On the whole, the great majority of 
the companies interviewed were dissatisfied with 
the terms offered by banks, noting that these were 
not in line with company needs. Only 12 compa-
nies were satisfied with repayment periods, and 
these are precisely the companies that were 
granted longer-term loans. 
These short repayment periods impacted on our 
companies in two different ways: on the one hand, 
these companies have been unable to make certain 
investments. On the other hand, to be able to in-
vest despite this situation, these companies fall 
back on other financing mechanisms such as 
short-term working capital loans, which in turn 
can seriously jeopardize a company's liquidity. All 
told, short-term outside financing constitutes a 
grave problem for the companies interviewed in 
that this approach increases cash-flow pressures 
and at the same time requires these firms to tie up 
the few securities available to them, which means 
that the latter are no longer available for long-
term, future-oriented investment projects. 
To come up with a more exact picture of the im-
portance of the lack of long-term credit in relation 
to other bottlenecks affecting company develop-
ment, we presented the companies interviewed 
with a list of possible problems.114 We found that 
the lack of long-term credit is perceived as the 
major obstacle to company development. In de-
clining order of importance, the companies speci-
fied the following factors as obstacles: fluctua-
tions in demand, lack of equity, and national and 
                                                     
114 In this context the companies were asked whether they 
would rate the aspects named as a "grave problem", a 
"normal problem", or a "problem of less importance". 
international competition. On the other hand, our 
companies saw availability of qualified manpower 
as unproblematic (Figure 8). 
For the future, the majority of the companies in-
terviewed, and in particular the small firms in the 
textile industry, see continuing problems in fi-
nancing investments. In view of the present lack 
of alternatives, the companies indicated that they 
intended to fall back on the same financing in-
struments that they had used in the past. This 
could entail negative impacts on the liquidity in 
their sectors, since, as noted above, company op-
erating resources are in many cases used to fi-
nance investments. 
The results of the survey reflect the predominately 
insufficient supply of financing provided by the 
Peruvian banking system for SMEs, in particular 
as far as long-term instruments are concerned. 
Especially in view of the fact that most of the 
companies interviewed expect to grow, a better 
supply of financial resources tailored to the indi-
vidual needs of SMEs would contribute both to a 
more efficient allocation of capital and, in the 
long run, to economic growth. Against this back-
ground it would appear reasonable to promote 
alternative financing mechanisms and the markets 
associated with them, especially since this could 
be expected to increase competition in the na-
tional financial system, and this in turn could set 
incentives for Peruvian banks to direct more of 
their attention to SMEs as a target customer 
group. 
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5 Venture Capital in Peru 
Projects that banks are unwilling to finance be-
cause of the higher degree of risk they entail, can 
often be efficiently financed through mechanisms 
based on equity instead of outside capital. The 
following chapter deals with the development of 
the venture-capital market in Peru. It starts out by 
looking into the current situation of the Peruvian 
venture-capital market and then goes on to ana-
lyse, on the basis of the survey data, the economic 
and legal conditions required for the development 
of a venture-capital market and the institutional 
setting, i.e. potential investors, CICs, and compa-
nies, involved. The results of the survey are based 
on interviews with experts as well as on inter- 
 
views conducted with 15 potential investors and 
three institutions that are interested in launching a 
fund in Peru. Section 5.7 also makes use of the 
interviews conducted with the 48 companies of 
our sample. 
5.1 Development of the Venture-Capital 
Market in Peru 
Due to the advantages offered by venture capital 
for company financing (see Section 3.2), efforts 
are being made worldwide to set up venture-
capital funds. In Peru, too, this alternative mode 
of financing is being supported by public- and 
Figure 8: Aspects with Impacts on Company Developmenta 
 
Source: Authors' presentation 
a In percentage of mentions 
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private-sector actors like the national securities 
oversight commission (Comisión Nacional Super-
visora de Empresas y Valores/CONASEV), the 
Ministry of Economics and Finance (Ministerio de 
Economía y Finanzas/MEF), COFIDE, and the 
trade association Procapitales, in particular with a 
view to improving the at present underdeveloped 
Peruvian venture-capital market. It was only in the 
early 1990s that the country's first investment 
funds emerged; but their activities concentrated  
 
 
 
 
 
primarily on large national enterprises. At present 
there are a total of four such funds registered with 
the oversight commission, two of them special-
ized in real estate financing, one in stock, and one 
in short-term investments.115 
While there at present no venture-capital funds are 
registered in Peru, two foreign funds are operating 
in the Peruvian market: FAPE (Box 1) and CDC 
Capital, a venture-capital fund run from Bolivia. 
                                                     
115 Cf. CONASEV, [www.consev.net.gob.pe/Portal/Estadis-
tica/Anuario/Anuario2001.pdf], (Accessed on: 27 April 
2002). 
Box 1: FAPE (Fondo de Asistencia a la Pequeña Empresa) – a Fund for the Support of small Companies 
FAPE is at present the only venture-capital fund in Peru specialized in supporting small and medium-sized com-
panies, which are defined by FAPE as firms employing fewer than 100 persons and having annual sales figures of 
less then USD 2 million and fixed capital assets of less than USD 500.000. Under the management of the US 
Small Enterprise Investment Fund (SEAF), FAPE, registered in Panama in 1996, began investing in Peruvian 
SMEs in 1997. The fund, which has total capital assets of USD 7.25 mio., is financed by multi- and bilateral insti-
tutions like the Multilateral Investment Fund (FOMIN), the Netherlands Investment Bank (FMO), the Caja Andina 
de Fomento (CAF), and the Peruvian development bank COFIDE. Between 1997 and 2001 FAPE made a total of 
17 investments ranging between USD 60.000 and USD 350.000 per company and acquired company shares rang-
ing between 25 and 49 %. In late 2001 SEAF transferred its fund-management responsibilities to APOYO, a Peru-
vian institution. 
The experience gained thus far by FAPE has not been entirely positive. For instance, the development-oriented 
objectives aimed for by investors – e.g. creation of new jobs, productivity growth, and upgrading of the formal 
status of companies – have proven successful in some cases. At the same time, two profitable buybacks of shares, 
terminating investments, have proven clearly that capital investments in SMEs can be profitable and that such 
investments can in fact be effectively terminated. 
However, the fund has been faced with major profitability problems. For instance, the volume of the fund, some 
USD 7.5 mio., has turned out to be economically inefficient. The general assumption is that to operate profitably a 
fund specialized in small enterprises has to demand a standard fund-management fee of roughly USD 500.000. 
FAPE's small size and the management fee of 7.7 % it demanded led to a 30 % loss of its capital assets within its 
first four years of operation. Especially in its first two years, FAPE invested mainly in small enterprises, and for 
this reason its average investment level was only USD 180.376. The necessary "standardization" of small firms, 
which required considerable additional technical support, e.g. in accounting, led to substantial costs, and it thus 
turned out that it is particularly difficult to achieve a reasonable cost-income ratio in this market segment. A fur-
ther obstacle emerged in the conflict of interests between commercial and development-oriented goals. Due to its 
original development orientation, for instance, FAPE's organizational structure lacked an incentive system suffi-
cient to operate profitably and achieve good project results. Furthermore, frequent replacements of board members 
led to losses of valuable experience and prevented any continuity in the fund's decision-making process and "in-
vestment philosophy." 
All in all, the experience of FAPE illustrates that there are in the Peruvian market both demand for venture-capital 
investments and a sufficient number of SMEs with major growth potential. Furthermore , three factors essential to 
the success of a venture-capital fund appear to be: an adequate fund structure (investments volumes), qualified 
personnel, and a unified orientation to the fund's objective. 
Source: Expert interview conducted with SEAF on April 19, 2002 
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Aside from these two active funds, four other 
venture-capital projects relevant to the Peruvian 
venture-capital market must be mentioned here: 
MERHAV, a group of private investors that oper-
ate in a manner comparable to that of venture-
capital funds, and VIP (Value Investments Peru), 
which likewise cannot be classified as an institu-
tional venture-capital fund, since the capital it 
invests stems not from a fund but from one indi-
vidual investor. An additional fund interested in 
venture-capital investments, the PPF (Peru Priva-
tization Fund), is in the process of liquidation and 
thus no longer invests, and the CFI (Corporación 
Financiera de Inversiones) does not actually in-
vest itself, though it does plan new equity-
investment projects. The low number of actually 
active equity-investment funds and quasi-equity 
instruments indicates that the Peruvian venture-
capital market is very limited. At the same time, 
however, there is considerable interest in develop-
ing this market and launching new funds geared to 
financing SMEs. At present some two or three 
institutions have plans to initiate venture-capital 
funds. 
5.2 Essential Conditions for the use of 
Venture Capital: the present state in 
Peru 
The basic condition required for the development 
of venture capital as an alternative source of fi-
nancing for SMEs is the existence of a conducive 
economic and legal framework and a functioning 
and active capital market. 
Positive economic development and confidence 
in future economic stability are factors that are 
particularly important for the use of venture capi-
tal, since in providing such capital investors enter 
into a medium- to long-term obligation. Above-
average yield expectations can, furthermore, best 
be achieved if the companies concerned have a 
positive economic setting in which to develop 
their growth potential. As the case of Chile clearly 
shows, one aspect essential to the emergence of a 
venture-capital market in developing countries is 
the point of time at which the first funds are set 
up: the first venture-capital funds in Chile went 
into operation in 1993/94, in a period of economic 
upturn which soon weakened, drifting into reces-
sion in 1998. Many of the investments made in 
the boom phase proved unsuccessful, and the 
growth and yields expectations of these funds 
failed to materialize. Furthermore, the negative 
experience made here proved for several years to 
be an obstacle to the further development of the 
Chilean venture-capital market, a factor which 
illustrates the important signal effect of initial 
efforts to establish venture-capital funds.116 The 
Peruvian fund managers interviewed in connec-
tion with the present accordingly study see posi-
tive prospects for investments in particular when 
such investments are made in a recessionary phase 
and are then able to profit from gains made during 
a subsequent upturn of the business cycle. 
Following a period of weak, or indeed even nega-
tive, economic growth in Peru over the last three 
years, experts are now predicting growth of 3.0 % 
to 3.7 % for the year 2002.117 In other words, at 
present the investment climate for venture capital 
can be seen as quite positive in Peru. However, 
asked for their assessment of the relevance of 
economic development, fund managers on the 
whole tended to see this factor as less significant, 
noting that careful selection and support of com-
panies can lead to positive results even under un-
favourable economic framework conditions. On 
the other hand, the investors interviewed see a 
positive economic picture as an important factor 
for the success of venture-capital funds. 
A further important condition for the smooth 
functioning of a venture-capital market is a stable 
and clearly defined legal framework. In industri-
alized countries investors can fall back on a func-
tioning legal framework and enforce their rights in 
court. This is not always the case in developing 
countries. While many such countries have func-
                                                     
116 Cf. Equitas Partners (2001), pp. 6f. The present study 
also found that this negative development of venture-
capital funds was also due in part to a lack of experience 
on the part of fund managers. 
117 Excepting Bolivia und Ecuador, Peru thus has the most 
positive growth prospects of all countries in Latin Ame-
rica. Cf. Sangmeister (2002), p. 5. 
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tioning tax and company laws, these laws often 
hinder flows of private capital and make it diffi-
cult and time-consuming to enforce claims. The 
most important problem areas for venture capital 
are bound up with protection of the rights of mi-
nority shareholders, the options open to compa-
nies to restructure their capital, concrete legisla-
tion governing investment funds, and corporate 
taxation.118 
The present study looked into existing legislation 
with an eye to its application to venture-capital 
funds. Furthermore, potential investors were 
asked for their assessment of whether the present 
legal framework constitutes an impediment to the 
development of the venture-capital market. The 
study found that a large majority of investors re-
gard the legal framework in Peru as adequate and 
conducive to investment. Compared with other 
countries of the region, it was noted, there are no 
problems involving protection of minority share-
holders or company buybacks of shares, and as far 
as its legal framework is concerned, Peru is seen 
as having regional competitive advantages. 
While it has no specific legislation covering ven-
ture-capital funds, Peru in 1996 enacted a law on 
investment funds119 that also allows for venture-
capital funds. The law was amended in January 
2002, one of the aims being to facilitate the estab-
lishment of investment funds. To this end, the 
amended law raises the maximum share that one 
investor may hold in a fund from 25 % to 33 %. 
For a period of three years (as opposed to the pe-
riod of six months previously provided for), the 
organizers of new funds are now allowed to hold a 
share larger than this maximum figure,120 and so, 
theoretically, one investor could launch a new 
fund, which would then be required to seek at 
least two new shareholders in the course of three 
years. Another step decided on to facilitate the 
                                                     
118 Cf. Mayoral / Baptista (2001), p. 5. 
119 Cf. Ley de Fondos de Inversión y sus Sociedades Admi-
nistradoras (Decreto Legislativo N° 862, amended on 19 
Jan. 2002 by Ley N° 27641). 
120 Cf. Ley de Fondos de Inversión y sus Sociedades Admi-
nistradoras, Article 28. 
establishment of new investment funds was to 
permit investors to contribute nonmonetary assets 
to a fund.121 Some other important amendments to 
the law include measures aimed at protection of 
investors; the latter are now entitled to a refund of 
their investment if they wish to withdraw from a 
fund, e.g. because of an amendment to fund stat-
utes,122 and now are better protected against any 
possible irregularities on the part of CICs.123 
The administrative regulation on the law on in-
vestment funds124 was also revised and was set to 
come into effect in June of 2002. In this new regu-
lation the supervisory authority, CONASEV, sets 
out highly detailed individual regulations, ranging 
from the establishment of a fund and its entry in 
the official list to the liquidation of a fund. But the 
new regulation also leaves a number of points 
concerning investment funds open, or in some 
cases even works to their disadvantage. For in-
stance, the new regulation contains a provision 
according to which a fund is permitted to begin 
investing only when all of its investors have fully 
paid in their shares, specifying a time frame of 
nine months for this purpose.125 Investment funds 
normally operate with so-called capital calls, i.e. 
the funds committed are called in by investors 
when needed. 
The following section looks into the official regu-
lations on various potential investors. But it 
should be noted here that our some of interview-
ees voiced criticism of the lack of coordination 
among the competent government authorities. 
                                                     
121 Cf. Ley de Fondos de Inversión y sus Sociedades Admi-
nistradoras, Article 5 
122 Cf. Ley de Fondos de Inversión y sus Sociedades Admi-
nistradoras, Article 3. 
123 Cf. Ley de Fondos de Inversión y sus Sociedades Admi-
nistradoras, Article 13 A-C. 
124 Reglamento de Fondos de Inversión y sus Sociedades 
Administradoras (Resolución CONASEV N° 002-97-
EF/94.10). The new regulation was to come into effect 
in June 2002 (Resolución CONASEV N° 074-2001-
EF/94.10). 
125 Reglamento de Fondos de Inversión y sus Sociedades 
Administradoras (Resolución CONASEV N° 002-97-
EF/94.10), Articles 45 and 53. 
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One examples cited is that the supervisory author-
ity responsible for banking and insurance, SBS, 
has not adapted the regulations on pension funds 
(AFPs) to take account of the new provisions of 
the amended law on investment funds. While the 
new law raises the maximum share of a fund held 
by one investor from 25 % to 33 %, Peru's private 
pension funds (AFPs), the most important inves-
tors in the Peruvian capital market, continue to be 
restricted to a share of 25 %.126 
Another important aspect bound up with the legal 
framework in Peru is tax legislation. A majority 
of potential investors regard the latter as an obsta-
cle to the development of the venture-capital mar-
ket in Peru. What is at issue here is the fact that 
funds are required to pay income tax, and for them 
this means a double tax burden, since investors 
are also obliged to pay income tax on their earn-
ings from a fund. Until now this case has been 
avoided by granting temporary exemptions on the 
tax on capital gains earned from listed funds.127 
Among those who see themselves as particularly 
discriminated against by the existing arrangement 
are the four private pension funds (AFPs), which 
are entirely exempt from taxes and now see taxa-
tion of investment funds as a threat to the returns 
they offer compared with other possible invest-
ments. One of our interviewees emphasized that 
he would not invest in a venture-capital fund as 
long as the tax situation remains as it is. Further-
more, representatives of the AFPs noted critically 
that the new legislation fails to set any clear-cut 
incentives geared to promoting the investment-
fund market. 
There is, however, also a draft bill on the agenda 
that would tax investors instead of funds, which 
would be in line with standard international prac-
tice. Another proposal provides for temporary tax 
exemptions for earnings from share sales made 
                                                     
126 Cf. Reglamento de la Ley del Sistema Privado de Pensi-
ones (Decreto Supremo N° 004-98-EF), Article 65. 
127 Cf. Texto del Impuesto a la Renta (Decreto Legislativo 
N° 774), Article 19. This tax exemption was set to end 
on 31 Dec. 2002, though the experts interviewed expect 
it to be renewed. 
outside the stock exchange.128 While this proposal 
aims specifically to promote investment funds, it 
would not entail the final clarity on taxation called 
for by some potential investors. 
Finally, a smoothly functioning and active capital 
market would mean more transparency concern-
ing the investment behavior of institutional and 
private investors, a factor of some importance in 
successfully terminating investments in venture 
capital. One crucial factor for CICs is the exis-
tence of a high-volume primary market in which 
company shares are placed in initial pubic offer-
ings and in which CICs can sell their company 
shares as profitably as possible.129 Between 1990 
and 2000 Peru experienced only eight initial pub-
lic offerings, which meant that at the end of 2000 
only 0.7 % of the securities in circulation – 2.2 % 
of GDP – was attributable to initial public offer-
ings; this places Peru far down the list behind 
other countries in the region (Figure 9).130 
The weakness of the primary market for company 
shares is due on the one hand to the high transac-
tion costs involved in placement and on the other 
to a low-volume secondary market. Without a 
liquid secondary market it is impossible for a buy-
er to resell a newly issued share profitably at a 
given point of time. The volume of sales in the 
secondary market developed positively in the 
wake of liberalization in the early 1990s, but it 
has declined sharply since 1997 (Figure 10). 
                                                     
128 Cf. MEF (2001a), p. 45. 
129 In Germany initial public offerings doubled as a percen-
tage share of possible exit variants in the 1990s, a fact 
due mainly to the establishment of the Neuer Markt in 
1997 and the growing acceptance of investments in secu-
rities among the German population. Cf. Geigenberger 
(1999), p. 28; Kaufmann / Kokalj (1996), pp. 68f.; 
Butzmann (1999), p. 27. 
130 Cf. MEF (2001a), pp. 18 - 21. 
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A deteriorating economic picture that forced many 
investors out of the market highlighted the market 
power of the small number of institutional inves-
tors, in particular AFPs, whose buy-and-hold pol-
icy prevented the development of any markedly 
active trading in shares.131 One other factor con-
tributing to the decline in demand was a law that 
permits private pension funds to invest 7.5 % of 
their assets abroad.132 
5.3 The Position of Potential Investors on 
Venture Capital as an Instrument of 
Financing 
In general terms, venture capitalists include both 
commercially oriented investors like large corpo-
rations, insurance companies, and pension funds 
and private investors interested in earning above- 
 
 
                                                     
131 Cf. MEF (2001a), pp.48 - 50. 
132 Up to 2000 they were only allowed to invest 5 % of their 
assets in foreign companies. Cf. MEF (2001a). 
 
average returns.133 On the other hand, as an inves-
tor the public sector must bear in mind factors 
such as business promotion and creation of new 
jobs. As a rule, investors invest in funds set up 
and run by capital investment companies. Direct 
investors active outside this structure include both 
large corporations that acquire shares of other 
companies for strategic reasons and private per-
sons. These private agents are referred to as busi-
ness angels. They are normally successful busi-
nesspeople interested in reinvesting their capital 
in young companies. Here, too, the one incentive 
is the expectation of higher returns than would be 
possible with traditional investments; the other, 
perhaps no less important, is the pleasure of doing 
business. Since this mode of financing is not or-
ganized in fixed structures, it is customary to refer 
to it as informal venture capital. Business angels 
tend more to help close the capital gaps of small 
businesses, whose investment volume is too low  
 
 
 
                                                     
133 On the characteristics of individual investors, see e.g. 
Sidler (1996), pp. 24 - 29. 
Figure 9: The Importance of the Stock Exchange as a Source of Financing in selected Latin American 
Countries (2000)a 
 
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (2001), p. 18 
a Measured as the ratio of shares issued to GDP. Data for Peru from 2000, all other country data from 1998 
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to be interesting for CICs, and they often provide 
intensive management support as well.134 
According to the experts interviewed, the follow-
ing potential venture-capital investors can be 
made out in the Peruvian setting. The companies 
and institutions named have sizable resources at 
their disposal and regularly invest them in the 
Peruvian financial system. 
— Peru's four major private pension funds 
(AFPs), which manage growing assets cur-
rently amounting to some USD 3 billion and 
have invested them mainly in bank deposits 
as well as in stocks and bonds of large Peru-
vian enterprises and finance institutions. 
— Peruvian insurance companies,135 which 
have assets of roughly USD 380 million and, 
as of December 31, 2001, had invested assets  
                                                     
134 Cf. Geigenberger (1999), pp. 29f.; Butzmann (1999), pp. 
11f. 
135 All told, there are 17 insurance companies active in the 
Peruvian market. 
 
amounting to USD 630 million in securi-
ties.136 In particular the country's seven life-
insurance companies, with their long-term 
and relatively predictable investment horizon, 
are prospective investors of venture capital. 
— Public institutions that administer long-term 
funds and invest them in the market, e.g. the 
government pension insurance corporation 
(Oficina de Normalización Previsional) or 
the public-sector health insurance corporation 
(EsSalud). 
— Commercial banks, which the recent eco-
nomic crisis has left with a good number of 
financially troubled companies in their port-
folios and which might, in this situation, well 
have a more pronounced interest in providing 
turnaround financing.  
 
 
                                                     
136 Cf. SBS [www.sbs.gob.pe/estadistica/financiera], (ac-
cessed on: 05 July 2002). 
Figure 10: Volume of Sales in Peru's Secondary Market, 1992 – 2000 
 
 
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (2001), p. 49 
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— National and international DC institutions 
like the Peruvian refinancing and develop-
ment bank, COFIDE, the Caja Andina de 
Fomento (CAF), the IADB, or the IFC. 
At present there are no business angels active in 
Peru. But there is at least one large company there 
that operates as a direct investor, supplying small 
companies with equity capital. Its main interest in 
doing so is evidently less expectations of returns 
than strategic corporate aims.  
 
Fifteen potential investors were interviewed in 
connection with the present study (four AFPs, 
three insurance companies, three public institu-
tions, three DC institutions, two banks), the aim 
being to analyze their position on venture-capital 
funds and to explore their willingness to invest in 
this instrument. 
5.3.1 Private Pension Funds 
In 1993 three private pension funds, so-called Ad-
ministradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs), 
were set up in Peru on the Chilean model; these 
funds focus on individual provision for old age 
instead of the traditional generation-oriented sys-
tem of provision.137 The volume of these funds has 
been growing constantly, and, with their invest-
ment volume of USD 230 million p.a., these AFPs 
have for some years now been the largest and most 
important investors in the Peruvian capital market. 
Together with Peru's insurance companies, the 
AFPs are the most important demanders of long-
term investments in the Peruvian capital market. 
Due to the long-term nature of pension insurance, 
the AFPs, should, according to their own esti-
mates, invest at least half of their portfolios for 
periods of five to seven years. In fact, however, 
their present average period of investment is more 
medium-term, a fact which the AFPs attribute to a 
lack of long-term investment opportunities in the 
Peruvian market. The continuous growth of pen-
sion funds runs parallel to a market capitalization 
that has declined sharply since 1998 (Figure 11), 
and what this development ultimately means is 
considerable difficulty in the medium term in 
meeting the demand for investment opportunities 
in the Peruvian market.138 
                                                     
137 Cf. Müller (2001), p. 241. 
138 This increased demand has to be satisfied in the national 
market, since the AFPs are permitted to invest only 7.5 % 
of their portfolios abroad and AFPs indicate that nearly all 
of them have just about fully reached this quota. 
Figure 11: Market Capitalization and Volumes of AFP Funds, 1993 – 2001 
 
Source: Equitas Partners (2001a), p. 23 
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Pubic regulations on AFPs, for which the Peru-
vian central bank and the SBS are responsible, 
expressly permit private insurance funds to par-
ticipate in investment funds, including venture-
capital funds: they are allowed to invest up to 
12 % of their portfolios in such funds.139 The 
AFPs interviewed indicated that at present they 
would be prepared to invest up to 2 % of their 
portfolios in venture capital, which means in ef-
fect that legal regulations are currently not an 
obstacle to the development of venture-capital 
funds. The SBS, however, restricts AFPs to a ma-
ximum fund investment share of 25 %,140 which, 
in view of the low number of potential investors in 
the Peruvian market, could constitute a hindrance 
to the development of investment funds. 
In addition to legal restrictions, every institution 
has internal investment regulations of its own 
which are as a rule far more restrictive and may be 
seen as an expression of the risk-management 
policy of AFPs. This is reflected in the makeup of 
their portfolios: looking at all of the investors 
interviewed, it is the AFPs that hold the highest 
percentage of stock in their portfolios, though they 
invest only in grade AAA to AA- securities, i.e. 
those with the lowest risk. 
Still, compared with the other potential investors 
interviewed, the AFPs turned out to be highly 
interested in the concept of venture-capital funds. 
Three of the four pension insurance companies 
interviewed are willing to invest USD 4 to 7 mil-
lion in venture-capital funds. The fourth AFP is 
more reticent and prefers to hold off on invest-
ments until the Peruvian venture-capital market is 
better developed. 
Asked about their expectations concerning a ven-
ture-capital fund's returns, maturity periods, and 
share fungibility, the AFPs responded in part in 
                                                     
139 Cf. Texto Unico Ordenado de Ley del Sistema Privado 
de Administración de Fondos de Pensiones (Decreto Su-
premo 054-97-EF), Article 25, Resolución 052-98-
EF/SAFP, Article 20, and Circular 030-01-EF/90. 
140 Cf. Reglamento de la Ley del Sistema Privado de Pensi-
ones (Decreto Supremo N° 004-98-EF), Article 65. 
very different terms. Their profit expectations 
vary between 12 % and 30 %, the average profit 
expectation being 20 %. The AFPs are willing to 
invest their capital for up to ten years, a period in 
line with current proposals on venture-capital 
funds in Peru. Even though AFPs generally attach 
great importance to investment fungibility, they 
are interested in investing in venture capital, de-
spite the fact that fund shares, even if they are 
officially listed, are unlikely to be tradable in the 
Peruvian market. 
Asked to comment on the most important obsta-
cles to the development of the venture-capital 
market in Peru, the AFPs saw the most serious 
problem in a lack of fund managers with experi-
ence in the national market (Table 4).141 This was 
also expressed in their assessment of limited exit 
options as the second most important obstacle, 
since, as two AFPs stated, termination of a fund's 
investments in businesses is one of the most im-
portant tasks of fund managers. The third impor-
tant aspect noted by all AFPs asked to comment 
on the development of the venture-capital market 
is Peru's current tax legislation, which diminishes 
profit expectations by taxing investment funds. 
5.3.2 Insurance Companies 
The product structures of AFPs and life insurance 
companies share many basic elements and may 
thus be expected to develop similar investment 
behaviors as far as maturity periods, profit expec-
tations, and risk assessment are concerned. Ac-
cordingly, the insurance companies interviewed 
complained of an insufficient range of investment 
possibilities in the Peruvian market. In their opin-
ion, the main problem is a lack of long-term pa-
pers. Still, one of the three insurance companies 
interviewed expressed its interest in the idea of 
venture capital and would be willing to invest 
some USD 500.000 in a fund. Pointing to the high 
                                                     
141 The persons interviewed were presented a list containing 
nine possible obstacles. The possible responses were: 
"highly relevant", "relevant", problem of "low relevan-
ce"; cf. Appendix 1. 
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risk of venture capital, the other two stated their 
unwillingness to consider any such investments. 
As in the case of the AFPs, the legal restrictions 
on investments do not constitute an obstacle that 
would prevent insurance companies from invest-
ing in venture-capital funds. The relevant SBS 
regulation permits investments of up to 10 % of 
their portfolios in investment funds.142 Thus far, 
though, only one insurance company from our 
sample has made use of this provision, investing 
1 % of its portfolio in a real-estate fund. Generally 
speaking, the makeup of these portfolios reflects a 
certain reticence toward high-risk forms of in-
vestment. Two of the companies interviewed indi-
cated that close to their entire portfolio is made up 
of bank deposits and fixed-yield securities. At 
least one of these companies rates even invest-
ments in stocks as too risky, even though the legal 
regulations on investment permit insurers to invest 
up to 20 % of their portfolios in company sha-
res.143 
Another important reason for their reticence to-
ward venture capital, it was noted, is the structure 
of their payment obligations to their clients. These 
require regular and constant revenues that are not 
possible with investment in venture capital. 
Asked about the development of the venture-
capital market in Peru, our three insurance com-
panies also saw the most important current obsta-
cle in a lack of experienced fund managers in the 
national market. They rated limited exit options, 
the legal framework, and tax legislation alike as 
the second most important obstacles, a finding 
that accords with the responses made by the AFPs 
(Table 4). 
                                                     
142 Cf. Reglamento de las Inversiones Elegibles de las 
Empresas de Seguros (Resolución SBS 039-2002), Ar-
ticle 5. 
143 Cf. Reglamento de las Inversiones Elegibles de las 
Empresas de Seguros (Resolución SBS 039-2002), 
Article 5. 
5.3.3 Public Institutions 
The three public institutions interviewed indicated 
that they had each invested over 95 % of their 
portfolios in savings deposits and fixed-yield se-
curities and are concentrating their investments on 
short-term papers because of the uncertain eco-
nomic picture. The determining variable of their 
investment policy is investment risk; profit con-
cerns are of only secondary importance to them. 
In other words, public institutions turn out to be 
even more risk-averse than insurance companies. 
The legal restrictions on investments by public 
institutions oblige the latter to invest 70 % of their 
portfolios in the national financial system.144 The-
se institutions are thus free to invest 30 % of their 
capital in accordance with their own internal 
investment regulations. In other words, the reti-
cence shown by this institution toward venture-
capital funds is also due to internal investment 
restrictions, which are highly detailed and risk 
averse in tendency. Moreover, these institutions 
tend to transfer the negative experiences they have 
made with other funds, e.g. real-estate funds, to 
venture-capital funds. One exception is an institu-
tion that has already entered into talks with a fund 
initiator and is considering an investment of USD 
1.5 to 3 million in venture capital. 
As in the cases outlined above, representatives of 
public institutions were also asked about possible 
obstacles to the development of the venture-
capital market. For them the greatest hindrance is 
the low level of liquidity in the Peruvian market 
and the low level of share fungibility which this 
entails, which is another indication of their risk 
aversion. 
 
                                                     
144 Cf. Lineamentos para la Inversión de Entidades del 
Sector Público en el Sistema Financiero (Decreto Su-
premo 040-2001-EF), Article 9. 
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5.3.4 Commercial Banks 
Another group of potential investors interviewed 
in connection with the present study are Peru's 
commercial banks. The assumption was that 
commercial banks would be highly interested in 
expanding their range of products and offering 
their clients a new mode of financing. This could 
prove particularly interesting for clients that are 
faced with liquidity problems and unable to obtain 
additional capital, even though they have growth 
potential. Turnaround financing could serve to 
substantially reduce the default risk for lending 
banks. 
Instead of commercial banks, the study conducted 
interviews with two investment companies, each 
of which is associated with a major bank. The first 
confirmed that the bank in question was interested 
in investment financing for businesses and stated 
that the bank was planning to develop a venture-
capital fund of its own, the main aim being to 
strengthen companies whose undercapitalization 
is due to a lack of investor confidence.145 This 
investment company sees the country's present tax 
legislation as the major obstacle to the develop-
ment of the venture-capital market in Peru, and 
thus also to its own decision to set up a new fund 
of its own. For it, the second most important ob-
stacle is the present lack of company transpar-
ency. For this reason the planned fund envisages 
using controlling stakes or certain provisions in its 
investment agreements to exert a larger measure 
of control over the companies in which it invests. 
The second investment company interviewed ad-
ministers, among other things, an investment fund 
with long-term investment objectives, although in 
fact only roughly 10 % of the fund is invested in 
long-term papers. Asked about government regu-
lation of investment activities, it stated that the 
                                                     
145 The investment company indicated that the bank was 
planning to set up an independent venture-capital fund 
with a volume of USD 50 million to finance business 
expansion and startups. The bank itself intends to contri-
bute USD 10 million and hopes to raise the remaining 
funds from national and international DC institutions 
such as IADB, CAF, DEG, or COFIDE. 
stock exchange oversight authority, CONASEV, 
has gone some way toward easing its regulations 
and that at present there were practically no re-
strictions on investment activities. This fund's 
internal regulations are also very broadly formu-
lated, permitting it, for instance, to invest up to 
25 % of its portfolio in grade BBB to BB+ securi-
ties. The company at the same time indicated that 
for the long term it invests only in grade AAA to 
AA- papers, while for the short to medium term it 
was able to invest in grade A- papers, another 
piece of evidence pointing to the reticent risk stra-
tegy of Peruvian investors. Due to the high risk 
involved, this investment company is also uninte-
rested in investing in venture-capital funds. In its 
view, the main obstacle to the development of the 
venture-capital market is the low number of inves-
tors active in the Peruvian market (Table 4). It 
noted that investor risk perception would have to 
change before venture-capital funds would be able 
to operate successfully in Peru. 
5.3.5 The Peruvian Development Bank 
COFIDE and DC Institutions 
National and international DC institutions, which 
in essence represent the role and the interests of 
public-sector investors, are likewise potential 
investors in the Peruvian venture-capital market. 
The present study interviewed COFIDE in its role 
as the national development bank, as well as the 
CAF as a multilateral institution, and the Nether-
lands development Bank FMO as an examples of 
bilateral DC with a view to determining their as-
sessment of the venture-capital market and their 
willingness to invest. All three of these institu-
tions are partners of FAPE and thus already have 
experience with venture capital in Peru. In gen-
eral, they stated that they were planning to con-
tinue supporting this financing instrument with an 
eye to strengthening both SMEs and, in the long 
term, the Peruvian capital market. Two of these 
institutions are in contact with fund initiators, and 
all three are considering further investments in a 
venture-capital fund. As far as investment levels 
are concerned, one institution indicated that it 
planned to invest roughly USD 1.5 million. At 
present COFIDE could invest only up to USD 8 
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million in venture capital since internal regula-
tions prevent it from investing over 2 % of its own 
capital in this financing instrument. Moreover, 
COFIDE is not permitted to hold more than 20 % 
of a fund's shares. 
As regards the development of the venture-capital 
market, this group of potential investors sees im-
portant obstacles on the side of Peruvian compa-
nies. The reluctance of entrepreneurs to accept 
outside capital and the rights of control it implies 
and the lack of transparency in many companies 
constitute, in their opinion, central obstacles to the 
development of venture capital funds. The poten-
tial investors from this group explained their as-
sessment by pointing to a lack of entrepreneurial 
culture and a generally short lifespan of family-
run companies, which often do not survive the 
third generation. 
Summing up the results of our survey of potential 
investors in venture capital, we find that nearly all 
of our interviewees were familiar with the instru-
ment. Eleven of our interviewees had already been 
approached by institutions planning to launch a 
fund and seeking investment. Furthermore, all of 
our interviewees were dissatisfied with investment 
opportunities available in the Peruvian market.146 
Most of them voiced criticism of the low number 
of issuers and the lack of long-term investment 
possibilities.147 It thus appears that investors are 
faced with a situation marked by unsatisfied de-
mand for investment opportunities. 
As far as obstacles are concerned that hinder the 
development of venture-capital funds in Peru, our 
interviewees frequently mentioned three aspects 
of the institutions under consideration here (Table 
4): lack of experienced fund managers, national 
tax legislation, and restricted exit options offered 
by funds specialized in company shares.148 The 
fact that investors perceive the lack of experienced 
                                                     
146 The three national and international DC institutions were 
not asked this question. 
147 It was mentioned in this connection that eight major 
companies account for 90 % of all new issues. 
148 For a more in-depth discussion, see Section 4.6. 
fund managers as an important obstacle to the 
development of the venture-capital market once 
again highlights the significance of the fund man-
ager as intermediary, which will be examined in 
more depth in the following section. 
5.4 Management and Structure of a Ven-
ture-Capital Fund 
On top of the willingness of potential investors to 
invest in venture capital, two further factors of 
crucial significance for the success of venture-
capital funds are the fund management of capital 
investment companies and the structure of the 
funds themselves. The following section starts out 
by looking into the role played by CICs. Based on  
our supply-side survey results, it then goes on to 
examine the importance of fund managers in rela-
tion to other key factors crucial to the develop-
ment of the venture-capital market in Peru. The 
section, likewise based on our survey results, con-
cludes by looking into the possible structure of a 
Peruvian venture-capital fund. 
CICs and Fund Managers 
Fund managers play a crucial role in the develop-
ment of venture capital. Venture capitalists invest 
in a fund set up and managed by a CIC. In the 
ideal case the fund manager, in possession of per-
fect information, operates in a highly intranspar-
ent investment market, and his information edge 
enables him avoid any processes of adverse selec-
tion. The fund manager's specific market knowl-
edge contributes to diminishing the risk of in-
vestment failure, e.g. by reliably assessing risks 
and by supervising and advising the management 
of young innovative companies.149 The focus of 
such funds on SMEs calls for special knowledge 
on internal company structures, successful growth 
strategies, and disinvestment strategies. Thanks to 
his right to information, a fund manager is in a 
position to constantly evaluate the situation of the 
individual companies in his portfolio and pass this 
                                                     
149 Cf. Kaufmann / Kokalj (1996), p. 11. 
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information on to investors. Generally speaking, a 
successful fund management will consist of a 
group of experts that have experience in capital 
investment sufficient to enable the fund to make 
sound and profitable investments. 
The present survey asked supply-side interview-
ees for their assessment of various aspects that 
contribute to the success of a venture-capital 
funds (Table 5).150 
Table 5: Ranking of the Importance of Aspects rele-
vant to the Success of an Investment Funda 
1 Fund manager quality 
2 Economic growth 
3 Legal and tax framework 
4 Sectoral portfolio diversification 
5 Composition of investors 
6 Capital market development  
7 Portfolio diversification geared to busi-ness phases 
Source: Authors' survey 
a The ranking corresponds to the frequency of mentions 
by the entrepreneurs interviewed 
It is not surprising to find that the most important 
aspect mentioned by our interviewees is fund 
manager quality. In this respect, we can identify 
in Peru a number of bottlenecks that bound up 
mainly with lack of experience in the Peruvian 
market.151 While the total number of institutions 
planning to launch venture-capital funds is low at 
present,152 our interviewees mostly criticize the 
fact that the institutions presently active in the 
field, lack a track record in venture-capital man-
agement, especially at the national level. Accord-
ing to our interview partners, both institutional 
                                                     
150 Specifically, 10 potential venture capitalists and experts 
were presented the list of aspects set out in Table 5 and 
asked to rank them as "highly relevant", "relevant", or 
"not relevant". 
151 See Section 5.1. 
152 Asked which institutions had already approached them, 
the majority of potential investors were unable to recall 
more than one or two. 
and financial backing for fund managers could 
raise the confidence of many potential investors in 
venture-capital funds. 
The results of the survey indicate that the second 
most important factor seen as bearing on the suc-
cess of a fund is economic growth, followed by 
the legal and tax framework.153 Furthermore, our 
interviewees identify the sectoral diversification 
of a fund's portfolio as a further aspect bearing on 
its success, since this factor can contribute to mi-
nimizing investment risk. But at the same time 
experts also emphasized that the Peruvian market, 
small and underdeveloped as it presently is, gen-
erally leaves little room for any specialization of 
fund portfolios. Half of our interviewees also see 
the composition of fund investors as an impor-
tant aspect.154 It was noted that the right composi-
tion could prove conducive to investor confidence 
in a fund and its management. On the other hand, 
our other interviewees, including experts, empha-
size that the key factor is not investor composition 
but the CIC itself or the constitution of the fund in 
question. 
The survey also identified capital-market devel-
opment as an additional key factor for the success 
of a fund, particularly in view of the fact, as was 
noted, that this factor is bound up with new disin-
vestment options, e.g. initial public offerings. But 
some of the persons interviewed disagreed, stating 
instead that development of the venture-capital 
market represents a mechanism through which, in 
the end, the Peruvian capital market will continue 
to develop. Portfolio diversification keyed to 
company development phase is seen as the least 
important factor bearing on the success of a fund. 
It should be noted in this connection that some 
potential investors reject early-phase financing, 
stating that the investment risk is particularly high 
in this phase of company development. 
                                                     
153 Cf. Chapter 5.2 on the significance of the economic, 
legal, and tax frameworks. 
154 Bi- and multilateral Investors in particular see the com-
position of investors as a relevant factor for ensuring that 
a fund's investors share a unified "vision". 
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Fund Structure 
To gain some idea of the possible structure of a 
Peruvian venture-capital fund, several different 
experts on the supply side were asked for their 
views on optimal size, investment volume per 
company, and possible percentages of company 
assets. While the results indicate a necessary fund 
volume of some USD 20 million,155 investment 
level per company depends on the business seg-
ment to which a fund is addressed. However, ex-
isting proposals on venture-capital funds in Peru 
suggest that an investment volume of at least USD 
1 million per company is necessary,156 a fact that 
indicates Peru's first funds will have to focus on 
medium-sized companies. The majority of our 
interviewees envisage shares of company assets 
not in excess of 50 %, though in some cases this 
would presuppose additional control rights over 
the company in question, e.g. the right to nomi-
nate a company's chief financial officer. 
5.5 Company Openness, Transparency, 
and Critical Mass 
Aside from the key factors named above as essen-
tial for the success of a fund, the companies re-
ceiving venture capital are an additional critical 
factor in the development of a functioning ven-
ture-capital market. In connection with SMEs, two 
obstacles are generally specified that have to be 
overcome: 
— the disinclination of small and medium-sized 
companies to open up to outside investors; 
— a low level of transparency and willingness to 
provide information, i.e. a lack of sufficient 
corporate governance. 
                                                     
155 Generally speaking, the majority view was that fund 
volume had to be large enough to prevent any rise in fi-
xed costs per investment. This assessment is line with 
FAPE's experience, i.e. that a fund volume of USD 7.5 
million is insufficient to cover the costs of fund admi-
nistration and management. See Box 1. 
156 Cf. Questus (2002), p. 5; Apoyo Consultoria (2001), p. 20. 
Our supply-side survey on the openness of Peru-
vian SMEs clearly indicates that the majority of 
potential investors anticipate little willingness on 
the part of Peruvian SMEs, which are mostly fam-
ily-run, to accept a new partner. Some interview-
ees, however, emphasized that many companies in 
Peru now see the need to modernize and develop 
new markets, a fact which will influence their 
willingness to accept a strategic partner. Our in-
terview partners on the whole thought that Peru-
vian SMEs should be better informed and 
schooled on the advantages involved in accepting 
new partners. 
Aside from their closed company structures, an-
other factor criticized was the lack of transparency 
of Peruvian SMEs, and it was noted that SMEs in 
Peru are for the most part marked by a low degree 
of formalization and inadequate accounting prac-
tices, factors which make it impossible to assess 
investment risks. This view was rejected by some 
of our interview partners, who noted that having a 
fund manager involved in the making of company 
policy would automatically increase transparency. 
Furthermore, funds always procure information on 
prospective partner companies, since every in-
vestment decision is preceded by a process of due 
diligence. Even though it is accordingly necessary 
to improve the level of transparency of Peruvian 
SMEs, there is confidence in the CICs and their 
ability to provide adequate control mechanisms, 
so that the investors will be offered the security 
they need. 
A further condition required for the development 
of the Peruvian venture-capital market is that pro-
spective companies must have reached the critical 
mass needed to ensure good investment possibili-
ties. Venture-capital funds look for companies 
that have the potential to develop into competi-
tive, export-oriented firms that are capable of 
seeking their place in global value chains. In this 
connection, our supply-side survey shows that a 
close majority of potential investors are of the 
opinion that there are not enough SMEs in Peru in 
a position to actually be able to meet the condi-
tions required for a financial investment of this 
kind. However, the remaining interview partners 
rejected this view, claiming that the Peruvian 
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market offers a sufficient number of interesting 
prospective companies. 
5.6 Current Disinvestment Options in Peru 
Since venture-capital investments are always lim-
ited in time, investors are in need of a secure time 
frame, usually five to ten years, at the end of 
which they can profitably terminate their invest-
ment. A properly functioning venture-capital mar-
ket should therefore offer sufficient possibilities to 
disinvest, i.e. or to sell the shares acquired in con-
nection with such an investment. There are up to 
four exit options available here:157 
— Company buyback, in which the original 
partners repurchase the shares concerned. 
— Sale to an industrial investor (trade sale): 
this exit option involves selling the shares 
concerned to another company, which as a 
rule purchases them in pursuit of its own stra-
tegic objectives. 
— Sale to a financial investor (secondary pur-
chase): here the shares in question are sold to 
another investor, usually another capital in-
vestment company specialized in later phases 
of financing. 
— Initial public offering (IPO): in the eyes of 
the investor, an IPO is the most attractive exit 
option. On the stock market share prices are 
determined, among other things, by expecta-
tions of future company development, and 
this offers the share-selling investor the pos-
sibility of participating in anticipated future 
company appreciation. However, high trans-
action costs make this exit option feasible 
only for larger companies.158 
                                                     
157 Cf. Butzmann (1999), pp. 26f.; Kaufmann / Kokalj 
(1996), pp. 48f. 
158 In Germany only roughly 14 % of such investments are 
terminated via an initial public offering. In capital-
market oriented Anglo-Saxon countries, however, IPOs 
play a larger role. Cf. Kaufmann / Kokalj (1996), p. 48. 
In the year 2000, company buybacks were the most im-
portant exit option in Germany (26 %), followed by tra-
de sales (24 %), IPOs (14 %), and secondary purchases 
In connection with the survey we asked our poten-
tial investors about options for terminating capital 
investments and the relevance of these options for 
their investment decisions. All of the interviewees 
emphasized the relevance of viable exit options, 
and the majority of investors noted a close link 
between the options available to terminate an in-
vestment and their decision whether or not to in-
vest in a venture-capital fund. But our investors 
expressed no preference for one of the exit options 
mentioned and were entirely aware that in Peru 
some exit options are not given at present. Ac-
cordingly, they noted that the most important con-
sideration is that a CIC has a clear idea of the 
ways in which an investment can be terminated. 
Exit options are in fact limited in Peru at present: 
a secondary purchase by another investor is 
unlikely since in Peru there is no network of spe-
cialized CICs that purchase shares with an eye to 
company phases and sizes. IPOs are not really a 
viable option for SMEs at present either, a fact 
due to the low anticipated demand for SME sha-
res, which, thanks to their naturally high risk, are 
unlikely to attract many potential investors in 
Peru. On the other hand, the transaction costs 
bound up with an IPO are prohibitive, since issues 
of stocks or bonds are economically viable only 
when they exceed a volume of roughly USD 10 
million.159 
Sales of shares to another company and buybacks 
are, according to our interviewees, the most likely 
ways for a venture-capital fund to terminate its 
investment and withdraw from the companies 
concerned. However, in recent years there have 
been virtually no mergers or acquisitions involv-
ing SMEs. Many potential investors are evidently 
quite reluctant to purchase minority shares of 
SMEs, so that this exit option is likely to be used 
only in isolated cases. Buybacks of shares by their 
                                                                                  
(7 %). 27 % of such investments were written off as a to-
tal loss. Cf. BVK, [www.bvk- ev.de/fakten00/ fak-
ten.cfm?page=8], (accessed on: 14 Jan.2002). 
159 Cf. MEF (2001a), p. 41. Nevertheless, one of the institu-
tions asked about this issue, and interested in setting up a 
venture-capital fund, sees some exits via IPOs as entirely 
feasible. 
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original owner therefore appear to be the most 
realistic exit option for Peru. But some potential 
investors fear problems in financing buybacks. 
This is the background of the frequently expressed 
view that is it imprudent to invest more than USD 
1 million per company: an investment of this size 
(plus company appreciation) is easier for the 
company owner to raise, or is generally easier to 
resell, at the end of the term of investment. 
5.7 Venture Capital: Financing Instrument 
for SMEs in Peru? 
The following two sections examine whether ven-
ture capital constitutes an interesting alternative 
mode of financing for SMEs. The first step con-
sists of a demand-side analysis, based on inter-
views with 48 companies, of the willingness of 
firms to seek venture capital. A second step, based 
on supply-side interviews, then examines the in-
clination of potential investors to invest in a fund 
for SMEs. 
5.7.1 The Demand Side: SME Willingness 
to use Venture Capital as an Alter-
native Mode of Financing 
Since venture capital is still in its infancy as a 
financing instrument in Peru, the concept is 
largely unfamiliar to Peruvian companies. The 
results of our survey indicate that 77 % of the 
companies in our sample were wholly unaware of 
venture capital as an option, while 23 % were 
familiar with the concept. While small and me-
dium-sized companies do not differ significantly 
in their knowledge of the concept, there is a dif-
ference between the two sectors examined: ven-
ture capital was less familiar to companies in the 
textile and clothing industry than it was to compa-
nies in the agroindustrial sector. Three of the 48 
companies interviewed are already using venture 
capital as a means of financing. 
The interviewees unfamiliar with venture capital 
were given a brief rundown on the use of the in-
strument, and then some of the key features of 
the instrument were explained to them in detail.160 
It turned out that these companies would welcome 
support and advisory services for the manage-
ment of their firms, be it in the field of account-
ing, marketing, or in establishing contacts, and see 
this as the most important feature of venture capi-
tal. The majority of companies also regard the 
equity function as positive, since an equity base 
strengthened by outside investment would boost 
the "soundness" of their companies and a capital 
investment would at the same time imply an ac-
tive investor interest in company operations. 
Furthermore, most companies assume that a capi-
tal investment by a new partner would improve 
their access to bank loans. According to the 
companies interviewed, Peruvian banks focus less 
on a company's equity ratio than on its reputation 
and the securities it can provide. Taking on a new 
and reputable partner could accordingly serve as a 
"mark of quality" which enhances bank confi-
dence, making it easier for such companies to 
acquire additional financial resources. This as-
sessment was confirmed by the experience of one 
company that already uses venture capital to fi-
nance its investments. Since Peruvian banks usu-
ally condition their loan decisions on a company's 
ability to put up security, a further advantage of 
such a capital investment is that it would enable 
them to acquire additional real estate, in this way 
enlarging their borrowing capacities. The fact that 
a venture-capital investment is as a rule termi-
nated at the end of an investment period of five 
to seven years is seen as positive by the majority, 
while three companies saw this investment period 
as too short.161 
Such a capital investment is as a rule bound up 
with investor rights of information and code-
termination. While a large number of company 
owners stated their general willingness to provide 
                                                     
160 The companies were presented a list containing some of 
the key features of venture capital; they were then asked 
whether they would rank it as "positive", "negative", or 
"not relevant" for their company. 
161 Two companies explained their assessment by noting 
that in agriculture a period of five years is not sufficient 
to make profits. 
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information on their companies, the smaller com-
panies tended to be less open than the medium-
sized firms. Beyond the right to information, the 
right of codetermination in company management 
turned out to be the most critical point. A slight 
majority of our interviewees see an advantage 
here to the extent that under this provision a com-
pany may benefit from the decision rights of 
qualified investors, or an investor may in this way 
be better able to minimize his risk. It should be 
noted here that a full quarter of all interviewees 
rejected any right of codetermination, insisting on 
their own autonomous management rights. Still, 
the companies interviewed proved on the while to 
be more open-minded on this issue than we had 
anticipated. 
It is not surprising that the above-average earn-
ings expected by investors prior to the termination 
of their investment are seen as negative by most 
companies interviewed. According to some com-
panies, it is impossible in Peru to earn annual 
returns of 20 % to 30 %, either in the textile and 
clothing industry or in the agroindustry. Instead, 
the large majority of companies interviewed re-
gard annual earnings of between 10 % and 25 % 
as realistic. This is surprising in view of the fact 
that some of the companies interviewed anticipate 
growth rates of 25 % to 300 % over the coming 
three years and would thus be in a position to 
meet the earnings expectations of investors. Our 
survey data further indicate a disparity between 
small and medium-sized companies, since seven 
of the eight of the companies that could earn high 
profits are small companies. The reason for this is 
that smaller companies are as a rule forced to pay 
interest rates of around 15 % (and in some cases 
even up to 45 %). Furthermore, some interviewees 
pointed out that if the ATPA is enlarged, compa-
nies in the textile and clothing industry could 
double their revenues and therefore meet higher 
earnings expectations. 
Three additional control questions were asked to 
verify company assessments of venture capital as 
an alternative means of financing. The first ques-
tion was whether the companies would recom-
mend other companies to take on a new partner if 
they were unable to find any other alternative 
sources of financing to realize an investment. 
Nearly 93 % answered in the affirmative. The 
second question was whether our companies 
would themselves be prepared to take on a new 
partner. Here only 71 % answered in the affirma-
tive. In other words, nearly one third would be 
unwilling to do so, a finding which in most cases 
can be attributed on the one hand to the owner's 
desire to remain independent and on the other to 
the fear that a new partner might expect too high 
returns. The third question, formulated somewhat 
more generally, concerned venture capital as a 
means of financing. The responses indicated that a 
total of 93 % of our interviewees see venture capi-
tal as an adequate means of investment financing 
for their sector. The underlying assumption of our 
companies here is that even though both the tex-
tile and clothing industry and the agroindustry 
have great potential, they will remain unable to 
realize long-term investment projects as long as 
they lack sufficient access to capital. 
On the whole, the majority of companies regard 
some key features of venture capital as positive 
and are open to the idea of taking on a new part-
ner. This finding permits us to assume that ven-
ture capital could prove to be a viable alternative 
source of financing for companies in both sectors. 
At the same time, however, our findings indicate 
that a great number of companies would make use 
of venture capital only under certain conditions, 
which include sufficient investor knowledge of 
the given sector, realistic earnings expectations, 
and a restriction of investor stakes to minority 
holdings. 
5.7.2 The Supply Side: Willingness to 
Invest in a Fund for SMEs 
One crucial condition for the development of ven-
ture capital as an alternative means of financing 
for SMEs in Peru is the willingness of potential 
investors to put their money into a fund geared 
specifically to this business segment. A large ma-
jority of the 15 potential investors interviewed 
stated their willingness in principle to invest in 
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medium-sized companies.162 Only two public-
sector institutions stated their unwillingness to 
invest in medium-sized enterprises, a finding that 
can be attributed to the marked risk aversion of 
this group of investors.163 As far as small busi-
nesses are concerned, this reticence is shared by 
the large majority of potential investors. Only four 
of our interviewees stated their willingness to 
invest in a fund specialized in small companies; 
these potential investors include an AFP as well as 
two institutions that pursue development goals.164 
But these institutions too express a preference for 
medium-sized companies or a diversified portfolio 
made up of investments from different business 
segments. On the whole, our supply-side survey 
results indicate that potential investors are hesitant 
to invest in small businesses because of the high 
risk associated with the segment and would be far 
more willing to invest in a fund specialized in 
medium-sized companies. Despite this reticence, 
however, 10 of our 14 potential investors regard 
venture capital in principle as an adequate long-
term financing instrument for Peruvian SMEs, 
even though they noted that certain conditions 
would have to be given if the use of this instru-
ment is to have prospects of success, one of these 
being the creation of a business culture conducive 
to investment. 
6 Leasing as an Alternative Means of Fi-
nancing for Peru's SMEs 
Leasing as a financing instrument alternative to 
classic investment financing based on bank loans 
can contribute decisively to providing SMEs with 
the medium- and long-term financing they need. 
As opposed to venture capital, this instrument 
already constitutes an important component of 
                                                     
162 Some of our interviewees emphasized their special 
interest in the segment of medium- to large-sized com-
panies. 
163 Cf. Section 5.3. 
164 These are the two multilateral organizations CAF and 
FMO and the public-sector development bank COFIDE. 
Peru's financial system. Accordingly, the present 
study, looking into the field of leasing, focuses on 
the question of how relevant leasing in fact is for 
the financing of Peruvian SMEs and/or what ob-
stacles may be blocking an expansion of leasing 
activities to include SMEs. 
The following section presents an overview of the 
significance and structure of the Peruvian leasing 
market. This is followed by a look at the providers 
in the Peruvian market and a discussion of our 
system of categorization and our sample. The 
chapter then looks into the most important frame-
work conditions required for the successful use of 
leasing and analyzes the extent to which Peruvian 
SMEs makes use of the instrument of leasing, 
examining the concrete makeup of leasing ser-
vices in the Peruvian market and the degree to 
which these services meet the financing needs of 
SMEs. 
6.1 Significance and Structure of the 
Peruvian Leasing Market 
The Role played by Leasing in the Peru-
vian Financial System 
The role played by leasing in an economy can be 
determined with reference to two factors: first, the 
absolute volume of investments financed by means 
of leasing and, second, the so-called leasing ratio, 
i.e. the relationship between leasing-based invest-
ment and overall gross investment in an economy. 
In Peru the leasing ratio was 16.7 % in 1999, com-
pared with 12.5 % for Brazil and 4.1 % for Chile in 
the same year (Figure 12).165 In terms of the abso-
lute volume of leasing investments, Peru ranks 
33rd worldwide and fourth in Latin America. 
                                                     
165 The prevalence of leasing in an economy can also be 
measured on the basis of a second definition of the lea-
sing ratio: the value of leasing-based investment as a 
share of a country's GDP. In Peru investments financed 
through leasing account for 1.52 % of GDP, while the 
corresponding figures for Chile and Brazil 1 % and 
0.88 %, respectively. Cf. Euromoney (2000), p. 6. 
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Since leasing was introduced in Peru 20 years ago, 
the value of new leasing agreements concluded p.a. 
increased constantly until 1998. Between 1995 and 
1999 it quadrupled, reaching a value of some USD 
2.3 billion. Since 1998, in parallel to the downturn 
in business activity in Peru, this absolute value has, 
however, been on the decline.166 On the other hand, 
                                                     
166 Cf. América Leasing (2001), p. 27 and IFC (1996), p. 40. 
the leasing ratio has continued to rise even in times 
marked by low economic growth. Between 1995 
and 1999 it rose from 7.1 % to a maximum value of 
16.7 %, though the figure also has declined since 
1999, a fact probably due to a change in the law 
enacted in December of 2000 and the uncertainty 
it has caused in the leasing sector (Figure 13).167 
                                                     
167 See Chapter 6.2 for an in-depth discussion. 
Figure 12: Peru's Leasing Ratio, an International Comparison (1999) 
 
Source: Euromoney (2000), pp. 3 and 28; authors' presentation 
Figure 13: Development of the Leasing Ratio in Peru, 1995 – 2001 
 
Source: América Leasing [www.americaleasing.com/alsaweb/frame_infoleasing], (accessed on: 26 April 2002) 
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Looking at their operating results, however, we 
find that most of the leasing companies inter-
viewed began to turn a profit again in 2001. Ac-
cording to information provided by them, only 
two leasing companies recorded losses due to 
restructuring, although one of them expects to be 
making profits again in the current year. Data 
provided by the regulatory authority SBS on six of 
our seven leasing companies indicate a generally 
positive picture for four of them (Figure 14).168 
                                                     
168 The poor profit picture of Latino Leasing is due to the 
bankruptcy of the Banco Latino. Latino Leasing now  
operates independently of Peruvian banks; its main part-
ners are IFC (some 50 % of the company's equity) and 
CAF (45 %). 
Leasing Agreements per Sector and Type 
of Leased Good 
Looking at the structure of leasing portfolios bro-
ken down by sector, we find that the manufactur-
ing industry is the most important customer seg-
ment for both leasing companies (33 %) and banks 
(43 %).169 Within this sector, the textile and clothing 
industry accounts for 6 % of all new leasing agree-
ments.170 By comparison, 5 % of the portfolios of  
 
 
                                                     
169 Leasing companies and banks are the most important 
providers of leasing services in the Peruvian economy. 
See p. 53 for a detailed breakdown of Peruvian leasing 
companies. 
170 Cf. Asociación de Bancos del Perú (2001), p. 120. 
Figure 14: Earnings of Peruvian Leasing Companies, 1998 – 2001 
 
Source: SBS, [www.sbs.gob.pe], (accessed on: 26 April 2002) 
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leasing companies and 2 % of bank leasing opera-
tions go to the agricultural sector (Figure 15). 
When we break portfolios down for types of  
 
leased goods, we find that the most important 
leasing assets traded in Peru are real estate, indus-
trial machinery and other industrial equipment, 
and transportation units (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 15: Leasing Portfolios of Banks (left) and Leasing Companies (right), by Sector (2001)  
Source: SBS, [www.sbs.gob.pe], (accessed on: 26 April 2002); authors' presentation 
Figure 16: Leasing Portfolios of Leasing Companies and Banks, broken down by 
types of Leased Good (aggregated), (2001) 
 
Source: SBS, [www.sbs.gob.pe], (accessed on: 26 April 2002); authors' presentation 
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Providers in the Peruvian Leasing Market 
At present there are 23 leasing operators active in 
Peru. The SBS breaks them down as follows:171 
— banks (13), 
— leasing companies (7), 
— finance companies (2), and 
— public-sector institutions (1).172 
In the year 2001 leasing companies accounted for 
the major share of leasing transactions (49 %), 
followed by banks (44 %). On the other hand, the 
two finance companies and COFIDE together 
accounted for a share of only 7 % of the total 
value of new leasing agreements (Figure 17). The 
leasing sector is thus marked by a high level of 
concentration: on the one hand, there is a limited  
 
number of competitors, on the other hand the 
three largest providers account for 48.5 % of all 
leasing operations. 83.7 % of all leasing activities 
are transacted by the ten largest providers. The 
ranking presented in Table 6 illustrates the market 
shares of individual leasing operators. 
                                                     
171 This is the breakdown of the leasing sector used by the 
SBS. Cf. SBS [www.sbs.gob.pe/estadistica/financiera], 
(accessed on: 25 April 2002). 
172 The only public-sector institution involved in leasing is 
COFIDE. 
The Sample of Leasing Operators 
Eleven of the Peru's leasing operators were inter-
viewed in connection with the present study. For 
several reasons it appeared appropriate to include 
only banks and leasing companies in the sample. 
One reason was that finance companies are special-
ized in the leasing of vehicles – which are, judging 
from their customer structure, more likely to be 
consumer goods than investment goods. Another is 
that COFIDE, the only public-sector institution that 
finances leasing agreements, serves the final bor-
rower only indirectly, via the financial system. 
Instead of taking over the SBS system of catego-
ries, the present study worked with a modified 
breakdown of Peruvian leasing operators based on 
their ties to banks. The present study defines as 
"independent leasing operators" all providers that 
have neither direct ties with nor financial backing 
from banks. Operators that are part of a bank are 
generally referred to as "bank-affiliated leasing 
operators," regardless of whether or not they are 
fully integrated in a bank, operate as specialized 
departments of a bank, or are bank affiliates.173 
The modified classification used for the present 
study appears justified for the following reasons: 
— Experiences from many developing countries 
indicate that independent leasing operators 
tend more than bank-affiliated leasing opera-
tors to concentrate on the SME segment.174 
— A providers' refinancing and institutional 
backing play an important role for his sus-
tainability. 
The breakdown used by the present study indicates 
that there are in the Peruvian market 14 bank-
affiliated leasing operators – the eight largest of  
                                                     
173 Examples of leasing operators which the SBS break-
down regards as leasing companies and the present study 
sees as independent leasing operators would include the 
bank-affiliated leasing operators Wieseleasing, Credilea-
sing, and Citileasing. 
174 Cf. IFC (1996), p. 24. 
Figure 17: Structure of Leasing Operators 
 
Source: SBS [www.sbs.gob.pe], (accessed on: 25 April 2002) 
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which were interviewed – and four independent 
leasing operators, three of them indicating that the 
focus of their efforts was on the financing of in-
vestment goods. 
6.2 Important Framework Conditions for 
the use of Leasing: the Present State 
in Peru 
Apart from internal company-level factors, the 
success of leasing as an instrument depends on 
external economic, institutional, and legal frame-
work conditions. An important economic factor  
 
that must be borne in mind is that a country's leas-
ing market develops in parallel to its economic 
situation and investment activity. And one of the 
reasons for the absolute decline in leasing invest-
ment to be observed in Peru in recent years is the 
economic slump the country has experienced 
since 1999. 
The institutional framework 
In institutional terms, the first condition required 
is an efficient financial system that covers the 
transaction and refinancing function and generates  
 
Table 6: Ranking of Leasing Operatorsa 
Current leasing agreements 
 Leasing operator (in 1000 n. 
soles) 
(in 1000 
USD) 
Percentage 
share 
 1 Wiese Leasing 927.941 280.025 18.02
 2 Credileasing 800.276 241.499 15.54
 3 Banco Santander Central Hispano 767.450 231.593 14.90
 4 Latino Leasing 341.289 102.991 6.59
 5 Banco de Crédito del Perú 336.036 101.406 6.53
 6 COFIDE 311.608 94.034 6.05
 7 Banco Sudamericano 226.802 68.442 4.40
 8 Citileasing 223.806 67.538 4.34
 9 Banco Wiese Sudameris 209.055 63.087 4.06
10 Banco Continental 163.990 49.487 3.18
11 Interbank 144.282 43.540 2.80
12 América Leasing 144.245 43.529 2.80
13 Banco Financiero 132.503 39.985 2.57
14 Banco Interamericano de Finanzas 126.490 38.171 2.46
15 Banco de Comercio 100.634 30.368 1.95
16 Volvo Finance 76.945 23.220 1.49
17 Bank Boston 70.947 21.410 1.38
18 Banco Standard Chartered 15.420 4.653 0.30
19 Mitsui Masa Leasing 10.799 3.259 0.21
20 Leasing Total 9.560 2.885 0.19
21 BNP Paribas Andes 3.019 911 0.06
22 Banco del Trabajo 2.293 692 0.04
23 Daewoo 585 177 0.01
Source: SBS [www.sbs.gob.pe], (accessed on: 25 April 2002) 
a Measured in terms of current leasing agreements, as per December 31, 2001 
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sustainable leasing operators. Important aspects 
here include licensing of leasing companies and a 
smoothly functioning insurance system. The pre-
sent study pinpointed four factors that are of par-
ticular interest for the development of leasing in 
Peru: 
— the refinancing situation of leasing operators, 
— the stage of development of Peru's insurance 
market, 
— the significance of Peru's used-goods markets 
for leasing, and 
— the dollarization of the country's financial 
system. 
Viable means of refinancing must be available to 
SME-oriented leasing operators if leasing is to 
become a practicable and widespread option for 
SMEs. Our survey indicates that independent leas-
ing companies focusing more or less on a clientele 
in the SME segment tend to be more actively con-
cerned with a refinancing of their operations and 
to concentrate more on finding reliable, competent 
partners than leasing operators that are affiliated 
with banks. On top of their ability to refinance 
their operations with the aid of their parent com-
pany, the latter also have the option of issuing 
bonds in the national capital market to procure the 
financial resources they require. It should be noted 
here, however, that in the recent past two bank-
affiliated leasing operators have run into difficul-
ties as a result of solvency problems on the part of 
their parent banks. Furthermore, most of our in-
terviewees, dependent and independent alike, 
rejected the assumption that SMEs are the first 
customer group to be refused new leasing agree-
ments when a leasing operator runs up against 
refinancing problems. This, they noted, is unlikely 
because good profit margins can be achieved in 
the SME segment. 
A further important condition for an adequate 
development of leasing is a smoothly functioning 
insurance system. Leasing operators have to ade-
quately insure the goods they lease out in order to 
cover the risk they bear as owners of the goods in 
question. The Peruvian legislative has taken ac-
count of the condition by obliging leasing opera-
tors to acquire insurance protection either on their 
own or through their customers. In all, this aspect 
was seen as unproblematic in Peru. 
However, the stage of development of Peru's 
used-goods markets poses a central obstacle to 
the development of leasing. All of the leasing 
operators interviewed underlined the great signifi-
cance of these markets for their risk assessment, 
pointing to the insufficient size and specialization 
of these markets. For the lessor, the risk on a 
leased good is fully covered only if he can recover 
its residual value in the event that a customer de-
faults. If this condition is not given, the lessor is 
forced to demand additional guarantees and higher 
deposits from his customers, and this factor re-
stricts the effectiveness of leasing as a financing 
instrument for SMEs. 
According to information provided by the leasing 
operators interviewed, the Peruvian leasing 
market is even more highly dollarized than the 
rest of the economy: nearly all leasing operators 
transact over 90 % of their leasing business in 
USD. While the leasing operators interviewed 
indicated that they offer their customers a choice 
between USD and nuevo sol, this option is seldom 
used, which means in effect that the currency risk 
is borne by the customer. 
The Legal Framework 
A framework consisting of laws, ordinances, and 
other legal regulations is an essential condition for 
the operation of a leasing market. This does not 
automatically imply the existence of any specific 
leasing legislation. But what is crucial here is that 
the various legal regulations in force are mutually 
consistent. One important factor is secure property 
rights for the leasing operator. Another is a legal 
status for leasing that is at least equal to that of 
other financing instruments, e.g. as far as tax laws 
are concerned. 
As regards property rights, the crucial issue for 
the lessor is how reliably and quickly he is able to 
enforce his property rights to the leased good in 
the event that a customer defaults. In formal  
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terms, Peruvian legislation is comparable to the 
picture in Germany, and accordingly if a customer 
files for bankruptcy, the lessor has a right to re-
cover the leased good without undue effort, since 
it is not seen as constituting part of the debtor's 
assets. Although the Peruvian system of justice is 
in part marked by corruption and protracted and 
complex procedures, the leasing operators inter-
viewed do not see property-rights issues as a seri-
ous problem. 
The effects of Peru's tax legislation are seen dif-
ferently. In December of 2000 the tax laws cover-
ing leasing, which were perceived as unfavorable 
by larger, bank-affiliated leasing operators, were 
fundamentally reformed (Box 2). In their eyes, the 
old legal framework was more flexible and of-
fered customers better tax advantages. Moreover, 
two leasing operators are exempt from the 
amendment and continue to operate under the old 
terms, which leads to distortion of competition. 
The smaller, independent leasing operators, on the 
other hand, see the amendment in a less negative 
light, both in terms of tax benefits and as regards 
the special position accorded to two competitors. 
The reason for this is that they, with their more or 
less smaller volumes of leasing business, derived 
less benefit from the tax arrangements previously 
in effect, and they are not in direct competition 
with the operators exempt from the new regula-
tions. But they too are calling for more clarity and 
more continuity in national legislation in order to 
strengthen confidence in the Peruvian leasing 
market. The companies interviewed were clearly 
uncertain and underinformed about the new 
amendment, and this is certainly one factor in-
volved in the downturn in the demand for leasing 
services in the past two years. 
Having outlined the framework conditions rele-
vant for leasing, we will now turn to the specific 
role played by leasing for Peruvian SMEs. The 
following section starts out by looking into the 
quantitative side of leasing, i.e. its dissemination 
among SMEs in Peru. The section first analyzes 
the information provided by leasing operators on 
their customer structure and SME orientation and 
then looks into the use of leasing by the compa-
nies interviewed, broken down by sector, com-
pany size, and location. 
Box 2: Peru's amended Tax Legislation 
On December 30, 2000, an amended version of Peru's so-called leasing law – in effect since 1984 – came into 
force (Decree No. 299). Owing to a few remaining unclear points, these amendments were again modified in 
April of 2001. 
Under the old version, the lessor was able to capitalize and write off the leased asset without undue delay. 
The lessee in turn was allowed to fully deduct his leasing rates from his income tax. The condition attached to 
these tax breaks was that the term of leasing agreements not be below 13 months (for movable goods) or 36 
months (for immovable goods). 
The tax implications of the amended law may be summarized as follows: 
- The lessor remains the legal owner of the leased asset. However, in keeping with the International Ac-
counting Standards (IAS), the lessee capitalizes the good and can write it off on a straight-line basis. 
- The lessee can write off the leased asset at an accelerated rate if the leasing agreement contains the 
new minimum terms of two years for movable goods and five years for immovable goods. 
- Today, however, the lessee is allowed to deduct only the interest element of his leasing rate from his 
taxes. 
- The possibility of an accelerated writeoff has been completely eliminated for sale-and-lease-back 
agreements. The reason for this was that this type of agreement was originally intended more as an 
instrument to safeguard a company's liquidity than as a tax-saving scheme. 
These amendments provide for exemptions for two foreign leasing operators who have concluded official 
continuity agreements with Peru (convenio de estabilidad). 
Source: [www.americaleasing.com/alsaweb/frame_infoleasing.htm], (accessed on: 26 April 2002); [www.americaleasing.com/ 
alsaweb/PreguntasFrecuentes.htm], (accessed on: 26 April 2002); Gestión Special (2002), p. IV 
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6.3 The Dissemination of Leasing among 
Peruvian SMEs 
The Importance of SMEs as a Customer 
Group for Peruvian Leasing Operators 
It is impossible to say anything definitive about 
the dissemination of leasing among SMEs without 
reliable statistical data. However, the Peruvian 
oversight authority SBS does not require banks 
and leasing companies to provide any data on the 
breakdown of their customer structures in terms of 
sales figures. One consequence of this is that we 
lack SME-specific data at both the official level 
and the company level. Another is that the data 
available are not sufficiently comparable. Most 
leasing operators were unable to provide detailed 
data on the relative significance of SMEs in their 
overall portfolios. Furthermore, banks differ con-
siderably in their operational definitions: as far as 
annual sales are concerned, for instance, the upper 
limits for small companies range between USD 
700.00 and 3 million; the lower figure cited is not 
even half the upper limit used for the present 
study, and the upper value is twice as high as our 
upper limit. Only two of the independent leasing 
operators involved in cooperation with bilateral 
donors175 use the definition of SME on which the 
present study is based. 
The statistical problems referred to above make it 
as good as impossible to come up with any reli-
able data on the customer structure of bank-
affiliated leasing operators. Proceeding on the 
data available, we find that small companies ac-
count for some 3-10 % – in one case max. 15 % – 
of the leasing volume and 10-35 % of the clients 
of bank-affiliated leasing operators. As far as me-
dium-sized companies are concerned, the data 
available fluctuate sharply between 30 % and 
75 % of the overall volume of leasing business. 
The percentages for overall customer figures ac-
                                                     
175 This year América Leasing and the Inter-American 
Investment Corporation (IIC) concluded an agreement 
on a credit line of USD 5 million aimed at further deve-
loping leasing business with SMEs. The most important 
partners of Latino Leasing (today: Qualita-Leasing) are 
IFC und CAF. 
cordingly range between 10 % and 55 %. One 
noteworthy fact in this segment is that the banks 
interviewed176 set an upper turnover limit of USD 
10 million to distinguish between medium-sized 
and large companies. 
The data on the customer structure of inde-
pendent leasing operators indicate a somewhat 
more favorable picture: the two operators men-
tioned above – both of whom use the definition on 
which the present study is based – were able to 
provide exact data on percentage shares of both 
overall leasing volumes and overall numbers of 
customers. Accordingly, small companies account 
for 35 % / roughly 50 % of their leasing volume 
and 55 % / 70 % of their clientele. Both leasing 
operators report that medium-sized companies 
account for 35 % of their leasing volume and 
20 % of their clientele. The third independent 
leasing company indicated that it has transacted 
70 % of its leasing business with SMEs.177 
In all, it can be noted that bank-affiliated leasing 
operators have a more marked presence in the 
SME segment than has been assumed until now – 
although this presence is mainly focused on the 
segment of medium-sized companies. Small com-
panies account for a more or less insignificant 
share of the volume of the leasing business they 
transact with SMEs.178 The independent leasing 
operators that were able to provide any more exact 
data on their customer structures transact far more 
of their business in the small-company segment. 
To sum up, we find that leasing business with 
medium-sized companies is already relatively 
well established among the leasing operators in-
                                                     
176 Since bank-affiliated leasing operators are closely bound 
up with bank structures, the terms bank-affiliated lessor 
and bank are used synonymously here. 
177 The definition of SME used by the last-named leasing 
operator lacks transparency and is difficult to quantify, 
since for it turnover figures are less important than fac-
tors like growth potential, technical know-how, and the 
fact that a company has survived the economic turmoil 
of recent years. 
178 The Banco Santander must be mentioned in this connec-
tion; referring to its overall commitment in the SME 
segment, it indicated a share of 50 %. 
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terviewed, while small companies are far less apt 
to make use of this instrument. 
Asked about their general assessment of leasing 
business with SMEs, the majority of leasing op-
erators emphasized that leasing with SMEs is a 
highly promising business, especially in view of 
the profit margins that can be realized in this seg-
ment (an average of 8 %).179 On the other hand, 
the profit margins indicated for large companies 
amounted to only 2 %. Moreover, it was pointed 
out, large multinational corporations have the 
option of seeking financing abroad at more favor-
able terms. Accordingly, five bank-affiliated pro-
viders and one independent leasing company ex-
pressed their interest in a stronger commitment in 
the SME segment.180 However, only four of these 
companies already have concrete plans or are 
currently implementing a product geared to the 
specific needs of this segment. 
This discrepancy is due not least to some typical 
problems involved in business with SMEs. In the 
eyes of the leasing operators interviewed, the in-
formal status of many SMEs poses an important 
obstacle to their further concentration on the SME 
segment, in particular on small companies. It was 
noted that a further factor closely bound up with 
the issue of informality181 is inadequate company 
accounting and financial management. Some addi-
tional problems pointed to in our interviews in-
cluded lack of company knowledge on leasing and 
the fact that low-volume leasing business entails 
                                                     
179 The profits margins indicated for medium-sized compa-
nies range from 4 % to 8 %, those for small companies 
vary between 5 % and 15 %. 
180 The two other independent leasing companies already 
have markedly SME-oriented portfolios; two banks ex-
pressed no intentions of becoming more active in this 
segment. 
181 In Peru informality is also widespread among larger, 
registered companies. Among other things, this may 
mean that a certain amount of business is transacted 
without any invoicing, or that part of a companies work-
force is not registered. The reason why this constitutes 
an obstacle to the use of leasing is that such practices 
make it impossible to cash in on the tax benefits associa-
ted with leasing and difficult for leasing companies to 
estimate the risks involved. 
average costs that tend to be too high. On the 
other hand, possible gaps in demand and problems 
with company access to foreign exchange were 
not thought to play a role here, though it was 
noted that smaller, independent leasing operators 
assign greater importance to the aspect of foreign 
exchange than larger-sized banks, which have 
fewer problems with refinancing. Finally, the 
reticent information policy of some companies is 
not seen as a major obstacle for leasing operators. 
The study examined leasing operators' willingness 
and awareness of the need to lower administrative 
costs as an indication that they are in fact inter-
ested in focusing more heavily on the segment of 
medium- and – above all – smaller-sized compa-
nies. Administrative costs are fixed costs and are 
therefore disproportionately higher for small leas-
ing transactions than for larger volumes of busi-
ness. 
Most banks were unable to provide any data on 
their administrative costs per leasing contract and 
saw no possibilities to lower their costs. One bank 
had in the past planned to introduce a standardized 
and simplified leasing contract, but the project 
failed to materialize. The smaller independent 
leasing operators appear to be better informed on 
their administrative costs; and one of them is al-
ready engaged in comprehensive efforts to reduce 
his costs, e.g. by using a website to transact part 
of his leasing business. 
If overly high administrative costs in fact consti-
tute an obstacle that prevents leasing operators 
from focusing more on SMEs, this situation is 
unlikely to change much. New approaches and 
efforts aimed at lowering costs can be observed 
only in isolated cases. Nor is this surprising in 
view of the weak competition among Peru's fi-
nance institutions and the lack of alternative 
means of financing available to SMEs there. 
The Importance of Leasing for the SMEs 
Interviewed 
On the demand side the question here was: How 
familiar are the companies interviewed with the 
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concept of leasing and to what extent do they 
make use of the instrument? Furthermore, we 
must look also into the issue of whether leasing is 
used more to finance capital investments than 
consumer goods. This issue has implications for 
development to the extent that in the former case 
leasing would prove to be an instrument ideally 
suited to promote investment. 
Since leasing has been in use for some 20 years in 
Peru and the country's leasing ratio, 12.7 % in 
2001,182 is relatively high, leasing can be assumed 
to be a widely known instrument there. Although, 
as anticipated, small companies turned out to be 
less familiar with the concept than larger firms, 
the disparities are not that large. If, on the other 
hand, we look at the use of leasing among the 
SMEs interviewed, we find some clear-cut differ-
ences. We will now break the sample down to re-
flect differences between company size (sales),183 
company location,184 and business sectors. 
                                                     
182 Cf. América Leasing, (2001), p. 5. 
183 It here seemed reasonable to break the sample down 
further to reflect micro enterprises (sales of USD 
125.000-750.000), small enterprises (USD 750.000-1.5 
million), small- to medium-sized enterprises (USD 1.5-
10 million), and medium- to large-sized enterprises 
(USD 10-20 million). 
Looking at company size as a distinguishing fea-
ture, we find a pronounced imbalance: only one of 
our 15 companies with a sales volume of USD 
125.000 - 750.000 has already made use of leas-
ing. Even though the differentials between the 
remaining company groups are less pronounced, 
we can still note here that the use of leasing tends 
to vary according to company size, i.e. the larger a 
company is, the more it is likely to make us of the 
instrument (Figure 18). 
If we look at the use of leasing as a function of 
company location, we find a marked regional 
differential between the capital and the towns of 
Cusco and Arequipa. While the large majority of 
companies in Lima have already made use of leas-
ing as an instrument of financing, the majority of 
companies interviewed in Arequipa and Cusco 
had yet to do so. In Cusco, moreover, none of the 
companies interviewed was able to name another 
company that uses leasing as an instrument of 
financing, and half of our interviewees in Cusco 
thought that there were no leasing services avail-
able there. This assessment is consistent with the 
actual presence of leasing operators throughout 
the country: only four of the leasing operators 
                                                                                  
184 Arequipa, Cusco, or Lima. 
Figure 18: Use made of Leasing in Peru, broken down for Company Sizea 
 
Source: Authors' presentation 
a In number of mentions 
1
4
8
12
14
3
3
2
-1
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
ME SE SME MLE
With leasing Without leasing
New Financing Instruments for Long-term Investments of SMEs – The Case of Peru 59
interviewed are represented throughout Peru, the 
others operate only or mainly in Lima.185 
Looking at business sectors, we find that leasing 
is more widespread among our textile companies 
and in the agroindustry, even though agroindus-
trial companies differ markedly from the rest of 
the sector as far as their management, profitabil-
ity, and (export-) market orientation are con-
cerned. This finding is matched in part by the 
information provided on the supply side. The 
great majority of leasing operators indicated that 
they served SME clients in the textile sector, 
while the agricultural sector played less of a role 
for them. The reasons given for this were sharp 
fluctuations and poor management in the sector. 
However, a look at the data available to the over-
sight authority, SBS, concerning the distribution 
of the overall business volume of leasing compa-
nies across sectors does not wholly confirm this 
impression: textiles and leather (6 %) do not ac-
count for a significantly larger share of the vol-
ume of leasing business than the agricultural sec-
tor (some 4 %). 
We can confirm the thesis that (finance) leasing 
mainly serves as an instrument to finance in-
vestment. Asked for the types of goods they fi-
nance via leasing or for the procurements they 
planned to make, our companies most frequently 
named machinery, followed by real estate (land 
and buildings), and small vehicles. This is in line 
with the information provided by the supply side, 
according to which machinery accounts for the 
largest share of the goods leased to SMEs. While 
real estate invariably accounts for the greatest 
share of the overall portfolios of leasing operators, 
                                                     
185 Furthermore, some companies in Arequipa und Cusco 
complained that although the larger banks had branch of-
fices there, they were required to consult with their 
headquarters in Lima on any decision, particularly bea-
ring on credit, and that all further correspondence had to 
be conducted directly with Lima. The consequence, it 
was noted, was a more or less inflexible provision of fi-
nancing arrangements. 
as far as leasing business with SMEs is concerned, 
real estate takes second place to machinery.186 
Finally, it can be noted that nearly all of the com-
panies interviewed are familiar with leasing as a 
concept and have already financed investments 
through leasing or indicate a positive attitude to-
ward leasing. However, we found marked dispari-
ties as far as the use of leasing is concerned: the 
smaller the company is, so it appears, the more 
difficulties it has gaining access to leasing. Fur-
thermore, companies in Cusco or Arequipa are 
faced with far more worse conditions in obtaining 
finance leasing than SMEs located in the capital. 
6.4 The Advantages of Leasing in Theory 
and in Peruvian Reality 
Leasing is seen as offering a number of important 
advantages specifically for SMEs. The present 
chapter looks into whether and to what extent 
these advantages are in fact given. In connection 
with our empirical survey, we asked representa-
tives of both the supply side and the demand side 
for their opinions on certain advantages. Our first 
aim was to determine the importance for compa-
nies of each individual key feature of leasing. Our 
second aim was to work out the conditions under 
which leasing is provided in Peru and to deter-
mine whether and to what extent SMEs are in fact 
in a position to profit from the positive features of 
leasing. 
6.4.1 Access 
Against the background of the cost-intensive and 
limited access to investment borrowing given in 
Peru, leasing is an important source of financing 
for Peruvian SMEs. Company motivation to use 
leasing as an instrument of financing is a reflec-
tion of the limited options available in the Peru-
                                                     
186 One bank affiliated leasing operator explained this with 
reference to the higher investment volumes involved,  
noting that they were beyond the reach of smaller com-
panies. 
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vian financial system. In the view of the compa-
nies interviewed, the main reason why leasing is 
attractive is that it is often the only financing in-
strument available, or that access to it is relatively 
uncomplicated. However, in Peru there are still 
obstacles to a more broadly effective use of leas-
ing, as is shown by the following list of conditions 
for an adequate access to it: 
— The main factor behind the less restrictive 
stance of finance institutions on the provision 
of leasing services to SMEs is as a rule the 
fact that leased assets can serve as security. 
This means that companies that lack suffi-
cient investment capital can in this way gain 
access to outside financing. And, at the same 
time, leasing provides such companies with 
the option of using unencumbered real estate 
etc. to obtain further financing. 
 Our empirical survey clearly indicates that 
companies attach great significance to the as-
pect of asset-unrelated security: the large ma-
jority of our companies saw the possibility of 
using leased assets without having to provide 
any additional security as "very important."187 
But of course theory is not always wholly in 
line with day-to-day practice: roughly half of 
our companies have been asked to provide 
additional security, and on this point there ap-
pears to be no clear-cut relation between 
company size and demand for security. It is, 
however, noteworthy that agricultural compa-
nies have been more frequently required to 
provide security unrelated to the asset in ques-
tion than have companies from the textile and 
clothing industry. This fact is due to the view 
of leasing operators that the textile sector is a 
highly promising branch of industry, while the 
agricultural sector involves high risks. 
For their part, leasing operators confirm that 
the risk involved in leasing is lower than that 
involved in credit. But they also point to the 
common Peruvian practice of demanding ad-
ditional security from customers. The reasons 
cited for this practice include the high default 
                                                     
187 43 of 48 companies share this view. 
risk of small and medium-sized companies 
and the limited possibilities available to les-
sors to recover the value of leased assets in 
cases of default. For lack of adequate secon-
dary markets, leasing operators fear that they 
will be unable to recover the market value of a 
leased asset in cases of customer insolvency. 
— The generally greater ease of access to leas-
ing is furthermore bound up with the type of 
risk analysis on which the financial transac-
tion is based. As a rule, future-oriented finan-
cial information plays a more important role 
here than past company performance data: in 
making decisions on leasing contracts, the an-
ticipated cash flow is more important than a 
company's capital base and past credit ratings. 
This is a relevant aspect especially for young 
companies that have no past credit rating and 
often have a relatively thin equity position. 
A majority of the companies interviewed see a 
future-oriented risk analysis as adequate and 
extremely useful. But in practice investor risk 
assessment is rarely transparent. Many com-
panies see risk analysis as a kind of black box 
and are unsure of what providers are actually 
interested in knowing. In most cases providers 
simply demand to see all company data. It is, 
however, clear that anticipated cash flows are 
given insufficient attention in risk analysis. 
Over half of the companies that operate with 
leasing claim that there is no difference be-
tween leasing contracts and bank loans as far 
as the requirement to provide company data is 
concerned, or that in both cases cash flow and 
past credit rating are of equal significance. 
Our interviews with leasing operators confirm 
this observation. Even though most leasing 
operators see the factor of cash flow as very 
important, it is only in rare cases that this fac-
tor plays a crucial role in the final decision. 
Not one leasing operators accepts cash flow as 
the sole and decisive indicator, and for many 
providers a negative past credit rating and/or a 
weak capital base are exclusion criteria. Bank-
affiliated leasing operators state, though, that 
it is not absolutely essential for a leasing cus-
tomer to be a client of the bank in question 
New Financing Instruments for Long-term Investments of SMEs – The Case of Peru 61
when a contact is finalized. It is, however, 
crucial that the company in question does not 
have a negative record with the central Peru-
vian credit-rating agency, Infocorp, the SBS, 
or suppliers. 
— Another feature that is often seen as facilitat-
ing access to leasing are the rapid processing 
and decision-making procedures involved 
in the process.188 The fact that a leased asset 
remains the property of the provider during 
the contract period facilitates risk analysis 
and speeds up contract procedures. This saves 
time and means relatively low transaction 
costs for the lessee. 
The large majority of demanders regard it as 
very positive that leasing contracts can be 
concluded without undue delay. Most compa-
nies already experienced in leasing confirm 
that this financing instrument is in fact pro-
vided with less delay than conventional bank 
loans. Only one fifth of our interviewees 
claimed that in this respect there is no differ-
ence between leasing and bank loans. Fur-
thermore, several companies indicated that the 
speed of contract processing differs greatly 
from leasing operator to leasing operator. 
An interesting fact in this connection is that 
independent and bank-affiliated leasing opera-
tors have very different perceptions of the 
time needed to implement leasing contracts. 
All of our independent leasing operators claim 
that leasing services are provided far more 
quickly than bank loans. Two thirds of our 
bank-affiliated providers note that although 
leasing may not be faster, it is at least easier to 
obtain than a bank loan. In contrast to the 
bank-affiliated leasing operators, the inde-
pendent leasing companies proved to be very 
accurately informed on processing times. 
Banks normally refer the decision process and 
risk analysis for leasing transactions to their 
central risk-appraisal department, which ren-
ders the overall process more time-consuming 
and less transparent. 
                                                     
188 Cf. IFC (1996), p. 10. 
— Another factor that makes leasing an effective 
and more easily accessible instrument of fi-
nancing is – compared to investment loans – 
the low minimum amount at which a leasing 
operator is willing to conclude a contract. 
This makes it possible for companies to meet 
low-volume financing needs. It is also impor-
tant to note here that many companies are in-
terested in leasing used goods for reasons of 
cost. If the minimum volumes set for a leas-
ing contract are too high, this type of financ-
ing is often not an option. 
The minimum leasing volumes demanded by 
providers in Peru range from USD 10.000 to 
50.000. Only in exceptional cases are contracts 
concluded under USD 10.000. Yet in some 
cases, e.g. leasing agreements on used machin-
ery, this lower limit is too high, and in many 
cases this puts an end to financing plans. 
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6.4.2 Financial Margins 
Another advantage associated with leasing is the 
fact that this instrument constitutes less of a bur-
den on company financial margins than other 
forms of financing, especially when the concern is 
to finance long-term investments. This aspect is of 
great significance mainly for SMEs in developing 
countries, which have very limited access to long-
term capital and lack sufficient resources of their 
own. 
— In industrialized countries these improved 
financial margins are due above all to the fact 
that leasing companies as a rule finance 
100 % of leasing assets and do not require 
the lessee to provide a deposit. Unlike the ca-
se of self-financing or bank financing, this 
approach does not burden a company with an 
immediate cash outflow, a factor which low-
ers the high risk of insolvency in particular at 
the outset of a project. 
Box 3: América Leasing S.A. – an SME oriented Leasing Company 
América Leasing S.A. was founded in Lima in 1995 as an independent leasing company. With its assets of USD 
51.7 and a contract portfolio worth USD 647 million, the company ranks 12th among Peruvian leasing operators. 
América Leasing has a market share of 3.7 % of the overall Peruvian leasing market and a 6.9 % share of special-
ized leasing business. With its 7.1 % return on equity, the company is distinctly above the market average 
(4.5 %). In 2001 América Leasing successfully concluded a due diligence process with the IIC, which provided it 
with a five-year credit line on international terms. This credit makes it possible for América Leasing to further 
diversify its sources of financing and enhance its competitiveness. 
América Leasing is by far the strongest of the 23 SME-oriented leasing operators active in the Peruvian market. 
According to its managing director, SMEs account for 90 % of the company's customers and 83 % of its business 
volume; the figures for small companies are 70 % and 48 %, respectively. The definition used here is the same as 
that on which the present study is based. The company's portfolio of leasing contracts is highly diversified and 
spread mainly across the sectors of industry, trade, transportation, and services. Its positive risk diversification is 
mirrored in the types of leasing assets it finances, the most important of which are real estate, industrial equip-
ment, and vehicles. With its average contract value of USD 86.000, América Leasing is far below the Peruvian 
market average of USD 222.000. The minimum contract volume set by the company is USD 10.000, though in 
exceptional cases it is prepared to accept lower amounts. 
The leasing contracts offered by América Leasing are in many respects more attractive than those of most of its 
competitors. The lessee is free to decide whether his contract is denominated in domestic or foreign currency. The 
leasing contracts as a rule have terms ranging from two to five years, and in some cases up to eight years. The 
company demands asset-unrelated security from only 15-20 % of its clients, and requires deposits averaging 
20 %. Moreover, América Leasing's management attaches great significant to intensive contact with its customers 
and visits them on a regular basis. It also sends information to its clients every three months. Every six months 
América Leasing calls in balance information from its customers in order to keep track of their financial situation. 
América Leasing takes a proactive stance on services, offering its customers both accounting and management 
support and advice on the financing instruments and leasing assets most appropriate for them. 
Another positive feature of América Leasing's activities is the advanced state of the IT solutions it offers. By 
using software it has developed itself, América Leasing has managed to keep its administrative costs relatively 
low, even for low-volume leasing contracts. It is also the only Peruvian provider that has a detailed and informa-
tive website that permits clients to concluded certain contracts online. 
On the whole, the case of América Leasing illustrates that leasing services optimized for SMEs can offer advan-
tages for both sides. Its customers can profit from the enhanced services offered by América Leasing, including 
more advisory services and intensive support. For América Leasing itself, business is highly profitable on account 
of its higher margins, a fact mirrored in the company's success. Seen in overall economic terms, the company 
contributes to creating favorable conditions for the development of SMEs and the formalization of companies in 
this group. 
Source: Interviews with the managing director of América Leasing on 03 July 2002 and 25 April 2002; América Leasing 
(2001). 
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Most of our interviewees (some 90 %) regard 
100 % financing as an important or highly 
important element of leasing.189 However, 
only one third of the companies that have al-
ready made use of leasing have been able to 
finance 100 % of their investments; and the 
majority of companies interviewed were 
asked to provide a deposit ranging from 10-
40 % of the value of the assets to be leased 
(the average being 20 %). 
According to our leasing operators, only in 
rare cases is 100 % of a leasing asset fi-
nanced, and the average deposit required var-
ies between 20 and 30 %. The reason cited by 
leasing operators for their need to ask for a 
deposit is that in a country like Peru, in which 
secondary markets are underdeveloped and 
economic development is subject to sharp 
fluctuations, deposits constitute an important 
component of risk-reduction strategies. Fur-
thermore, for a minority of our interviewees 
deposits are an important signal of client 
commitment that mirror lessee confidence in a 
planned investment. 
— Another key feature of leasing, one which 
increases company financial margins, is a 
level of flexibility of contractual arrange-
ments that is generally not given in conven-
tional credit agreements. This offers compa-
nies the option of adapting both leasing rates 
and time frames to their individual financing 
needs. This means, for instance, that a com-
pany whose sales are dependent on seasonal 
factors can opt for a leasing contract stipulat-
ing high rates for high-revenue months, and 
vice-versa. And this makes it possible to a-
void liquidity bottlenecks at given periods of 
an investment. 
It became clear in the course of the study that 
companies that have not yet made use of leas-
ing place more emphasis on flexible contrac-
tual arrangements than companies that already 
have experience with this financing instru-
                                                     
189 The responses possible were "very important", "important", 
or "unimportant". 
ment. One possible explanation could be that 
companies that have already made use of leas-
ing are generally in a better financial situation 
than others and therefore less dependent on 
this flexibility. The results of the survey 
showed that leasing has been flexibly adapted, 
in one way or another, for roughly half of the 
companies in the sample. In most cases this 
flexibility meant leasing rates adjusted for 
seasonal factors. It is, however, noteworthy 
that one quarter of the companies interviewed 
were unaware of the theoretical possibility of 
flexible contractual arrangements. 
Two thirds of our supply-side leasing opera-
tors claim to be highly flexible in their con-
tractual arrangements. They spoke of season-
ally adjusted rates and the possibility of inter-
est-free start-up years. But our providers also 
pointed out that this flexibility is restricted to 
the period until a leasing contract takes effect. 
Once the contract is finalized, it is no longer 
possible to alter its terms. If the lessee fails to 
make payments, the lessor is entitled to repos-
sess the leased asset. 
6.4.3 Cost Advantage 
Costs are one of the most important factors in-
volved in any kind of financing. Leasing is often 
said to be a more a more economical form of 
financing than borrowing. 
Fifty percent of the persons interviewed for the 
present study confirmed that in their case leasing 
turned out to be more inexpensive than a compa-
rable bank loan. But it was also often pointed out 
that the cost advantage of leasing must be sought 
not in the instrument's price or interests costs but 
in the tax breaks it offers. In cases where leasing 
has turned out to be more costly than a compara-
ble bank loan, companies have still opted for leas-
ing because their applications for credit-based 
financing were rejected by banks. 
On the supply side we find one significant differ-
ence between the statements made by bank-
affiliated and independent leasing operators. 
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Without exception, the independent leasing opera-
tors indicate that leasing is less costly than a nor-
mal bank loan. If companies did not have the pos-
sibility to write off the interest share of a finance 
leasing transaction, there would be no price dif-
ferential between it and a bank loan. 
Some of the possible cost advantages of leasing 
are thus due to non-interest elements that were 
analyzed in the framework of the present study: 
— Peru's tax framework plays a key role in 
making leasing more attractive and in lower-
ing costs. A large majority of the companies 
that have already made use of leasing under-
line that tax-related aspects are one of the 
most important motives to opt for leasing as a 
means of financing investments. But it is also 
noteworthy that the other companies inter-
viewed were far less familiar with this aspect 
of leasing. There is a great need for informa-
tion and publicity work here if leasing is to 
become better known as an interesting alter-
native means of financing. 
— A further cost advantage can result from the 
fact that due to their bargaining power vis-à-
vis manufacturers, leasing operators are in a 
position to obtain more favorable terms for 
the purchase, maintenance, and insurance of 
leasing assets than companies themselves. 
In Peru, however, most of the leasing offered is 
finance leasing or operate leasing.190 What this 
means is that maintenance of a leased asset is not 
part of the services provided by the leasing opera-
tor, who thus assumes no responsibility for this 
aspect. Even in the procurement of leasing assets 
Peruvian leasing operators show little initiative: 
only in rare cases does a leasing operator negoti-
ate directly with a wholesaler. The consequence is 
that lessees benefit neither from low procurement 
costs not from better conditions on equipment 
maintenance. 
                                                     
190 See Chapter 3.3 for a discussion of the different forms of 
leasing available. 
6.4.4 Medium- and long-term Financing 
As a rule the term leasing refers to the medium- to 
long-term 'rental' of capital goods. In view of the 
generally short terms of loans granted in Peru, the 
terms provided for leasing play a significant role 
for the companies concerned. The average terms 
for leasing agreements on movable capital goods 
named by the companies interviewed ranged be-
tween two and five years; and the contracts con-
cluded for immovable capital goods specified 
terms ranging on average between five and eight 
years. Most of the companies interviewed see 
these terms, which are in line with the minimum 
terms set by law, as appropriate.191 Roughly one 
third of our interview partners would, however, 
prefer longer-term leasing contracts. In the agro-
industrial sector in particular, five years are often 
not sufficient to cover a project cycle. 
The information provided by leasing operators on 
the average terms of leasing contracts confirms 
the information given by the demand side. It is 
noteworthy that a bank that, owing to the terms set 
out under the so-called convenio de estabilidad,192 
is not obliged to comply with the legal regulations 
on minimum periods in fact offers contracts with 
shorter terms than both other banks and independ-
ent leasing operators. Still, leasing continues to be 
the preferred instrument for financing medium- to 
long-term investments. 
6.4.5 Additional Services 
Finally, compared with classic bank loans, leasing 
often entails the provision of additional services, 
which might include support for company man-
agement, accounting, or marketing activities. 
Family-run companies, for instance, often tend to 
neglect some important business aspects, includ-
ing accounting. The external support provided by 
a leasing operator can contribute to formalizing 
such firms and enhancing their market capability. 
                                                     
191 See Chapter 6.2 for a discussion of the minimum terms 
set by law for leasing. 
192 See Box 2. 
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Companies that have not yet made use of leasing 
as a rule also see these additional services as a 
helpful and desirable element as long as the costs 
they entail remain at reasonable levels. Only a few 
of the companies interviewed were reticent and 
showed no interest in company support elements, 
preferring to manage their company's leasing af-
fairs themselves. The survey furthermore found 
that only a limited number of the companies that 
already have experience with leasing have been 
offered any additional services. Most of them 
have not even considered the possibility of accept-
ing management, accounting, or marketing sup-
port from their leasing operator. 
7 Summary of the Study's Empirical 
Results, and Conclusions 
The conclusions and recommendations presented 
in this chapter are based on the following findings 
of our company survey: 
— Even in a Peruvian setting that was found to 
be not particularly dynamic, we identified a 
number of companies in the SME segment 
that are marked by both great potential and 
high levels of investment activity. 
— But these companies are unable to grow sus-
tainably as long as they do not have an ade-
quate access to capital that permits them to 
meet their financing needs. 
— Targeted promotion of SMEs would enable 
this business segment to take advantage of its 
comparative advantages and develop into a 
mainstay of the Peruvian economy. The in-
struments of venture capital and leasing dis-
cussed in the present study have an important 
role to play here. 
The study's findings are meant to serve as an ac-
tion orientation for the provision of a set of fi-
nancing instruments geared to the needs of SMEs. 
As discussed below, the addressees include both 
the Peruvian government and actors from the pri-
vate sector and development cooperation. 
7.1 Promotion of the Venture-Capital 
Market 
As the empirical study shows, venture capital 
represents, in the view of the companies inter-
viewed, a reasonable alternative means of financ-
ing capital investments. On the one hand, venture 
capital can be used to strengthen their equity base, 
and on the other hand companies can in this way 
make use of the advisory and support services 
provided by fund managers. The fact that the 
SMEs interviewed showed themselves to be rela-
tively open to a more stringent requirement to 
provide company information as well as to accept 
the control function of an external financier stands 
in contrast to the assumption of the supply side 
that many companies would reject these condi-
tions. Moreover, a large number of the companies 
interviewed indicated that they were in a position 
to meet the high earnings expectations of funds 
(20-30 %). Their willingness to accept outside 
investors is accordingly high and permits the con-
clusion that the establishment of a venture-capital 
market could set important development incen-
tives in the SME segment. 
However, in the view of the supply-side actors 
interviewed, there are three central obstacles to 
the development of a venture-capital market: 
— the tax framework, 
— the low number of capital investment compa-
nies with sufficient experience and institu-
tional backing, and 
— the limited exit options available. 
Above and beyond these concerns expressed by 
the actors involved, the results of the study point 
to a fourth serious bottleneck that constitutes a 
drag on the development of the venture-capital 
market: both the number of investors expressing 
interest in investing in a venture-capital fund and 
the levels of the investment volumes under dis-
cussion indicate that the number of institutional 
investors active in the Peruvian venture-capital 
market are insufficient to guarantee any sustain-
able provision of venture capital. On the whole, 
only four to six institutional investors showed 
active interest in the concept. Adding up these 
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potential commitments of capital, we arrive at a 
figure of max. USD 30-40 million that would be 
available to set up venture-capital funds, a figure 
that would – assuming a uniform orientation of 
investor interests – suffice to establish two funds. 
To overcome these bottlenecks, both the Peruvian 
government and bilateral DC could focus on a 
number of different fields of action indicated by 
the weaknesses diagnosed above: 
Adequate Tax Framework 
As opposed to natural persons, venture-capital 
funds should not be subject to income tax and 
should instead have a neutral status in tax terms. 
The criticism of the present tax system voiced by 
our interviewees focuses in particular on two 
points: 
— Current tax practices lower the profitability of 
venture-capital funds, placing them at a dis-
advantage compared with other capital in-
vestments. This must be emphasized in par-
ticular in view of the fact that interest and 
capital gains realized in the stock market are 
temporarily exempt from taxation.193 
— Positive experiences have been made in other 
countries like Chile, Uruguay, or Venezuela, 
in which funds have a only channeling func-
tion and are themselves not obliged to pay 
taxes. This is in line with the recommenda-
tions of the IFC.194 
New legislation currently under discussion could 
provide clarity and encourage the development of 
venture-capital funds. The proposed legislation 
would require investors to declare their capital 
gains as income. Funds, on the other hand, would 
be tax-exempt and have only a channeling func-
tion. This arrangement would also contribute to 
the development of a clear-cut and stable system 
                                                     
193 See Texto del Impuesto a la Renta (Decreto Supremo N° 
774), Article 19. This exemption is in force until 31 Dec. 
2002, though it is expected to be extended. 
194 Cf. Carter (1995), pp. 14f. 
of tax legislation by ruling out the possibility of 
double taxation (on investor and fund alike), 
which has thus far been avoided on the basis of 
temporary – and regularly renewed – tax exemp-
tions. It would thus be important for this bill to be 
passed as soon as possible. 
Capital Market Development 
The further three obstacles named above are an 
expression of Peru's' relatively shallow and un-
derdeveloped capital market. A functioning capi-
tal market is the sine qua non for any broadly 
effective use of venture capital. Efforts geared 
deepening this market and rendering it more effi-
cient contribute to reducing these impediments. In 
general terms, the following measures can con-
tribute to promoting the capital market: 
— First, it would be possible to continue on with 
the most recent approaches aimed at integrat-
ing new issuers, like trade in low-volume pa-
pers (valores de emisión no masiva), stepped-
up issues of government bonds, and revision 
of the framework for short-term papers. 
— Second, it would be possible to take steps 
toward improving investor protection, e.g. by 
unifying the criteria used to rate securities 
and by revising the legal corporate frame-
work for listed companies. 
— Third, it would be essential to guarantee more 
liquidity on the stock market. Possible ap-
proaches here would include the introduction 
of after-hours trading and adjustment of the 
guarantees required for short-term papers. 
Aside from these general recommendations, it 
would be important to introduce some additional 
measures specifically geared to overcoming the 
above-named obstacles. These will be outlined in 
what follows. 
Enlargement of the Number of Institu-
tional Investors 
The currently limited number of institutional in-
vestors is a factor detrimental to the establishment 
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of venture-capital funds. Three points could be 
addressed in this connection to create a viable 
base of investors: 
— Even though reform of Peru's pension system 
has provided an important impulse toward di-
versifying country's institutional landscape, the 
AFPs continue to constitute a quasi-oligopoly, 
in particular as far as long-term financial in-
vestments are concerned. This de facto con-
centration of financial resources on four insti-
tutions makes the establishment of a venture-
capital fund contingent on the investment deci-
sions taken by the AFPs. Furthermore, in view 
of the present lack of any other long-term sav-
ings products and the obligatory character of 
pension payments, the control of long-term 
private savings by pension funds is an impor-
tant factor involved here. One possible ap-
proach to promoting a future diversification of 
institutional investors would entail the reform 
of the national pension system. What is 
called for here is viable measures aimed at 
bringing about a more flexible and less con-
centrated investment of pension contributions 
and at the same time stimulating private sav-
ing. One conceivable approach would be the 
introduction of a second, voluntary pillar of 
the pension system; the resources involved 
could be administered by specialized financial 
institutions, for instance on the model of the 
US 401(k) Plan (Box 4). Other approaches 
aimed at stimulating private saving have been 
implemented e.g. in Chile and Mexico. In 
Chile tax breaks are granted for certain forms 
of investment, including voluntary contribu-
tions to the country's private pension system 
and home loan and savings contracts. Mexico's 
Patronato de Ahorro Personal is a program 
for small savers that guarantees savers a posi-
tive rate of interest if they meet certain condi-
tions, e.g. regular payments into the program. 
Another possible incentive could be a lottery 
linked with contribution payments: starting at 
a certain minimum amount, the contributor 
automatically becomes a player in a lottery, 
and the sums won are directly remitted to the 
winner's savings account.195 
— Furthermore, government can also assume a 
greater role as an investor in the venture-
capital market by boosting the development 
of the market with the aid of special vehicles 
of investment. One promising approach 
would be the creation of a fund that invests 
exclusively in private venture-capital funds 
operating in Peru. This so-called fund-to-
fund financing operates on a principle ana-
logous to the indirect financing of end 
customers practiced by COFIDE. It is not 
least due to this parallelism that COFIDE 
                                                     
195 Cf. Repetto (2001), pp. 227 - 232. 
Box 4: The 401(k)Plan – Private Pension Arrangements in the US 
Since the early 1980s the so-called 401(k) Plan has been the most important pillar of the private pension 
system in the US. The term 401(k) refers to a section in the US tax code that permits employed persons to 
pay a certain share of their gross wages or salaries (in 2000 the maximum amount was USD 10.500 p.a.) 
into a private pension fund of their choice. 
As a rule, the funds start to pay when a participant has reached the age of 60, and the sums paid out are 
taxable. In hardship cases, participants are permitted to tap their balances at an prior to maturity. Further-
more, participants are entitled to borrow, at their own discretion, a share of the capital they have saved. 
In 1998 34.6 % of US households had a 401(k) account with an average balance of USD 57.220. The aver-
age participant pays 6.7% of his gross wage or salary into this private pension plan. As a rule, employers 
also participate in the plan, though their contribution (2-5 %) is distinctly lower than it is in conventional 
pension plans. The volume of the 410(k) Plan has grown constantly since its inception in 1981, increasing 
from USD 41.5 million in 1986 to a figure of USD 142.6 million in 1990, USD 486 million in 1996, and 
USD 1.2 billion in 2000. 
Source: Gesichertes Leben, [www.gesichertesleben.de/archiv/rente/791971302133923840.html], (accessed on: 21 May 
2002); 401k.com, [www.401k.com/401k/pfp/rp/fringe.htm], (accessed on: 21May 2002); and IG Metall(2001), p. 12 
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would appear to be well suited to administer a 
fund of this type. COFIDE has recently re-
viewed various instruments suited to promot-
ing the venture-capital market and is now 
convinced of the advantages involved in fully 
financing and administering such a fund pat-
terned on semi-governmental agencies e.g. 
from Germany (KfW) and the US (SBA). To 
boost the instrument's effectiveness and to 
signal its intentions, a higher-level fund 
should be entitled to assume investment obli-
gations totaling up to 33 % of another fund's 
total assets. However, COFIDE's authority to 
establish a fund on its own responsibility is 
limited, and it is at present unlikely the MEF 
itself will provide the financial resources re-
quired. Here, multi- and bilateral financial 
cooperation institutions could provide an im-
portant contribution by making available cer-
tain shares of the resources needed to estab-
lish a higher-level fund. 
— Clear-cut regulations on the investment 
rights of public institutions that could act as 
investors could provide a further impulse to-
ward diversifying the investor landscape in 
Peru. A revision of the country's investment 
regulations is anticipated in the near future. 
At present public institutions are required to 
invest 70 % of their assets in deposits offer-
ing the highest possible interest rate deter-
mined by a call for bids. There are no con-
crete regulations covering the use of the re-
maining 30 %. When the regulations are re-
vised, it would be desirable to provide for the 
possibility of public institutions to invest in 
venture-capital funds. Even though conserva-
tive investment strategies are appropriate for 
public institutions, which often lack sufficient 
expertise in investment management, this ap-
proach could generate more interest in new 
forms of  investment. By hiring specialized 
fund managers and introducing a more com-
plex form of portfolio analysis geared to ex-
amining the papers available in the invest-
ment market, public institutions could begin 
to play a more active role in the capital mar-
ket. 
Development of Human Capital 
As far as the low number of fund managers avail-
able in the Peruvian market is concerned, greater 
investor demand for higher-risk and higher-yield 
investment opportunities is the best means to en-
sure the development of the human capital needed 
to strengthen capital investment companies. Aside 
from this, joint efforts undertaken by government 
decision-makers and bi- and multilateral devel-
opment cooperation can contribute to popularizing 
the concept of venture capital and providing the 
relevant actors with the know-how they need. 
Other promising approaches include seminars, 
practice-oriented visits abroad, and other commu-
nication-related instruments like the setup of an 
Internet platform that facilitates contacts between 
investors and capital-seeking businesspeople. One 
good example of concrete support for the training 
of fund managers is offered by the Chilean devel-
opment bank CORFO, which funds advanced 
training seminars for fund employees in the US or 
invites experts to the country to conduct advanced 
training measures. The IADBcommitments to 
Peru include a training component for the finan-
cial sector that could be utilized for this purpose. 
Startup Initiatives and Improvement of the 
Administration of Peruvian Companies 
Looking at the last-named obstacle, limited exit 
options, there exists as far as IPOs are concerned a 
possibility to reduce the transaction costs which 
are connected with the access to the stock ex-
change. However, creation of a new segment of 
the stock exchange for trade in papers of young or 
smaller companies appears unrealistic, at least at 
present. 
As regards the possibility of buybacks, the poten-
tial investors interviewed expressed doubts as to 
whether the companies concerned had the critical 
mass needed. Many Peruvian companies, it was 
noted, have been unable to meet growth expecta-
tions and lacked the administrative structure 
required for a venture-capital investment. Here, 
political decision-makers have three principle 
options for action: 
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— First, the state could directly promote start-up 
initiatives, e.g. by fostering and supporting 
incubators or business development or start-
up centers. One point of departure here would 
be the country's 70 universities, though care 
should be taken to select universities that of-
fer high-quality and practice-oriented courses 
of study. 
— Second, SME administration and manage-
ment can be provided support through busi-
ness development services. Here, support 
programs are already being conducted by 
German and bilateral donors. 
— Third, seminars tailored to the needs of inter-
ested businesspeople that can at the same 
time facilitate contacts between suppliers and 
demanders of capital. 
7.2 Promotion of Leasing as a Financing 
Instrument for SMEs 
The present study's findings on the Peruvian leas-
ing market lead to the following central conclu-
sions: 
— Leasing is an effective instrument that per-
mits SMEs in developing countries to procure 
medium- to long-term resources for their in-
vestments. 
— In Peru leasing is already widely dissemi-
nated among medium-sized companies, 
though the instrument is not yet widely used 
by smaller companies. 
— Some of the advantages widely attributed to 
leasing for SMEs were not confirmed for Peru. 
Proceeding from these findings, the present study 
recommends the following approaches to increas-
ing the use made by SMEs of the instrument of 
leasing and better adapting the "product" to the 
needs of SMEs. 
Greater Dissemination of Leasing Among 
SMEs – the Quantitative Aspect 
Promising approaches to further disseminating 
leasing among SMEs should focus on the gov-
ernment and DC levels as well as on the market 
actors themselves. 
The basic condition of any sustainable SME sup-
port policy is reliable information on the group 
targeted by the policy as well as on its signifi-
cance and regional distribution. In Peru, however, 
there is no viable, unified database available on 
SMEs. A valid definition of the segment formu-
lated at the government, ministerial, level would 
contribute to clarifying the picture. Furthermore, 
the relevant government actors could undertake 
more, and more targeted, efforts than they have in 
the past to collect and statistically evaluate rele-
vant data. The financial intermediaries of the SBS 
could be called upon to meet their obligation to 
break down their portfolio in terms of customer 
size. As far as leasing is concerned, this would 
make it possible to come up with reliable data on 
the SME orientation of individual providers, and 
this in turn could serve as a basis for defining 
concrete support measures, e.g. measures aimed at 
facilitating refinancing. 
What is called for to alleviate the current uncer-
tainty among the actors interviewed as regards the 
present legal framework and its tax implications 
is an analysis of the burdens of individual compa-
nies and the allocative effects of the new deprecia-
tion regulations. In general, international experi-
ences have shown that tax incentives substantially 
boost the willingness of leasing operators to ex-
pand their operations to include SMEs. It should 
at the same time be noted that such incentives do 
not necessarily mean a reduction of tax revenues, 
since they for the most part lead to a dispropor-
tionate increase in the absolute values of transac-
tions. To create an environment that is conducive 
to leasing and poses no additional uncertainties 
for market actors, Peru should therefore imple-
ment a legal framework that provides for adequate 
tax benefits, applies equally for all leasing opera-
tors, and is set to remain in force for a longer pe-
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riod of time. The present tax framework should be 
reviewed with this in mind. 
Leasing operators are forced to rely on adequate 
refinancing mechanisms, and these are limited in 
Peru. It can thus be said that the issue of refinanc-
ing constitutes a serious constraining factor for 
independent leasing operators and a high barrier 
to the market entry of new providers. This is also 
indicated by the low number of providers in gen-
eral and the low number of independent providers 
in particular encountered in the Peruvian market. 
As the present study has shown, independent leas-
ing operators tend to be more SME-oriented than 
bank-affiliated providers. Against this back-
ground, the government side or the donor side 
could create alternative means of refinancing with 
appropriate security arrangements. This would 
facilitate the market entry of additional independ-
ent leasing operators and enable bank-affiliated 
providers already active in the market to expand 
their operations. And this in turn would entail 
positive effects on the intensity of competition in 
the Peruvian leasing market and at the same time 
broaden the scope of leasing for SMEs. 
In their promotion of leasing institutions, bi- and 
multilateral financial cooperation organizations 
should focus on medium-size leasing operators. 
The reason why this appears appropriate is that 
this category of leasing operators is large enough 
to be able to operate cost-effectively, without 
being hampered by the typical bank structures that 
restrict flexibility and close customer relations. 
Another issue closely bound up with refinancing 
is a framework that permits and promotes the 
formation of strategic alliances with foreign ma-
nufacturers and financial institutions. Above and 
beyond a broadened refinancing potential, this 
approach may also entail a transfer of knowledge, 
for instance concerning novel or innovative deci-
sion-making mechanisms in the leasing business. 
Finally, deficits in accounting and company man-
agement in the SME segment constitute an obsta-
cle to an expansion of leasing to include small 
companies. By instituting and promoting business 
development services (BDS), government agen-
cies could contribute to closing this formalization 
gap. 
Looking at the relevant market actors, we find that 
the risk associated with SMEs constitutes an ob-
stacle to any expansion of leasing to include 
SMEs. One way to address this increased risk 
would be to work for closer and more open coop-
eration between leasing operators and their cli-
ents. From the perspective of providers, close 
customer relations not only give rise to customer 
loyalty, they also are conducive to obtaining better 
information on the circumstances of client com-
panies. And this can render risk analysis more 
transparent than it has been in the past. At present 
companies see risk analysis, particularly that con-
ducted by banks, as a kind of black box, which 
makes it as good as impossible for them to com-
prehend certain decisions with which they are 
faced. Open cooperation in advance of decisions 
and, if worse comes to worse, a reasoned, "con-
structive" rejection may provide customers with a 
chance to eliminate their weak points, and this in 
turn can contribute to company formalization. 
More transparent decision-making mechanisms 
should be accompanied by a greater range of ad-
visory and support services provided by leasing 
operators. This can help customers to improve 
their financial management and make their ac-
counting more transparent. 
Adjustment of Leasing to the Needs of 
SMEs – the Qualitative Aspect 
The present study's findings indicate that the leas-
ing agreements offered in Peru lack, or are defi-
cient in, certain elements which are commonly 
regarded as typical of leasing. We are thinking 
here in particular of three elements of leasing 
contracts that run counter to the needs of SMEs: 
— Leasing operators often demand guarantees 
and a deposit. 
— Decisions on contracts take insufficient con-
sideration of the cash flows of potential cli-
ents. 
— Access to leasing is often too slow and lacks 
sufficient flexibility. 
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Development of the markets for used goods. 
One reason cited by the leasing operators inter-
viewed for their need to demand additional guar-
antees and deposits is the insufficient size and 
specialization of the Peruvian market for used 
goods. This factor is due on the one hand to the 
size of the Peruvian economy on the whole and on 
the other hand to the weakness of the economy in 
recent years. There is little that can be done to 
alter this picture or to counter the major loss of a 
value to which goods are subject once they have 
been purchased. Both government and market 
actors can, however, take certain measures to al-
leviate this effect. 
The government side can work to reduce informa-
tion asymmetries and improve the flow of informa-
tion in used-goods markets. These markets are gen-
erally highly intransparent. In Germany, for in-
stance, creation of a fair for used machinery has 
substantially increased market transparency.196 Fur-
thermore, Internet platforms can be used to bring 
supply and demand more into line. In recent years 
the Internet has become an indispensable market-
place for used goods – though the quality and user 
friendliness of supplier websites often leave much to 
be desired. A competition on the design of a central 
Internet platform could help to reduce such deficits. 
For their part, market participants should give 
more thought to the option of used goods. This 
can work to the benefit of both sides: the lower 
risk of depreciation in the years following the 
purchase of a good can compensate a leasing op-
erator for the additional costs he incurs in assess-
ing the quality of a good and make it possible for 
the lessee to cut his procurement costs. Moreover, 
it may prove advantageous for a leasing operator 
to retire from the strict role of financier and as-
sume a more active role in sales negotiations be-
tween manufacturer and lessee. Thanks to his 
market power, the leasing operator is in a position 
either to obtain a more favorable price or to in-
duce a manufacturer to agree to a repurchase 
guarantee for a given period of time. 
                                                     
196 Cf. Fleig (2000), p. 274. 
Consideration of the Factor of Cash Flow 
in Decisions on Leasing Contracts 
As far as decisions on leasing contracts are con-
cerned, there is little of the often-touted future-
oriented character of leasing to be seen in Peru. 
Whether and to what extent leasing operators can 
be induced to show more flexibility toward their 
customers in this regard depends in large measure 
on competitive pressures in the market, but also 
on the information provided by clients on the po-
tentials and chances offered by leasing. The latter 
could, for instance, be addressed in workshops 
conducted by the chambers of commerce for in-
terested businesspeople. 
Simplification and Acceleration of Access 
As an instrument, leasing is relatively easy to 
manage and entails lower risk than other financing 
instruments. However, the present study was un-
able to confirm the expectation that, at least for 
standard goods, decision procedures would be 
briefer than they are for bank loans. Furthermore, 
and in keeping with Peru's centralist structure, 
leasing services are largely concentrated in Lima. 
Both leasing operators and their clients can con-
tribute to accelerating the decision-making proc-
ess. A leasing client interested in having his leas-
ing application processed promptly should be 
prepared to present a punctual, viable, and reliable 
documentation on his company and his planned 
project. For their part, leasing operators inter-
ested in focusing their business more on SMEs 
can facilitate access regionally by improving their 
presence in the regions and giving their regional 
branch offices more competence to decide on 
leasing contracts. Moreover, bank-affiliated leas-
ing operators are only likely to accelerate the pro-
cedure if leasing contracts are not processed like 
bank loans in a central risk-assessment department 
but instead decided on a decentral basis in re-
gional branch offices. The efforts already under-
taken by some leasing operators to standardize 
and simplify leasing contracts as a means of both 
speeding up procedures and reducing costs should 
be further pursued. 
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To conclude, the present study's goal was to work 
out and present a conceptual contribution on the 
assessment and promotion of alternative instru-
ments of investment financing for SMEs. The 
study's aim was in particular to examine whether 
and under what conditions leasing and venture 
capital are, or can in fact become, effective means 
of financing for the target group, SMEs. In gen-
eral, the two instruments turn out to be well suited 
to financing the investment of SMEs. It is becom-
ing evident that in the medium term venture capi-
tal will reach only a limited number of SMEs, 
though the instrument can provide important im-
pulses that help SMEs to exploit their comparative 
advantages and thus to master the ongoing process 
of structural change. Leasing, on the other hand, is 
better suited for use as a broadly effective financ-
ing instrument that can serve to supply SMEs with 
the long-term financial resources they need and 
reach even the smaller companies of the target 
group. 
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Appendix 1: Possible obstacles to the Development of the Venture-Capital Market in Peru. 
  Response possibilities: “highly relevant”, “relevant”, problem of “low relevance” 
 
Possible obstacles to the Development of the Venture-Capital Market in Peru. 
Response possibilities: “highly relevant”, “relevant”, problem of “low relevance” 
1 Limited fungibility of fund shares 
2 Limited exit options 
3 Legal framework 
4 Tax legislation 
5 Lack of experienced fund managers 
6 Lack of investors 
7 Lack of transparency on the part of entrepreneurs as far as external capital and con-trol are concerned 
8 Lack of company transparency 
9 Lack of enterprises with potential 
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Appendix 2: List of interviews conducted in Peru 
 
Experts (15) 
18-02-02 CONASEV       Carlos Castro, Rodny Rivera 
21-02-02 PROCAPITALES     Daniel Cordova 
21-02-02 Ministerio de Agricultura     Gycs M. Gordon 
22-02-02 Equitas Partners     Omar E. Goyenechea, Isabel Elías 
26-02-02 SNI, Comité de Industria de laConfección  Fernando Carrasco 
26-02-02 SNI, Comité de Industria de Textil   Martín Reaño 
27-02-02 GTZ      Uwe Kleinebrahm, Martha Cruz 
05-03-02 APOYO     Lizardo Miranda, Miguel Angel Zapatero 
07-03-02 Inform@ccion     Fernando Cillóniz 
11-03-02 Enfoca     Enrique Solano 
14-03-02 FOMIN     Fernando Lucano 
19-04-02 SEAF      José Garcia 
23-04-02 VIP      David Ambrosiani 
25-04-02 Estudio Rodrigo, Elías y Asociados   Dr. Juan José Cárdenas 
 
Potential Investors in Venture Capital (15) 
28-02-02 AFP Integra     Gabriel Villalobos 
28-02-02 AFP Horizonte     Pablo Moreyra Almenara 
01-03-02 CAF      Jorge Gartner 
01-03-02 EsSalud     Katherine Bartra 
04-03-02 FMO      Efrain Salas 
04-03-02 Wiese Aetna     Julio Romaní Vadillo 
06-03-02 AFP Profuturo     Guillermo Garrido Lecca 
08-03-02 AFP Unión Vida     Mariano Avarez 
08-03-02 Credifondo     Christian Laub Benavides 
12-03-02 Fondo Mivivienda     Marilú Gonzales 
20-03-02 Interseguros     Guillermo Kocnim  
05-04-02 Pacífico Vida     Katherina Bringas 
05-04-02 ONP      Alberto Medina 
18-04-02 COFIDE     Claudio Higa 
22-04-02 Wiese Sudameris Fondos     Martin Palmer 
 
Leasing operators (11) 
26-02-02 Credi Leasing     Teobaldo Llosa 
26-02-02 Citi Leasing     José Antonio Iturriaga 
27-02-02 Banco Sudamericano     Adolfo Torres 
28-02-02 Wiese Leasing     Javier Ducassi, Gonzalo Tamayo 
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28-02-02 BBVA Banco Continental    Rafael de Vivero Delgado 
01-03-02 Banco Santander Central Hispano   Carlos Cano 
01-03-02 Leasing Total     David A. Nuñez 
05-03-02 Latino Leasing     Carlos Krüger 
06-03-02 Interbank     Claudio Thiermann, Víctor Vinatea 
07-03-02 América Leasing     Mario Ventura 
12-03-02 Banco Financiero     Oscar Albán Velasco 
 
Companies in the Textile and Clothing Sector (31) 
07-03-02 MODIPSA     Víctor Duenas 
07-03-02 Corporación Calex     Farid Issa, Patricia Portalanca 
07-03-02 Creaciones Anahi     Orestes Romero Toledo 
08-03-02 Samitex     Carlos Valdivia 
08-03-02 Creaciones Mariana     Francisco Fernandini 
11-03-02 Confecciones Aaron S.A.     Rosa Días de Arce 
11-03-02 Filasur     Nicolás Abuseda 
12-03-02 Inversiones Comindustria S.A.    Geri Ciabatti 
12-03-02 Textil Oceano     Jorge Villacorta 
13-03-02 Textiles del Sur     Nicolá Sansour 
13-03-02 Romosa     Pablo Lupis 
14-03-02 Textil Koral     Juan Morán Peralta 
14-03-02 Cotton Knit     Sandro Rujo 
14-03-02 Perú Pima     Daniel Varón, Ilona Bialikamien 
15-03-02 Fijesa      Elie Scialom 
18-03-02 El AYNI     José SimonZubieta 
19-02-03 Texfina     Oscar Seattone 
19-02-03 Hilandería Andina     Francisco Obludyner 
19-02-03 Alpacryl     José Luis Vigo 
20-03-02 Marga S.R.L.     Marcia López de Romaña 
21-03-02 Confecciones Mogli     José Mosquera 
21-03-02 Inversiones Alma Viva     Jaime Murga 
22-03-02 Cantex S.A.     José Luis Peroni 
25-03-02 Perypel (Arequipa)     Rosario Flors 
25-03-02 Qori Exports (Arequipa)     Luis Alvarez, Leonor Becerra de Alvarez 
25-03-02 Raymi Reru (Arequipa)     Nelson Mallea 
26-03-02 Europa Textil (Areqipa)     Oscar Davila 
26-03-02 Grupp (Arequipa)     Carlos Grupp 
27-03-02 Fibras Peruanas (Arequipa)    Edilberto Munoz Prado 
01-04-02 Artesania Illary (Cuzco)     Hector Uribalda 
01-04-02 Mayela (Cuzco)     José Luis Dominguez 
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Companies in Agroindustry (17) 
11-03-02 Nuevo Horizonte     Federico Vacari 
13-03-02 TAMBO INCA     Miguel Angel Popolizo 
14-03-02 Fundo de Mango     Carlos Correa 
15-03-02 Athos S.A.     Jorge Checa 
15-03-02 Duna Corporación     Bruno Carlini 
15-03-02 Agrocasa      Juan Arrieta 
18-03-02 Fundo San Hipólito     Luis Alayza 
18-03-02 Agrícola Copacabana     César Peschiera 
19-03-02 Inagro Sur     Adolfo Valle 
25-03-02 El Bosque (Arequipa)     Peter Pollandt 
26-03-02 AgroInca PPX (Arequipa)    Alvaro Delgado 
26-03-02 MC&M Agronegocios (Arequipa)   Sandra del Carpio Benavente 
27-03-02 Alimentos Procesados S.A. (Areqiuipa)  Leonidas Zavala Lazo 
01-04-02 Agroindustrias Andinas SRL (Cuzco)   Jose Luis Aguirre Navarro 
01-04-02 Asociación Agrotrade (Cuzco)    Gustavo San Roman, Marco Olivares Palisa 
01-04-02 Kuski (Cuzco)     Andrés Llosa 
01-04-02 Misky (Cuzco)     Patricia Kross 
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